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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
AMERICAN POLITICS OF A JEWISH JUDEA AND SAMARIA 
by 
Rebekah Israel 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Richard S. Olson, Major Professor 
This dissertation poses a set of six questions about one of the Israel Lobby’s 
particular components, a Potential Christian Jewish coalition (PCJc) within American 
politics that advocates for Israeli sovereignty over “Judea and Samaria” (“the West 
Bank”). The study addresses: the profiles of the individuals of the PCJc; its policy 
positions, the issues that have divided it, and what has prevented, and continues to 
prevent, the coalition from being absorbed into one or more of the more formally 
organized components of the Israel Lobby; the resources and methods this coalition has 
used to attempt to influence U.S. policy on (a) the Middle East, and (b) the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in particular; the successes or failures of this coalition’s advocacy and why it has 
not organized; and what this case reveals about interest group politics and social 
movements in the United States.  
This dissertation follows the descriptive-analytic case-study tradition that 
comprises a detailed analysis of a specific interest group and one policy issue, which 
conforms to my interest in the potential Christian Jewish coalition that supports a Jewish 
Judea and Samaria. I have employed participant observation, interviewing, content 
analysis and documentary research.  
vii 
 
The findings suggest: The PCJc consists of Christian Zionists and mostly Jews of 
the center religious denominations. Orthodox Jewish traditions of separation from 
Christians inhibit like-minded Christians and Jews from organizing. The PCJc opposes an 
Arab state in Judea and Samaria, and is not absorbed into more formally organized 
interest groups that support that policy. The PCJc’s resources consist of support and 
funding from conservatives. Methods include use of education, debates and media. 
Members of the PCJc are successful because they persist in their support for a Jewish 
Judea and Samaria and meet through other organizations around Judeo-Christian values. 
The PCJc is deterred from advocacy and organization by a mobilization of bias from a 
subgovernment in Washington, D.C. comprising Congress, the Executive branch and 
lobby organizations.  The study’s results raise questions about interest group politics in 
America and the degree to which the U.S. political system is pluralistic, suggesting that 
executive power constrains the agenda to “safe” positions it favors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Much has been made, literally for decades, of the putative power and influence in 
U.S. politics of the “Israel Lobby,”1 but that entity is hardly monolithic, and my 
dissertation will answer an interrelated set of six questions about one of its particular 
components, a Christian Jewish potential coalition (PCJc) within American politics that 
advocates for Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, also known as the West Bank.2  
The questions are the following: 
1. What are the profiles of the individuals who constitute this potential coalition? 
2. What are the policy positions that have held this coalition together over time, 
and what issues have divided it? 
3. What has prevented, and continues to prevent, this coalition from being 
absorbed into one or more of the larger and more formally organized 
components of the Israel Lobby? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Israel Lobby is preferred to Jewish Lobby as a more accurate term denoting the disparate elements – 
including Christians, Jews and others – that comprise the entity. Jewish Lobby is used where the cited 
author has chosen that term or where the organization is primarily Jewish in membership.  
 
2 The Christian members of the coalition tend to be those who adhere to orthodox beliefs, namely they tend 
to believe in the following eight measures from James Guth’s study: the virgin birth; the literal existence of 
the Devil; Jesus as the only way to salvation; opposition to gay clergy; Adam and Eve as historical persons; 
rejection of evolution as an explanation for how the universe/world came into being; belief in the inerrancy 
of Scripture; belief in the second coming (2007, 20). The Jewish members are Jewish by rabbinic 
definition, thus, a person is a Jew if his mother is Jewish or if he converted. This is a potential coalition 
because the members are not aware of each other and lack an organizational structure.  Finally, hereafter, 
the Potential Christian Jewish coalition will be referred to as the PCJc. The size of the group this study was 
able to identify as belonging to the PCJc is 28 individuals, obtained on the basis of criteria to be explained 
in the Methodology section. 
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4. How – with what resources and methods – has this coalition attempted to 
influence U.S. policy on (a) the Middle East generally, and (b) the Arab-
Israeli conflict3 in particular? 
5. What appear to have been the successes or failures of this coalition’s 
advocacy and why has it not organized? 
6. What does this case reveal about interest group politics and social movements 
more broadly in the United States? 
The dissertation will be structured to contextualize, develop, and then answer the 
question set.  In so doing, the study is especially interested in the answers to questions 
regarding the individuals of the PCJc in five areas: 1) religious attributes; 2) policy 
positions on a Jewish Judea and Samaria; 3) political attributes and political activity; 4) 
assessments of success or failure during the 2012 presidential election season (before, 
during and after the election); 5) possible reasons why this interest remains unorganized.  
The remainder of Chapter One will place the dissertation and its core questions 
within the American Politics literature on interest groups, and religion and politics, and 
explain its methodological approach.  Chapter Two will define the Judea and Samaria 
issue. Chapter Three will address the nature and profile of the advocacy coalition.  
Chapter Four will explicate in more detail the policy positions of this coalition over time 
and why it possibly remains outside of more formal organizations that advocate on 
Jewish or Israeli issues. Chapter Five will explore the resources and methods that the 
coalition has developed and employed to influence U.S. policy in its areas of interest. 
Chapter Six will assess the apparent successes or failures of the coalition’s influence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The Arab-Israeli conflict is the disagreement over to whom the land of Israel belongs.   
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attempts and why it does not organize. Chapter Seven will sum up the lessons of the 
dissertation for the broader study of interest group politics and social movements in the 
United States. Because the issues that unify and divide the PCJc are complex and often 
context-dependent, their treatment will occur in several of the chapters and will be duly 
highlighted. 
According to a 2008 National Survey of Religion and Politics, the principal 
supporters of Israel are Jews, evangelical Protestants, and Latino Protestants, where it 
was reported that 77 percent of Jews, 55 percent of evangelical Protestants, and 43 
percent of protestant Latinos support Israel over the Palestinians (Guth 2011, 27). I 
therefore expect the membership of the PCJc to be mainly Jewish and evangelical 
Protestant.  Before I define the Christians under study, however, I shall present a brief 
historical differentiation between fundamentalist and evangelical.  
The fundamentalist-modernist dispute of the early twentieth century influenced 
American Protestantism. For most of the 1800s, many Protestants believed that science 
confirmed biblical teaching. When Darwinian biology and scholarly “higher criticism” 
challenged belief in the Bible's authorship and veracity, the American Protestant 
movement split. Mainline Protestant denominations agreed with modernists that 
Christianity should absorb the new scholarship into theology. Fundamentalists continued 
to believe in the “fundamentals” of the Protestant faith, such as the literal truth of the 
Bible. However, eventually, the fundamentalists themselves split. One group, the 
“separatists,” argued that true believers should leave churches that tolerated modernity. 
The other group sought engagement with the world, and became neo-evangelicals. Today 
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that movement is referred to as evangelical, and the separatists remain as fundamentalist 
(Mead 2006). George Marsden and William Svelmoe (2005) note that  
the distinction between fundamentalist and evangelical is not always an easy one 
to make, and what can be said of fundamentalists can often be said, at least in 
part, of some (even most) evangelicals. Nevertheless, the term [fundamentalist] is 
applied with some usefulness to the more theologically and culturally 
conservative wing of evangelicalism, although the precise parameters of that wing 
are open to conjecture. 
  
Indeed there are those who refer to Christians who believe in the Bible as divine 
as fundamentalists (Marty and Appleby 1991; Mayer 2004; Unnever and Cullen 2006). 
Others use “evangelical” to describe the same religiously conservative individuals 
(Collins et al. 2013; Guth 2011; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011).  
The meaning of “evangelical” (adj.) is “of or for the gospel.”4 Relatedly, to 
evangelize is to preach the gospel or the good news of the New Testament.5 While both 
evangelicals and fundamentalists are similar in that they believe in a divinely inspired 
religious text, some authors, such as Mead (2006), mentioned above, or Woodberry and 
Smith (1998), have emphasized that evangelicals have tended to be those who emphasize 
political engagement more than do the fundamentalists who avoid politics.  
The word evangelical is also important for the group under study in that it 
traditionally divides Christians and Jews. Orthodox Jews are forbidden to enter Christian 
churches and the last topic they would discuss with Christians is the topic of Jesus Christ. 
When the potential coalition under study meets, however, the discussions are about 
political agreements and not differences of religious beliefs. In fact, Christians refer to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “evangelical.” 
 
5 Ibid., s.v. “evangelize.” 
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the American Judeo-Christian heritage. Though the Christians in the potential coalition 
evangelize other religious groups, they rarely evangelize Jews because they believe the 
scripture that they that bless Abraham will be blessed and they that curse Abraham will 
be cursed. They believe that the descendants of the authors of the Bible have a divine 
purpose on the earth.  
Following Mead’s (2006) and others’ historical explanation, this study shall 
define an evangelical as one who believes in the inerrancy of the Bible, and who engages 
with the world on biblical principles. The Christian members of the PCJc in this case 
study are politically active and hold orthodox Christian beliefs and are evangelical 
Christians. I use Guth’s (2007, 20) measures of fundamentalist orthodoxy6 to evaluate 
how strictly the Christian group studied here adheres to a literalist interpretation of the 
Bible.  Because there may be many evangelical Christians in America who may not share 
all of the Christian orthodox beliefs, however, I will refer to the Christians in the PCJc as 
Christian Zionists.  
It is reasonable to assert that Christian Zionists are evangelical Christians who: (1) 
hold orthodox Christian beliefs (described more fully later); (2) are politically active; (3) 
and who support a Jewish right to all the biblical promised land which includes Judea and 
Samaria (see “Scriptural Inerrancy and the Borders of Israel” in Chapter Three). While 
the terms “Christian Zionist” and “evangelical Protestant” (or “evangelical Christian” – 
some Catholics or non-Protestants hold the orthodox Christian beliefs of evangelical 
Protestants) are not equal in meaning because as suggested above Christian Zionists may 
hold more orthodox Christian beliefs than some evangelicals, for the purpose of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I later explain in this Chapter’s Methodology Section (under the subsection “Research Questions”) my use 
of Guth’s measures for fundamentalist orthodoxy. 
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dissertation “Christian Zionist” shall be considered synonymous with “evangelical” 
Protestants or Christians, and “evangelical Christian” shall no longer be used in any 
substantive way throughout this dissertation, except where it or variants are referenced 
from literature.   
Christian Zionists, of course, may include all religious denominations. Christian 
Zionism is belief in the distinctive specialness of the nation of Israel. I test for this 
attribute in one of my interview questions where I used Guth’s (2007, 21) measurement 
of Christian Zionism determined by how strongly a person agrees or disagrees with the 
statement “Modern-day Israel is a special nation blessed by God.” 
 According to a 2008 study, evangelical Protestants were found to be 26.3 percent, 
about a quarter, of the United States adult population (Guth 2011, 10; Pew Research 
Center 2008). In that same year, the U.S. adult population (18 years and older) totaled 
229,945,000 persons (U.S. Department of Commerce 2012b). Thus, about 60,475,535 
American adults are evangelical Protestants.  
According to the Bible, God promised the land from the river of Egypt (the Nile 
River) to the Euphrates River to the Jews (Genesis 15:18) and to judge the nations that 
would divide the land of Israel (Joel 3:2), and because Christian Zionists tend to take the 
Bible’s messages literally, I expect that they will tend to oppose the two-state solution, or 
an Arab state in Judea and Samaria. I expect that a certain number of the 60 million 
evangelicals support a Jewish Judea and Samaria similarly to the potential coalition. I 
estimate that about 75 percent of these, or 45 million, Christian Zionists would be 
opposed to an Arab state in Judea and Samaria. Christian Zionists thus comprise a 
considerable portion of the adult population of the United States in opposition to the U.S. 
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government’s policy for a two-state solution. Thus, the importance of the present study to 
the American politics literature is suggested by this estimate of the hefty number of 
Christian Zionists who support Israeli sovereignty over the land of Israel. 
Jews, on the other hand, fewer in number, are a small ethnic group in America, 
making up about 1.7 percent of the adult population in the United States (Pew Research 
Center 2008, 5). About 0.3 percent of the adult population of the United States is 
Orthodox Jewish and about 0.5 percent of the U.S. adult population is Conservative 
Jewish (2008, 5). It is the Orthodox Jews and some Conservative Jews who are more 
likely to oppose territorial concessions as I will show below.  
Sending a message especially important to Christian Zionists, the Hebrew 
Scriptures warn against dividing the land of Israel. They capture an admonition to nations 
that would divide Israel. Two particular verses warn:  
for, behold, in those days, and in that time, when I shall bring again the captivity 
of Judah and Jerusalem [back to Israel], I will also gather all nations, and will 
bring them down into the valley of Jehoshaphat, and will plead with them there 
for my people and for my heritage Israel, whom they have scattered among the 
nations, and parted my land.” (Joel 3:1-2; emphasis added)  
 
The verses consider “all nations” responsible for scattering the people of Israel 
among the nations and, most importantly, for parting “my land.” Christian Zionists are 
likely to have read and believed such verses. Just as Muslims are wont to reverence 
Islamic law over any nation’s laws – including those of the United States – Christian 
Zionists would also adhere to biblical principles even when United States policy 
contradicts biblical scriptures. Christian Zionists and some American Jews, like the 
Muslim minority, will not be silent as their beliefs are intensely held. The study is 
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important in order to obtain a more complete understanding of the politically active 
minority with intensely persistently held beliefs.  
Since early 2010, I have been interviewing Dan Pollak of the primarily Jewish 
Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) and Richard Hellman of Christians’ Israel Public 
Action Campaign (CIPAC) in Washington, D.C. Without having explicitly broached the 
issue of a PCJc, interviewing these two men stimulated my interest in the potential 
coalition and the empirical research that followed. Both ZOA and CIPAC are formally 
organized and ideologically similar, tending to be against Israeli territorial concessions. 
Christians’ Israel Public Action Campaign is explicit in its support for a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria; it supports “solely the Jewish State of Israel in the area west of the Jordan” 
(CIPAC n.d.). Pollak and Hellman meet regularly to share information and thus present 
an example of friendly Jewish and Christian cooperation in favor of the Jewish state of 
Israel. The political issue of the PCJc is whether there should be a sovereign Arab state 
located west of the Jordan River. The potential coalition opposes such a state. Interviews 
included in this research are with those who oppose such an Arab state in Judea and 
Samaria, are able to talk about their religion, and who describe themselves as “politically 
active.” Other membership requirements of the PCJc are discussed below under the 
“Membership in the PCJc” section.  
The research phase of the current study included the 2012 United States 
Republican presidential primary season preceding the 2012 presidential elections, when 
the electorate was more than usually politically excited and active. Mostly conducted in 
Florida, the interviews underlying this study occurred within the context of Republican 
presidential primary efforts in that battleground state, heavily populated with Jews who 
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tend to influence close elections because their voting turnout rate is relatively high 
(Krieger 2012). 
The Two Major Religions of the PCJc  
Judaism split into two branches shortly after the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. When 
the Romans destroyed the Second Temple in 70 AD, old Judaism disappeared because 
there was no way to follow the rituals of the law (e.g., offering of sacrifices). One branch 
developed into Orthodox Judaism with its new text (the Talmud), where prayers replaced 
sacrifices and synagogues substituted for the Temple. 7  The other developed into 
Christianity with its new text (the New Testament),8 where the crucifixion of Jesus 
replaced sacrifices and the baptism of the Holy Spirit replaced the need for a Temple. 
Orthodox Judaism developed in Jerusalem and Babylonia (Jewish Virtual Library 1991), 
and Christianity spread to Greece and Rome. Originally, Christianity was a Jewish 
religion that did not accept gentiles, but first Peter and then Paul brought gentiles into the 
membership of Christianity. Orthodox Judaism remained Jewish, with kosher dietary 
laws and other rituals to discourage intermarriage. While the two branches of Judaism 
received their own differing new texts and followed different beliefs, they shared the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In the modern world, there are three main branches of Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative and Reform. The 
roots of Orthodox Judaism formed when the rabbis, soon after the crucifixion of Jesus and in the absence of 
the Temple, developed Judaism pursuing the traditions of oral teachings. While the latter two branches – 
Conservative and Reform – have their own Rabbis just as Orthodox Judaism does, because all rabbinic 
branches developed out of the Orthodox tradition this dissertation will consider Orthodox Judaism and 
rabbinic Judaism as interchangeable. When I use the term rabbinic Judaism, I refer to Orthodox, not 
Conservative or Reform, Judaism. The Talmud will be described more fully in Chapter Three.  
 
8 The “New Testament” is the second part of the Bible, both parts of which Christian Zionists consider 
God’s words. The term is neutral because it describes a part of a Bible that Christians recognize as teaching 
about a new testament. 
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Hebrew Scriptures, their belief in the eventual return of the Jews to the land of Israel, and 
the arrival of the Messiah. 
Literature Review 
My question set for the dissertation requires an eclectic drawing from political 
science literature broadly defined. The first question addresses the profiles of the 
individuals of the potential coalition. I now turn to the literature on interest groups and 
social movements. 
Group theory speaks to the organization of leaders and members in a unit that 
attempts to meet some goal. Olson (1965) pointed out that coercion or selective benefits 
were necessary to motivate individuals towards collective action within large groups. 
Certain small groups may obtain collective goods without coercion or inducements apart 
from the collective good itself, however, because at least one member will find her or his 
personal gain greater than the cost of providing some amount of the collective good, and 
because there are members better off with collective goods even if they had to provide all 
of those goods themselves (Olson 1965, 33-34). The dissertation focuses on just such a 
small group whose leaders or members are self-motivated and willing to work for the 
collective good without coercion or selective benefits for the reasons Olson adduced – 
namely that at least one member (of the PCJc) finds her or his personal gain greater than 
the cost of providing some amount of the collective good or because there are members 
better off with collective goods even if they had to provide all of them by themselves.  
According to Clark and Wilson (1961), selective benefits are material, solidary, or 
purposive. Material benefits are physical rewards, such as a sufficient salary for the 
member of a labor union, and solidary benefits provide social rewards, for example 
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attendance at a volunteers’ luncheon. Purposive benefits are somewhat different, 
however, and offer a sense of having done the right thing. The PCJc works for mainly 
purposive benefits. Now I will move to a definition of interest group. 
An interest group may be defined as “an organized body of individuals who share 
goals and who try to influence public policy” (Berry 1990, 4), but I find Truman ([1951] 
1971, 33) classic definition of an interest group even more compelling:  An interest group 
is “any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims 
upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of 
forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes.” Truman’s definition speaks to 
contention over which ideas will dominate in the marketplace of ideas. Yoho’s (1998) 
definition includes four elements of interest groups: They “are comprised of actual 
organizations, rather than multiple persons who are unorganized; they attempt to 
influence government; they are not themselves government agencies; they are not 
political parties – i.e., they do not nominate candidates for public office.” 
Yoho’s definition thus includes essential attributes of an interest group: (1) 
organization, (2) an effort to affect government (which holds ultimate authority and 
power), (3) separateness from government and political parties, and (4) a potentially 
conflictual relationship with the latter two. The PCJc is defined by three of the four 
elements but not the first, because it exists in the absence of any formal organization. 
Since the PCJc is a potential collectivity of disparate entities, I present here Tarrow’s 
(2011) definition of coalitions because he defines coalitions as “collaborative, means-
oriented arrangements that permit distinct organization entities to pool resources in order 
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to effect change” (191). The following section will cover the basic literature on the theory 
of interest groups.  
Interest Group Theory  
Pluralism. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison suggested that a large republic would 
allow for the necessary checks on factions. In practice, the structure of American 
government has not prevented some interests from exercising greater influence than 
others. Nonetheless, the beliefs underpinning Federalist No. 10 have remained (Berry 
1990, 3), perhaps because of the basic American emphasis on the importance of the 
smallest unit, the individual, rooted in part in the Judeo-Christian emphasis on salvation. 
For Judaism this is salvation through fulfillment of God’s commandments, mitzvoth. For 
Christianity it is a salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. 
David Truman ([1951] 1971, 14) saw groups as the natural and fundamental 
building blocks of society. Families are a good example of these building blocks.  
According to Truman, “changes and disturbances” in society occurred through 
interactions followed by a “return to the previous state of equilibrium or, if the 
disturbances are intense or prolonged, by the emergence of new groups whose specialized 
function it is to facilitate the establishment of a new balance, a new adjustment in the 
habitual interactions of individuals” (44). Truman saw interest group organizations as 
exhibiting a noticeable degree of cohesion, with “expectations of permanence, internal 
division of labor (e.g., leaders, distributions of responsibility, and methods of determining 
policy), and formalized values,” all of which would enhance the survivability and 
influence of the group (113). Truman regards the unassociated as fellow travelers who are 
not members of formal interest group organizations “but who interact with members 
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frequently enough to have influence.” Similarly, there are potential interest groups that 
may become actual groups “if events, including the activities of already-organized 
groups, permit” (114). Truman asserts that “adequate research has never been done on the 
incidence of widespread unorganized interests” and on the extent to which they are 
considered and prioritized in the attitudes of various parts of the population (519).9 
The PCJc exemplifies this idea of a potential interest group defined by four policy 
positions on Judea and Samaria (covered below), because this interest is not represented 
by organizations,10 even by those farthest to the right on the continuum by Waxman 
(2010) that will be explicated below. These far right organizations are CIPAC, ZOA and 
AFSI. My interviews with their organizational representatives and perusal of their 
websites show that these organizations do not assert all of the main four policy positions 
of the PCJc (also to be described under “Membership in the PCJc” below). Christians’ 
Israel Public Action Campaign (CIPAC n.d.) comes closest of all organizations to 
agreeing with the four policy positions but is expressly different on one question.11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Later, David Truman abandons the notion of "potential groups," a variation of the traditional doctrine of 
consensus, and requests instead for a "consensus of elites," a dedication on the part of the leaders of 
political parties, labor unions, trade associations and other voluntary associations to defend the fundamental 
procedures of democracy in order to protect their own positions and the basic structure of society itself 
from the threat of an irresponsible political leader (Truman 1959, 481-497). See also a perceptive critique 
of Truman's change of attitude in Bachrach, "Elite Consensus and Democracy,” (1962, 439-452). 
 
10 For the last three and a half years (2010-2013), I have searched through resources – print and Internet – 
for organizations that represent positions of the PCJc and have found none that do. A ZOA representative 
told me that House Foreign Relations Committee members do not like to oppose policies of the U.S. 
government such as Israeli land concessions, the Oslo Accords, funding of the Palestinian Authority or the 
idea of an Arab state in Israel. What benefit would result by the organizing of the PCJc for the purpose of 
pressuring these politicians to do what they simply do not want to do? 
 
11 The question is “Should the U.S. continue supporting the Oslo Agreements?” PCJc members answer 
“no.” CIPAC’s website, however, merely supports Congressional re-evaluation of “past U.N. resolutions 
and other documents that require an exchange of land for peace or would create a Palestinian state.” 
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Elite Theory. In his classic work, The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills (1956) points to 
elitism and indicates the presence of a prestige system of American society, where the 
political, economic, and military components dominate (8-9). He claims that this 
ascendancy has now become national in scope. He adds that the vividly materialistic 
aspects of this national system of status distract attention from its authoritarian features 
and seek to “justify the power that it often conceals.” He additionally asserts a stalemate 
has developed at the middle levels (political institutions) of power and that a mass-like 
society has formed toward the bottom that is unable to exploit voluntary associations as a 
means to power (28). Mills’ elite theory may be applied to this case where the United 
States executive branch is the politically elite entity and the PCJc is part of the mass-like 
society. The elitist United States executive branch differs from the PCJc in its viewpoint 
regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict over the land. The difference presents a challenge for 
the PCJc, which must face expressing a viewpoint in disagreement with that of the 
dominant executive branch. That is, United States administrations have consistently 
favored the two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, whereby Israel cedes parts of 
Judea and Samaria to Arabs.  In direct contradiction, the PCJc supports an undivided 
Jewish Judea and Samaria. 
In his “A Critique of The Elitist Theory of Democracy,” Walker questioned the 
view of the social structure as a functionally integrated system held in equilibrium by 
patterned and recurrent processes. Walker described elite theorists as placing emphasis on 
the “limitations of the average citizen” and being “suspicious of schemes which might 
encourage greater participation in public affairs. Accordingly, [elite theorists] put their 
trust in the wisdom and energy of an active, responsible elite” (1966, 295). Berry’s study 
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(2007) emphasizes participation problems as a consequence of his finding that 501c3 
non-profit organizations are intimidated by the threat of potential IRS examinations for 
speaking out for a candidate or for “too much lobbying”; organizations are thus reluctant 
to be as involved in politics as they might be without the tax-exempt status. 
Many of the members of the PCJc are in fact members of 501c3 organizations and 
may be more or less coerced by the IRS status to be less politically active than they 
would if they did not belong to such organizations. As of May 2013, the IRS non-profit 
division has come under scrutiny for singling out Tea Party groups’ non-profit 
applications for excessively exhaustive examinations (Eilperin and Goldfarb 2013b), 
which shows the involvement of the IRS in preventing conservative views from finding 
expression in organizations under the non-profit status. Walker (1966), Berry (2007), and 
the currently ongoing IRS controversy suggest the obstacles to political participation 
against entrenched elite.  
Lowi (1979) envisioned liberalism in America reaching its end in two stages: 
first, the national government monopolizes a given area of private activity; second, a 
program is authorized, a broad area is monopolized by the government and is then given 
back piece by piece as privileges to specific individuals or groups on a case by case basis 
(278). Lowi’s concept of liberalism stimulates the thought that privileges may be less 
likely to be extended towards groups that oppose executive branch policies. Given that 
the PCJc opposes the two-state solution – United States policy – it would seem less likely 
to be on the receiving end of governmental privileges.  
Subgovernments or Iron Triangles. A particular variety of elite theory sees government 
policy-making occurring through subgovernments or iron triangles that consist of 
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“interest group advocates, legislators and their aides, and key agency administrators who 
interact on an ongoing basis and control policymaking in a particular area.” The 
subgovernment model sees a small group of persons dominating policy-making in a given 
field (Berry 2009, 164). However, this theory has been downplayed as being too 
simplistic. It has been found that lobbying organizations are continually seeking coalition 
partners to combine resources to face interest group adversaries. Also, the President 
influences lobby groups’ access to the executive branch. The growth in interest groups, 
change in the structure of government (i.e., the growth in the number of subcommittees), 
and the growth of the executive branch are said to be additional reasons why the tidy 
subgovernment model is outdated (Berry 2009, 168-170). 
More complex and realistic than subgovernments, issue networks are thought to 
better explain policy-making. Interest group and government issue networks are 
characterized by a defined set of persons, objects, or events because of which information 
is shared in a recurring fashion in a particular policy area. The persons are individuals 
who speak for organizations – notably, interest groups – congressional committees and 
executive branch agencies” (Berry 2009, 171). Since no one lobby organizes all the major 
interest group activity, there is a hollow core in the middle of the network. Also, most 
individual groups of a network operate within issue niches, engaging with those groups 
with similar interests (Berry 2009, 172). According to Heclo, issue networks “comprise a 
large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual commitment or of 
dependence on others in their environment; in fact it is almost impossible to say where a 
network leaves off and its environment begins” (Heclo 1978, 102). 
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Unorganized Interests. I touched on unorganized interests earlier, which also go by the 
name latent or potential interests.  Working from Yoho’s (1998) definition of an 
organized interest, an unorganized interest group is a group of multiple persons, lacking 
organization, exogenous to political parties and government, which seeks to influence the 
latter. Considering the characteristics necessary for the formation and maintenance of 
interest groups, Nownes raises the question of why some groups of individuals have large 
and powerful interest groups working on their behalf while others have either small 
operations or no interest group representation (Nownes 2013, 55). Affluence, intensity, 
access to leadership, altruism, and social pressure are necessary ingredients (2013, 56-
60). Of all these qualities, altruism and intensity are the most prevalent amongst the 
PCJc, while leadership is also present (among the two subgroups, which I will explain 
later in this chapter).  
 Bachrach and Baratz (1962) suggest a compelling view of how interests are 
denied expression. They call for an investigation into “mobilization of bias in the 
institution under scrutiny.” Individuals or groups may maintain values, myths, political 
procedures, and rules of the game to keep out other political actors and to limit debates to 
“safe” issues.12 Bachrach and Baratz’s work elucidates the importance of the mobilization 
of bias theory. The theory is applicable to this dissertation when it is seen how that bias 
prevents a discussion for a Jewish Judea and Samaria within important political venues. 
The bias is towards the two-state solution; the almost unchallenged idea is that the Arabs 
have a legitimate claim to the land of Israel; the political procedures and rules of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Another elaboration is offered by John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness (1980). 
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game which keep out the PCJc are those implemented by the executive branch, Congress 
and powerful interest groups, suggesting a subgovernment.    
Summary of the Interest Group Literature 
I will now thread together points of the interest group literature review that speak 
most coherently to the dissertation. Olson (1965) testifies to the existence of the small 
group that is motivated to collective action by personal gain apart from coercion or 
inducements. Clark and Wilson (1961) impress with the merit of purposive benefits that 
are the main rewards for the small group, the PCJc, under research here. 
David Truman’s view on groups as the fundamental building blocks of society 
([1951] 1971) connects well to my participant observation of activism. The members of 
the PCJc in my case study can be summarily viewed through the most active, who consist 
of six individuals in two subgroups of three persons, each group headed by a leader. 
While pluralist theory hints at the importance of individuals, humans are social beings 
and are operationally ineffective acting alone.   
Truman’s theory of potential interest groups has remained empirically 
underexplored. There is little question that there are no organizations that pressure the 
U.S. government for a Jewish Judea and Samaria. There is little doubt that the PCJc’s 
lack of organization accounts for its failure to make much of a dent on U.S. policy on the 
Arab-Israel conflict.  
Elite theorist C. Wright Mills’ (1956) theory is another useful way to look at the 
current United States political system. Congress has reached a stalemate where the 
conservatives agree with the liberals not to pass budgets; banking corporations receive 
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lenient punishments for irresponsible management of mortgage loans; and the public 
gazes on.  
As Walker (1966) points out in “A Critique of The Elitist Theory of Democracy, 
it is not adequate to leave governance to elites who will coerce the public to get their 
way. In 2013 America, the crises are piling up, and no end is in sight. The IRS 
controversy is one issue that may trouble both liberals and conservatives, even though 
targeting of conservatives seems to have been covered more than that of progressives. 
The public is also dismayed at the revelation that the NSA is sifting through the public’s 
personal communications (and thereby trampling on Fourth Amendment rights) in order 
to combat terrorists, a group that could apparently include both you and me.  
As Lowi (1979) has argued, the age of liberalism is over, and now the government 
is likely to hand out privileges only to those it deems worthy. Both subgovernments and 
issue networks describe political activism with the former system depicting a small 
triangle of central government bureaucrats, interest group leaders, and Congressional 
committee leaders. Issue networks are accepted as being more realistic depictions of how 
policy is made. Subgovernments, however, seem more descriptive of the political system 
that blocks entry to the organizing of the PCJc to pressure for a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria, and Bachrach and Baratz (1962) suggest that individuals or groups can block 
participation of others by monopolizing the selection of values, political procedures, and 
rules of the game.  
To recall, I define an unorganized interest group as multiple persons, lacking 
organization, exogenous to political parties and government, which seeks to influence the 
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latter. Among the qualities that Nownes (2013) identifies as lending to powerful interest 
groups, altruism and intensity belong to the group, the PCJc, under study.  
The summary of interest group theories is thus a selection of the “best of the best” 
for this particular dissertation – those that help to shed light on the interest group politics 
of this study’s issue, a Jewish Judea and Samaria. 
Religion and Politics in the United States  
According to Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2011, 108), religiously inspired political 
action is best characterized as a social movement rather than as interest group activity. 
Social identities derived from religion, race, ethnicity, kinship, or occupations unite 
individuals in collective activity without formal organizations. 
Particularly useful for the dissertation, Wilcox and Larson (2006, 6) define the 
Christian Right as “a social movement that attempts to mobilize evangelical Protestants 
and other orthodox Christians into conservative political action” (Marsden 2008, 3). For 
my study, I will define a member of the Christian Right as a Christian who attempts to 
mobilize other Christians to political action. However, the PCJc can hardly be 
characterized as a religiously-defined social movement given that its religious 
components – Jewish and Christian Zionist – are not unified. Nonetheless, the social 
movement literature will be briefly reviewed to distinguish the difference between social 
movements and interest groups, to show that political activism for a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria in America, Israel and worldwide is better pictured as interest group activity than 
as a social movement.  
Social Movements. Tarrow (2011) defines social movements as “collective challenges, 
identified on the basis of common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained 
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interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (9). Contentious politics occurs when 
“threats are experienced and opportunities are perceived, when the existence of available 
allies is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed” (33).  
More specifically, contention inspires movements towards three kinds of 
collective action – disruption, violence, and contained behavior (99), the latter of which 
elites accept and will even facilitate, such as running for office. Disruption– for example, 
a standing peaceful protest during a speech – is unstable for several reasons. First, as in 
the later stages of the Tea Party movement, politics attracts  activists to pursue less 
disruptive forms of activities, such as lobbying, publishing, media politics, and 
participation in elections.  A second reason for declining disruption is its dependence on 
maintaining a high level of commitment, which is seldom sustainable when police are 
determined and elites are united. Third, marginal members of social movements tend to 
return to private life (103-4).  Thus, the key to movement dynamism is steadfast social 
networks that lie at the heart of formal organization and that can survive even when these 
organizations disappear or are repressed (183). Tarrow (2011) also argues that success for 
some movements may consist more of establishing a collective identity than of achieving 
policy success (217).  
It is important to clarify that the PCJc does not fit within the category of a social 
movement for the reason that, following Tarrow’s definition above, it does not seek to 
collectively challenge elites, opponents and authorities, but rather to pressure them to 
support Israel’s preexisting historical claim to the land of Israel.  The PCJc does, 
however, share the following with social movements: It will accept a collective identity 
as an intermediary step towards policy success, and it accepts disruptive or contained 
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behavior. The PCJc respects Judeo-Christian morality stemming from respect for law and 
is thus steadfastly committed to legal means towards their goal. Violence is a last but not 
discounted resort because the PCJc respects the Declaration of Independence and its 
message that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of the right to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish said 
government.  
Social movement theory looks to culture to understand from whence religious 
interests derive, evaluates resources to describe the ways that enable these interests to 
participate effectively in politics, and concentrates on the importance of the state and the 
political environment in conditioning the opportunities groups have to influence the 
political system (Tarrow 2011; Wald, Silverman and Fridy 2005).  
Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2011) argue that the social movement framework 
employs concepts such as motive, means, and opportunities to explore religious group 
participation in politics (108). Political parties motivate or mobilize particular religious 
factions. For example the Republican Party has successfully attracted the Christian Right 
(110).  To be clear for this dissertation, the PCJc supports the Republican Party but is not 
per se motivated by it. Indeed, today the Republican Party is polarized between those 
such as Michelle Bachman, concerned about Muslim infiltration of the United States 
government, and other Republicans (Idaho Statesman 2012). The PCJc is in fact more 
aligned with Tea Party groups and the Christian Right within the Republican Party, and 
the still unfolding IRS discrimination controversy against tea parties seeking non-profit 
statuses suggests another organizational hurdle for the PCJc, which I will treat in more 
detail below.  
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According to Rosenstone and Hanson (1993), use of direct mobilization (through 
community leaders) and indirect mobilization (through social networks) – is the means 
through which political leaders distribute information about politics that many citizens 
otherwise would not have. Absent mobilization, rational ignorance would deter much 
citizen involvement in politics. Through mobilization of both kinds, political leaders 
create selective and solidary inducements to participate (36). Participation in 
governmental politics occurs at strategically significant moments. Citizens write letters, 
attend meetings, and sign petitions when their actions most probably will have their 
largest impact on some governmental decisions. The strategic efforts of politicians, 
interest groups, and issue activists put in motion strategically timed political participation 
(125). Searches of various media show that the leaders of churches or synagogues do not 
openly support a Jewish Judea and Samaria. It is little surprise then that the PCJc is not 
strongly linked to religious organizations.  
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) relate the way participation skills are 
acquired. The family of origin plays a primary role, setting the boundaries of the 
individual’s education and occupational opportunities and providing access to political 
stimuli and to religious institutions. Experiences in school add to the foundation laid at 
home (459). The PCJc, which cares about conservative values, supports patriotic actions 
such as saluting the flag before meetings and prayer. 
Religious organizations provide opportunities for skill development among 
congregants and do not display as much discrimination towards the disadvantaged as do 
other institutions. In this regard, labor unions and political parties are weaker. Thus, 
American churches – especially the Protestant churches – may somewhat compensate for 
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the weakness of institutions that ordinarily function to mobilize the disadvantaged (332-
3). In short, Rosenstone and Hanson (1993) and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) 
indicate that even if an individual has all the qualities and attitudes for participation, that 
person may not act without additional encouragement, which religious leaders may 
provide by framing and explaining issues and offering organizational help to structure 
activities. Religious institutions are rich in culture, leadership, money, resources, and 
infrastructure, and provide an audience and a communication network. Clergy, as opinion 
leaders, use their resource-rich institutions – churches, temples, mosques, and synagogues 
– for mobilization (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011, 126-7). However, the PCJc cannot 
depend upon religious institutions for opportunities because the leaders tend not to use 
their pulpits to support a Jewish Judea and Samaria.13 The PCJc thus lacks the physical 
resources of religious organizations, the means through which they commonly facilitate 
action.  
Political opportunity is the final component that social movements rely on for 
religious political mobilization. It is what groups need to gain access to political 
institutions to try to affect politics or policy. For example, regardless of how intense the 
grievances or abundant the resources of Focus on the Family’s political supporters, after 
the election of 2008 they confronted a diminished political opportunity structure for their 
goals (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011, 140). For its part, the PCJc saw the 2012 election 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 As a member of a religious institution, I have studied activism for Israel. The synagogue associates with 
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which supports the policy of an Arab state in 
Judea and Samaria. The synagogue will not publically oppose AIPAC’s policy. I investigated the question 
of the synagogue’s Israel policy by asking the synagogue leadership to publish a mission statement 
opposing an Arab state in Judea and Samaria, which the synagogue refused to publish. However, in an 
interview, a highly placed leader of this synagogue told me that he opposes an Arab state in Judea and 
Samaria. The case study suggests the influence of AIPAC over a religious institution, in spite of the 
leadership’s differing policy view.    
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season as an opportunity to promote their values.  Given that their preferred candidates 
generally lost, they face a diminished opportunity to promote support for a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria. 
The American Jewish People. Liberalism is at the essence of Judaism for most American 
Jews, with the exception of the more religiously observant. Perhaps most American Jews 
favor liberalism because of their lingering identity as a persecuted people, making them 
feel vulnerable to the majority (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011, 266-7). Consequently, 
American Jews seek social programs sponsored by liberals as a source of security against 
social tensions that may foster or at least exacerbate religious bigotry (Fein 1988). 
Another possible reason for liberalism among Jews is their tendency to “follow the 
leader” (the rabbis) in order to maintain their religious identity or to separate from 
Christians. The rabbis tend towards liberalism, being supportive of receiving government 
handouts as a benefit of making connections with executive and congressional branch 
officials and lobbyists in Washington D.C., which speaks to Lowi’s (1979) end of 
liberalism argument, noted above, whereby the government disperses favors to the 
favored; and it also depicts the triangular theory of subgovernments, where powerful 
lobbies such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC; to recall, lobbies 
are one of the three corners of an iron triangle or subgovernment) come into the picture, 
which I will cover in later chapters.  
Djupe and Sokhey’s study of rabbis finds that generally “a more [Jewish] 
orthodox perspective on Jewish law will drive down openness to compromise on the 
status of Israel” (2006, 908). Thus, a tension exists between most Jews, who would lean 
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towards liberalism and the Establishment, and some among the orthodox Jewish 
leadership who would prioritize a Jewish Israel. 
Recently Sasson’s (2009) focus group study noted that Orthodox Jews support 
communities outside of the Israeli proper and cite friends and family members who 
populate them. Orthodox, and some Conservative, Jews referred to the territories Israel 
possessed in 1967 by their biblical names, Judea and Samaria. A few speakers pointed to 
the historical significance of the West Bank territories. “That is where most of our history 
took place,” one remarked. The security arguments dominated the historical themes, 
which overshadowed the specifically religious ones – only one speaker described the 
Bible as a contract that established the Jewish people’s right to the land of Israel. In the 
1993 American Jewish Committee poll, 84 percent of Conservatives, 90 percent of 
Reforms, and 83 percent of nondenominational Jews backed the Oslo agreement, but only 
53 percent of Orthodox Jews did. Also, the Orthodox supported additional Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank more than other denominations. The latter group was also 
least likely to “trust the Arabs and the Palestinians, and more likely to insist on the unity 
of Jerusalem” (Seliktar 2002, 125). My study includes a conservative Jewish component 
willing to support a Jewish Judea and Samaria.  
Christians. According to Wagner (2003), Christian Zionists hold that God’s eternal 
covenant with the Jewish people – including the promise of a specific land – cannot be 
abrogated.14 Religious beliefs play an important part in predicting American public 
opinion on foreign policy issues in the Middle East, and evangelical Christians are among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Genesis 12:1-7, 15:4-7, 17:1-8; Leviticus 26:44-5; Deuteronomy 7:7-8. 
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the strongest supporters of Israel (Baumgartner, Francia and Morris 2008, 171). Thus, 
generally Christian Zionists support Israel.  
A 2002 study of 350 evangelical leaders, however, found that although prominent 
evangelical figures such as Pat Robertson, Gary Bauer, and syndicated radio talk-show 
host Janet Parshall are opposed to Israeli territorial concessions and 60 percent of 
evangelical leaders support Israel, 52 percent of those leaders favor the establishment of a 
Palestinian state (Schrag 2005). Thus, more than half of evangelical Christian leaders 
support a Palestinian state, leaving the opinion of 48 percent of these evangelical 
Christian leaders unknown on this question, which suggests that the Christian element of 
the PCJc faces uncertain support for a Jewish Judea and Samaria from Christian 
leadership. My research suggests that Christians indeed lack the necessary knowledge, 
ability and skills to overcome resistance to the two-state solution from the subgovernment 
protecting that policy.15 
McCloskey and Zaller (1984, 233) note that the significant ideological conflict in 
America occurs within the framework of almost unanimous public support for the basic 
values of capitalism and democracy. The Protestant ethnic viewed toil as a calling, as a 
blessing rather than a curse. The respect for work may be considered the most 
characteristic feature of the social ethic of capitalistic culture. Though the theological 
roots have been removed, the view of work has been incorporated into the American 
value system (107), and today capitalism seems to derive its legitimacy less from the 
features of the Protestant ethic than from secular values such as individualism and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Recently I interviewed the leader of an organization that benefits Jewish communities in Judea and 
Samaria who was unable to conceive of a powerful Jewish lobby group in Washington D.C. that protects 
the two-state solution.  
28 
 
economic efficiency (127). Indeed, over the last half a century, the prevalence of a 
broadly secular perspective among members of American elites has given conservative 
groups reason to worry about the quality and future of American society (McCloskey and 
Zaller 1984, 26; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011, 218). For its part, the PCJc struggles for 
a less secular America.  
The review has highlighted the social movement literature. The best features of 
the survey suggest the relevance of religion to the dissertation more than social 
movements. The PCJc is more of a potential interest group than a social movement.  
Policy Positions and Divisive Issues 
The second question inquires as to what are the policy positions that have held the 
coalition together over time, and what issues have divided it. First, it should be noted that 
the advocacy of the PCJc is placed on the right of a spectrum of positions. Briefly, here is 
the continuum of Jewish-American organizations active on Israel. 
Today, centrist lobby groups, such as AIPAC, the American Jewish Committee 
(AJC), the American Jewish Congress (AJ Congress), the Anti-Defamation League 
(ADL), Hadassah, the Jewish Council of Public Affairs (JCPA), and the Conference of 
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (Waxman 2010), do not actively 
show support for a Jewish Judea and Samaria. Left of center groups, such as Ameinu, 
Americans for Peace Now, Brit Tzekek v’Shalom, Israel Policy Forum, J Street, and 
Meretz USA (Waxman 2010), would have the United States push Israel harder to 
withdraw from the West Bank. The right-wing lobby including, among others, Americans 
for a Safe Israel (AFSI) and the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA; Waxman 2010) 
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tends to be against Israeli territorial concessions. The PCJc identifies to the greatest 
extent with this right-wing lobby.16  
In 1993, there was little opposition to the Oslo Accords among American Jews. 
The anti-treaty forces attracted only 10 percent of American Jewry – but they made up 
for that in their strength of expression (Rosenthal 2001, 125). While Labor Party Israeli 
Prime Minister Rabin decided not to be concerned about every Palestinian violation, the 
Likud Party formed an anti-treaty alliance with the Zionist Organization of America. 
They lobbied Congress to monitor the compliance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) with 
the Oslo treaty. The monitoring group’s success in finding violations could have 
terminated aid to the PA and signified the end of the Oslo Accords process itself 
(Rosenthal 2001, 128-9). 
Jews and Christians Separate. A 2007 Pew Center survey, which found Jews much more 
likely than the rest of the population to vote for gay, female, black, Hispanic, Mormon, 
Muslim, and atheist presidential candidates, also found Jews less likely to vote for an 
evangelical Protestant. Jews were three times as likely as the population at large to say 
they would be less likely to vote for a candidate who was an evangelical Christian. Why 
would this be?  It turns out that about 70 percent of Jews (as opposed to 45 percent of the 
population) said they were “uncomfortable when candidates talked about how religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 According to Dov Waxman, the centrist lobby engages in “consensus politics.” Consensus politics argues 
that the best way to influence is be unified before Congress and the White House. It tries to represent the 
consensus of the organized American Jewish community. When there are differences of opinion, it tries to 
reduce the differences internally. The centrist lobby avoids taking strong positions on controversial and 
polarizing issues. The left-wing lobby consists of “dovish” groups that support diplomacy, negotiations, 
and concessions more than military force. The right-wing lobby is opposed to Israeli land concessions. It 
favors Israel’s control of the West Bank, opposes the division of Jerusalem and the creation of a Palestinian 
state. For them, the biggest challenge Israel confronts is from radical Islamism, Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran 
(Waxman 2010, 11-12). 
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they were,” and 87 percent (opposed to only 41 percent of all respondents) agreed that 
“religious conservatives had too much control over the Republican Party” (Wald and 
Calhoun-Brown 2011, 272).17 
Jewish people see evangelical Christians, whose views and beliefs conflict with 
liberal Jewish positions, dominating in the Republican Party. Uslaner and Lichbach 
(2009) found that for the 2004 election, negative feelings toward evangelicals influenced 
Jewish voting for Democrats more than any factor other than partisanship but mattered 
little among non-Jews (406-410). Windmueller (2009) found that the presence and 
influence in the Republican Party of evangelical Christians, whose views and beliefs 
appear to conflict with liberal Jewish positions, helps to explain Jews’ aversion to vote 
for Republicans in 2008. The election of 2012 will be another test of their avoidance. 
Following the election, according a 2012 Pew exit poll, the Jewish vote for the 
Republican presidential candidate increased from 2008 by nine percentage points; in 
2008, 21 percent of Jews voted for McCain; in 2012, 30 percent of Jews voted for 
Romney. The white evangelical Christian vote for the Republican presidential candidate 
also increased compared to 2008; the evangelical Christian vote increased six percentage 
points from 73 percent for McCain in 2008 to 79 percent for Romney in 2012 (Pew 
Research Center 2012).  
On the evangelical Christian side, leadership guards the border between Jews and 
evangelical Christians. For example, the late Jerry Falwell, an evangelical Christian, 
stated that “the very definition of a Christian precludes the possibility of one converting 
to Judaism or any other religion” (Simon 1984, 31) and added, “It is an act of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Wald (2011) downloaded the data used for this analysis from “August 2007 Religion & Public Life 
Survey” (Pew Research Center 2007). 
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abandonment for a professing Christian to convert to Judaism” (35-6). On the topic of 
Israel, however, he warmed up to the Jewish right-wing position stating, “Judea and 
Samaria should be part of Israel” (81). To current times, there are organizations such as 
Christians and Jews United for Israel and the Broward Pastors Network which coordinate 
events for Jews and Christians around support for Israel.  
Jews and Christian Zionists Uniting. Ehud Barak won a strong victory in Israel’s May 17, 
1999 election. Right wing Zionists disliked Barak’s mandate to further and fulfill the 
Oslo Agreement, and the right-wing Israel lobby and the evangelical Christians 
approached Congress. Both ZOA and the National Unity Coalition pressured 
congressmen to vote against a new aid bill for the Palestinians, depicting it as an abuse of 
taxpayers’ money (Seliktar 2007, 127-8).  
Many Orthodox Jews value non-Jewish support for Israel, and welcome 
evangelical support. Schrag (2005) notes a 2002 Stand for Israel poll. The poll asked 
evangelicals to state their key theological reasons for supporting Israel. Fifty-nine percent 
of evangelicals said that they support Israel because of the Hebrew Scriptures’ promise to 
bless Israel and the Jewish people (e.g., Genesis 12:3).18 Twenty-eight percent support 
Israel because of end-times prophecies of the New Testament.  
Orthodox Jews tend to be more ideologically congruent to evangelicals on both 
domestic and foreign policy than other Jews. Concern about proselytizing, however, 
reduces Orthodox Jewish warmth towards evangelicals (Schrag 2005). According to 
Dittmer and Sturm (2010, 13), Messianic Jews (Jews who believe that Jesus Christ is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “And I will bless them that bless thee, and him that curseth thee will I curse; and in thee shall all the 
families of the earth be blessed” (Genesis 12:3). 
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Messiah, the “anointed one,” and the Savior) tend to believe in post-tribulation doctrine, 
which stipulates that both Jews and Christians will endure God’s final tribulation.19 On 
the other hand one would expect that the Christian belief in pre-tribulation rapture, which 
holds that only Christians will escape the final cataclysmic tribulation, would discourage 
a bonding between Jews and Christians.   
Prevention of Coalition’s Absorption into Formal Organizations 
The third question of the dissertation revolves around what has prevented, and 
continues to prevent, this coalition from being absorbed into one or more of the larger 
and more formally organized components of the Israel Lobby. Throughout Chapter One I 
have suggested several impediments to the absorption of the potential coalition into the 
formally organized components of the Israel Lobby. A first reason may be because of 
what Mills (1956) describes as the elitist society where the United States executive 
branch is the politically elite entity (that exclusively deals with the main organizations) 
and the PCJc is part of the mass-like society trapped underneath a stagnant and 
ineffective legislative branch. 
A second reason may be because of what Lowi (1979) articulated as the privilege 
system. The PCJc opposes the two-state solution of United States policy, which possibly 
makes it less likely to be granted the access that formal organizations in line with 
government policy generally receive. A third reason may be because religious leaders 
tend not to use their pulpits to support a Jewish Judea and Samaria, the PCJc is not 
mobilized by religious institutions for political opportunities in which the latter engage.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Israeli Messianic Jews recently sent 120 New Testaments to members of the Israeli Parliament, much to 
one member’s dismay (Miskin 2012).  
33 
 
A fourth reason that the PCJc is not absorbed is ideological. As a consequence of 
its conservative nature it is rejected by larger liberal Jewish organizations, such as the 
AIPAC lobby group, which is one of the three corners of the iron triangle or 
subgovernment that dominates policy making in Washington, D.C.   
Resources and Methods 
The fourth question of this dissertation is how – with what resources and methods 
– has this coalition attempted to influence U.S. policy on (a) the Middle East generally, 
and (b) the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. 
Kenen (1982, 66) and Tivnan (1987, 34) hold that in order to counteract the State 
Department’s political leaning towards the Arab states, a Jewish leadership driven lobby 
group (AIPAC)20 formed to pressure Capitol Hill for legislation in support of Israel 
(Haney and Vanderbush 1999). 
An effective political action group would succeed in advocating for its cause. 
Haney and Vanderbush (1999) inquire “What makes ethnic interest groups effective?” A 
dominant theme in the literature argues that a characteristic of powerful ethnic interest 
groups is organizational strength – namely organizational unity, a professional lobbying 
structure that provides useful information, and financial resources. Membership unity and 
location as well as voter participation are important sources of organizational strength 
because of the electoral ramifications of these factors. Members of influential ethnic 
interest groups both assimilate in American society and identify with their homelands.   
McCormick states that the Jewish lobby, and “AIPAC in particular, has indeed 
been successful in influencing the direction of American foreign policy toward Israel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 According to an AIPAC representative, AIPAC is an American organization, not a Jewish one.  
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over the years” (2012, 321). The question is what accounts for the success of the Jewish 
ethnic lobby, or any ethnic lobby? Jewish-Americans, numbering 6.2 million persons, are 
less than three percent of America’s population. In his work on ethnic groups and foreign 
policy, political scientist Tony Smith (2000) notes two factors determining influence: the 
structure of the American political system and the characteristics of ethnic groups (2000, 
86). According to Smith (2000, 88), these groups find access “at the local, grassroots 
level of party selection of officeholders during primaries…[and] in the divisions that 
naturally open between the executive and the legislature [and] in the divisions within the 
legislature itself in Washington.” Smith (2000, 95-109) additionally suggests that for 
ethnic groups to take advantage of these points of access and obtain influence, they must 
have three resources: ability to provide votes in key areas, ability to make campaign 
contributions to office seekers, and ability to organize and lobby on important issues.  
 McCormick (2012, 322) applies these three criteria to the Jewish Lobby to show 
the lobby’s effectiveness. First, America’s Jewish population tends to be located in 
several key states. States along the East Coast (New York, New Jersey, Florida) tend to 
have large groups of Jewish voters, as do the states of California, Illinois, and Ohio. 
Additionally, and significantly, Jews tend to participate politically at a much higher rate 
than other groups in America. Resultantly, presidential candidates care about Jewish 
interests in these states, certainly since these states have a large number of electoral votes 
and particularly in years with closely contested national elections, especially in Florida 
and Ohio. 
Second, the Jewish community and pro-Israel lobbying groups donate a large sum 
of campaign funding for congressional and presidential elections. Pro-Israel groups 
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provided $13.8 million in campaign contributions in 2008. Sixty-three percent of those 
funds were for Democratic candidates and 37 percent were for Republican candidates. 
Additionally, pro-Israel groups can support or oppose candidates. Two examples are the 
reelection defeats of Senator Roger Jepsen (R-IA) and Senator Charles Percy (R-IL) in 
the 1980s.  
Third, the dominating lobby group, AIPAC, has a strong organizational structure 
in Washington, D.C. Additional factors include networking, American public support for 
Israel and a relatively weak Arab lobby: the American Israel Public Affairs Committee is 
well tied to the political decision-making network in Washington. For example, the list of 
regular attendees and speakers at the annual AIPAC policy conferences displays 
presidential candidates, speakers of the House, and other political elites (McCormick 
2012, 323). The late Senator Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (1981, 978) related that “Foreign 
lobbies that lack significant domestic support exert only limited influence on American 
foreign policy.” The American public tends to support Israel over the Palestinians 
(Mendes 2012). Finally, the Israel Lobby does not face strong opposition from an Arab 
lobby in the three ways mentioned – a voting bloc, fundraising, and support from the 
American public (McCormick 2012, 323).  
Trice (1977, 462) has noted that while it is not possible to measure exactly the 
relative influence of pro-Israel and pro-Arab groups, it is probable that the greater 
organizational strength and activity level of domestic pro-Israel groups has resulted in 
political payoffs in terms of congressional receptivity and willingness to make public 
statements in support of Israeli positions. Watanabe (1984, 13) states that the pro-Israel 
activity of the American Jewish community is effective. On the other hand, according to 
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Bard (1991, 270), when the Israeli lobby’s policies contradict the desires of the President, 
the lobby loses three-fourths of the time, which suggests the limits to influence for 
individuals who would lobby against the policy position of the United States executive 
branch. 
 A view of right-wing Jewish lobby activity in the 1990s indicates its effort to 
influence government. A group of Orthodox organizations – Orthodox Union, National 
Council of Young Israel, Rabbinical Council of America, Poalei Agudat Israel, Religious 
Zionists of America, and Amit Emuna – joined with ZOA and AFSI in Washington, D.C.  
These groups opposed Oslo. Congress passed the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act 
(MEPFA) in order to fund the Palestinian Authority (PA). National Director of ZOA 
Mort Klein supported the July 29, 1994 passage of the Specter-Shelby amendment, 
“which required the State Department to certify the PA’s compliance” with Oslo (Seliktar 
2002, 136-7). On June 13, 1995, a group of one hundred Orthodox rabbis went to Capitol 
Hill to ‘lobby for a delay in the funding” (Seliktar 2002, 137). On September 20, 1995, 
the Committee on International Relations gathered to debate a MEFPA extension. The 
Zionist Organization of America opposed the extension; the Orthodox Union wanted to 
stop payment to the Palestinians until they complied with their DOP (Declaration of 
Principles, the first Oslo Agreement) obligations. ZOA convinced some legislators to 
press the Clinton administration to force Arafat to hand over Palestinian terrorists 
accused of killing American citizens in Israel (Seliktar 2002, 137).  
By 1995, the National Jewish Coalition and ZOA renewed an effort to move the 
U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Finally, a bipartisan group in Congress passed 
the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Act. The Embassy Relocation Act showed the new 
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dynamics of lobbying for pro-Israel causes in the Republican-dominated Congress. The 
incoming conservative lawmakers who came to fill both Houses in 1994 gave the 
nationalist-Orthodox coalition an advantage over the mainstream AIPAC and the 
Conference of Jewish Presidents. The fact that many of the conservative legislators had 
the support of evangelical Christians helped this coalition to oppose Oslo (Marsden 2008; 
196-216; Seliktar 2002, 139). The National Unity Coalition for Israel and the Christians’ 
Israel Public Action Campaign (CIPAC) lobbied against aid for the PA and in favor of 
the embassy move. In August 1995, CIPAC organized a conference to create a grassroots 
lobbying system; AFSI joined it (139). The new lobbying effort showed that the 
American Jewish community was more pluralistic and polarized.  
Successes or Failures 
The fifth question of this dissertation addresses the apparent successes or failures 
of this potential coalition’s advocacy. 
Scholars find that members of Congress are more influenced by their constituents 
than by Washington lobbies (Berry 2009, 120; Browne 1995, 288; Kingdon 1981). 
Kingdon (1981, 22) found that fellow congressmen were the most important influence on 
voting decisions, followed by constituency, which suggests the importance of the elite in 
determining policy. However, it also speaks to the relative importance of constituents on 
the actions of their representatives. As noted above, Berry (2007) shows that 501c3 
organizations are intimidated by the threat of potential IRS examinations because of 
speaking out for a candidate or because of “too much lobbying” and are thus reluctant to 
be as involved in politics as they might be without this tax-exempt status. Internal 
Revenue Service 501c4 organizations are also not permitted to endorse candidates. If 
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501c (nonprofit) organizations are sufficiently intimidated to limit their activism, this 
increases the already substantial influence of congressmen on voting decisions.  
What this Case Reveals 
The sixth dissertation question is what does the study reveal or inform about 
interest group politics and social movements more broadly in the United States. The 
question will be answered in Chapter Seven after the results of this research have been 
analyzed and tied to previous research. 
The thematic questions that tie all the foundational literature together for the 
purposes of this dissertation are: (1) How is power distributed, through individuals, 
groups (pluralistically), or elites? (2) How and why do issue-centered coalitions form and 
what sustains them? (3) How do religion and politics relate to one another in America? 
My dissertation topic and the questions on page 1 above address core issues about 
interest groups in American politics, and religion and politics in the United States. First, 
the characteristics of coalition leaderships and the natures and qualities of the rank and 
file relate to the literature on interest group leaders and members. The data I have 
collected on the potential interest coalition under study will add to knowledge on this 
group, which is on the far right of the spectrum of views on the land-for-peace issue in 
Israel. Second, the advocacy positions that have held together this coalition over time will 
be covered in the history of the land-for-peace issue. I will focus on the most recent 
history starting from the beginning of the Oslo Peace Accord period in 1993, but 
including historical background information. The points or issues that have divided it or 
could potentially divide it in the future are mainly the religious differences between 
Christians and Jews, which is suggested in the literature on Christian-Jewish relations. 
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Third, the resources and methods which this potential coalition has used to attempt to 
influence U.S. policy in the Middle East will add to knowledge about collective action, 
pluralism, elite and social movement theories. Fourth, studying the successes or failures 
of this coalition’s advocacy will delve into what factors make groups successful in 
fulfilling their objectives. Fifth, this case will inform about the viability of an interest that 
is barely represented in American politics. In particular, how does such an interest 
survive with its leadership support? The question informs to interest group politics 
broadly in the United States because it speaks to representation of diverse views. My 
specific central contribution to the literature will be research concerning impediments to 
the unity of a potential Christian Jewish coalition and obstacles to the organizing of a 
potential interest group.   
Methodology 
My dissertation falls within the descriptive-analytic case-study tradition (Collier 
1993; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Ragin and Becker 1992; Yin 2003) in the study of 
American politics broadly and in the study of interest group politics, collective action, 
and social movements more specifically. Thomas (2004, 18-20) defines the four major 
approaches to interest group research as: (1) theoretical studies, (2) comprehensive 
studies of interest group activity, (3) studies of a particular aspect of interest group 
activity, and (4) case studies. The latter may comprise “a detailed analysis of a specific 
interest group…and one policy issue and the groups involved in it,” which conforms to 
my interest in the potential Christian Jewish coalition that supports a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria. Within this case study tradition I will employ participant observation, elite 
interviewing, interviewing of the rank and file individuals, content analysis and 
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documentary research.21  Selection methods will include snowball interviewing with 75 
or more subjects who participate in meetings in favor of a “strong Israel and America,” 
campaigns, legislative lobbying and protests (Gorges 2004, 399). Interest groups likely to 
be in favor of a Jewish Judea and Samaria are located around the United States and in 
Israel.  
The Participant-Observer Role 
In taking on the responsibility of the participant-observer role I faced potential 
analytic challenges including: (1) cognitive dissonance and the consequent filtering of 
information; (2) selective research design and selective data acquisition (including 
interviewing); (3) overweighting of certain aspects or literature sources; and (4) 
predetermined interpretations of results. 
 As a Jewish Zionist (by birth and belief) and a friend of Christian Zionists through 
experience, I have reason to be biased in favor of a Jewish Judea and Samaria. I believe, 
however, that I overcame the potential analytic challenges referenced above.  
Cognitive dissonance is a mental state where a person filters out information that 
conflicts with his established point of view. To counter the tendency of cognitive 
dissonance, I decided to study interest group activism with which I agree, specifically 
that in favor of a Jewish Judea and Samaria. The fact that I am biased for a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria removes any need I might have to filter out opinions with which I disagree. 
My goal was to understand the people, not misrepresent them. I am not arguing for what 
is the best policy for Judea and Samaria (West Bank). If I was, my bias would be a 
problem, as I would not represent the opposing side objectively. Because I more or less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The Appendix provides the interview questions, some of which were used in this dissertation. 
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agree with the respondents, I can get closer to them to work towards the goal of better 
understanding them.  
 I avoided the problem of selective research design and selective data acquisition 
because of my particular background. I am Jewish by birth and I married a Christian who 
later converted to become Jewish. I am therefore well experienced in most aspects of 
Judaism by birth and of Christianity through marriage, which gave me an advantage in 
the selection of a research design and data acquisition appropriate for the religious 
groups.  
 In finding relevant literature as a basis for theory, I believe I was not hindered by 
personal bias because the topic I selected is so understudied that it was challenging to 
even find relevant literature at all. As a result, when I did find useful theories (about 
which you shall learn), they stood out amongst the less helpful ones, as day from night.  
 My selection process was not biased by my personal relationships but controlled 
by specific question-answer criteria. People I know well whose answers did not match the 
selection criteria were excluded and strangers whose answers qualified were included. 
Finally, by choosing appropriate filtering questions I was able to limit the type and 
number of participants in the study thus preventing a predetermination of the results, and 
thereby deterring bias in my interpretation of them.   
PCJc Membership   
Initially, I conducted short interviews with 129 individuals. Of these, 81 
participated in long-form interviews, with 28 qualifying as members of the PCJc, not a 
statistically significant sample representative of the entire PCJc but a case study, a 
preliminary investigation of religious individuals: who share policy positions in 
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opposition to those of U.S. administrations and Congresses over time, who are willing to 
discuss their religions, and who are politically active. Any conclusions will present a 
preliminary view of the religious, political and activist traits of PCJc members. 
The potential coalition consists of those who answer four of the Judea and 
Samaria policy questions in a manner to be described here: The first question asks “What 
percent of Judea and Samaria would you give up (or give to a sovereign entity) for 
peace?” The answer is “zero” or any word denoting an equivalent value (e.g., “none”). 
The second question is “Should the United States continue supporting the Oslo 
Agreements?” The answer is “no.” The third question asks whether the United States 
should continue funding the Palestinian Authority. The answer is “no.” The fourth 
question inquires whether the respondent is in favor of an Arab state in Judea and 
Samaria. The answer is “no.”  
Analysis on the PCJc policy positions occurs in Chapter Four. Members of the 
PCJc are those respondents willing to provide answers to several questions on Jewish or 
Christian theological beliefs (if Jewish, to determine Jewish orthodoxy or if Christian, 
Christian orthodoxy). Analysis on the PCJc’s theological beliefs is found in Chapter 
Three. Members of the PCJc are those respondents who are politically active. When 
asked “are you politically active” they must answer “yes.” Analysis of the PCJc activism 
variable is revealed in Chapter Five. 
After amassing a large set of interview responses, I found that for reasons of 
clarity I should focus on two subgroups (six individuals from among the 28 members of 
the PCJc) because their activism was the most visible of all the PCJc members both 
through the election and after it. One education subgroup (ES) is led by an activist who 
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founded an educational non-profit to which two PCJc members also belong. Thus, the 
first subgroup consists of three members. The second media subgroup (MS) is led by an 
activist who founded an Internet media outfit to which two PCJc members also belong. 
The second subgroup consists of three members. Thus, the two subgroups of the PCJc 
consist of a total of six individuals, a number of persons whose interview data would for 
qualitative analysis be more manageable towards the goal of understanding the type of 
individuals that make up the potential coalition.  It is also best to focus on these 
subgroups because they are the most active and organized, if only in subgroups of their 
own organizations. However, I decided to present analysis of all 28 members for Chapter 
Three, since this would present an overview of the religious and basic characteristics of 
the PCJc, an important task for understanding the potential coalition. In short, Chapter 
Three presents and analyzes interview data for the entire membership of the PCJc of this 
case study; Chapters Four through Six analyze interview data for the six individuals of 
the two educational and Internet media subgroups ES and MS. Chapter Seven concludes 
the study.  
I have listed the types of organizations from which I recruited in Table 1 below. 
However, membership of the PCJc is selected on the basis of answers to questions (see 
“PCJc Membership” above). Therefore, the organizations I initially approached represent 
reasonable recruitment targets but not necessarily the organizations to which members of 
the PCJc belong. I will now provide some information that indicates these organizations’ 
relevance to this research: 
1) The Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) is a very old Zionist organization 
founded in 1897. The present leader, Morton Klein, sometimes criticizes the United 
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States government when its policy is detrimental to the existence of a Jewish state (Klein 
2012). It has till recently openly supported the right for Jews to live anywhere in Israel 
(Zionist Organization of America 2013).22 
2) Americans for a Safe Israel (AFSI), founded in 1970, is an educational 
organization “created to support an undivided Israel” (Americans for a Safe Israel 2013). 
3) Christians’ Israel Public Action Campaign (CIPAC) is an organization that 
describes itself as the only “Christian lobby registered with the U. S. Congress on behalf 
of biblical Israel” (CIPAC n.d.).  
4) Z-Street argues for “The right of the Jewish people to a state, and the right of 
Jews to live freely anywhere, including inhaling oxygen in areas the world insists are 
reserved for Arab Palestinians”; (Marcus 2009a); Z-Street is an organization which is a 
plaintiff in a case against the Internal Revenue Service. Z-Street’s application for 501c3 
exemption was “delayed, and may be denied, because the IRS is spending part of its 
decision-making process scrutinizing Z STREET’s positions on issues relating to Israel in 
an effort to determine whether the applicant’s ‘activities contradict the Obama 
Administration’s public policies’” (Z-Street 2011). 
5) New Wine Ministries, located in Florida, is a church that has in the last year 
organized pro-Israel events where Jews and Christians gather to show support for Israel. 
6) Act for America’s mission includes the creation of a “nationwide network of 
chapters in order to more effectively inform, educate and mobilize Americans regarding 
the multiple threats of radical Islam, and what they can and must do to protect themselves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The position is presently questionable because the ZOA website no longer shows the petition that states 
the position. I was told the website is under construction, however since ZOA lost their 501c3 non-profit 
status, their rhetoric has toned down. Therefore, it is possible that ZOA no longer vocalizes the “right for 
Jews to live anywhere in Israel.” 
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and their country against this determined enemy” (Act for America! n.d.). At local 
chapter meetings, Act features speakers who warn against the threat of Sharia (Islamic) 
law to the United States Constitution. 
7) Christians and Jews United for Israel (CJUI) attracts Christians and Jews to 
work on behalf of Israel (Christians & Jews United for Israel 2010). 
8) Women Impacting the Nation (WIN) is active in educating women to “know 
what’s important to them,” to create a more knowledgeable citizenry, according to a WIN 
representative at lectures attended by the author in 2012. The group WIN attracts mostly 
Christians to its regular meetings. The organization is part of a network of activists, 
including pro-Israel groups.   
9) International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (ICEJ), with representatives 
worldwide, is headquartered in Jerusalem. When in the summer of 1980, the Israeli 
Parliament declared the city of Jerusalem to be the undivided, eternal capital of the State 
of Israel, thirteen national embassies withdrew from Jerusalem. At the time, there were a 
number of Christians in Jerusalem for the Feast of the Tabernacles who, in support of 
Israel’s claim to Jerusalem, decided to open a Christian Embassy and to call it the 
International Christian Embassy Jerusalem. It represents Christians worldwide and its 
mission is to speak “words of comfort and support to Israel” (Buehler n.d.; International 
Christian Embassy Jerusalem n.d.). 
10) The United West is a Pro-America and Pro-Israel organization whose main 
purpose is: “[to] defend [sic] US Constitution, defending Israel and working to defeat 
Sharia compliant Islam,” according to a United West representative by phone interview, 
May 1, 2012. 
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As of 2006, U.S. congressional district 1923 in which I live has the largest Jewish 
population of all districts in the United States (Paul 2009, 8). Boca Raton, numbering 
some 76,800 persons, has a Jewish population approximately 12 percent of the entire 
Jewish population in Florida (Sheskin 2006). The Pew “U.S. Religious Landscape 
Survey” shows that more non-denominational evangelical Protestants live in the South 
(36 percent) than in any other region (Pew Research Center 2008, 92). Evangelical 
Protestants make up twenty-five percent of Florida’s population (98). The majority of the 
Christian members of the PCJc consist of non-denominational Christians; ten out of 
eighteen of the PCJc Christians are non-denominational.  
Catholics make up the largest denominational group in Florida, or 26 percent of 
religious adherents, one percent more than Protestant evangelicals in Florida (Pew 
Research Center 2008, 98). According to Greeley’s 1974 study, Irish Catholics and Jews 
are the most politically active groups (170). Jews have a voting rate one-third higher than 
other Americans (Fisher 1988, 126). The Christian Right has become a new highly 
politically engaged public (Marsden 2008; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Spector 2009; 
Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011).  
The probability of voting increases with age (Lewis-Beck, et al. 2011, 354-6). The 
political participation of the elderly may have implications for the group under study, 
especially since there is a substantial retired elderly population in Florida where the warm 
weather is conducive to the health of those advanced in age. Jennings and Marcus 
conclude that some modes of political action decline among the young-old (age 65-74) 
regarding “trying to influence the views of others, attending political meetings, and some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Following the 2010 U.S. Census, Florida gained two seats in the House of Representatives. My address 
was reassigned to District 21.  
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other comparably strenuous political activities.” However, cognitively based political 
resources do not wither in the later years. Also, reductions in types of political 
participation among the elderly are in part balanced by their increased involvement in 
“age-appropriate” behaviors that may have direct political implications (Jennings and 
Markus 1988, 315). 
Florida has the greatest density of persons 65 years or older, 17.3 percent of the 
state’s population (U.S. Department of Commerce 2012a). There is a large elderly 
population in Florida from which I expect to find a pool of those active politically in 
support of a Jewish Judea and Samaria and active in the election season to unseat the 
present President. The region and area in which I live, with its rich palette of Jews, 
Christian Zionists, and Catholics, should provide respondents who are willing to 
participate in the study and some of whom qualified as members of the potential 
coalition. 
The Research Questions 
What is the relevance of religion to the present study? The answer is that among 
the American population, the support for Israel is mainly among Jews and evangelical 
Protestants, which suggests that religion is a factor in the support of Israel. Therefore, to 
understand the respondents who support a Jewish Judea and Samaria, it is prudent to 
question them on their religious attributes. For the first question, in describing the 
profiles of the members of the coalition, the interview questions inquire as to the 
respondent’s religion, religious denomination, Jewish orthodoxy,24 Christian orthodoxy,25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Jewish Orthodoxy is a set of beliefs and practices of Orthodox Jews. I use Paul A. Djupe and Anand E. 
Sokhey’s (2006, 906-907) definition: “Orthodox Judaism is smaller in the United States, but holds a 
stronger position worldwide (particularly in Israel). Adherents view the Torah as recorded law, believe in a 
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age, profession and other religious issues that might cause division between Jews and 
Christians. 
Table 1.1 Some Key Organizations, by Identity and Description 
Name aIdentity bDescription Location 
ZOA Jewish Pro-Israel 501c3 U.S./International 
AFSI Jewish Pro-Israel 501c3 U.S./International 
CIPAC Christian Pro-Israel 501c4 U.S./International 
Z-Street Jewish Pro-Israel U.S. 
New Wine 
Ministries 
Christian Religious 501c3 Florida 
Act for America non-sectarian Pro-America U.S./International 
CJUI Christian/Jewish Pro-Israel 501c3 MA/FL 
WIN Christian Pro-America U.S. 
ICEJ Christian Pro-Israel 501c3 U.S./International 
United West Christian/Jewish Pro-America Israel 501c3 U.S. 
aIdentity. The group identity is determined by participant observation, websites or interviews with members 
in leadership positions. 
bDescription. Pro-Israel applies to an organization that supports the present borders of Israel. Pro-America 
refers to an organization that works to preserve the United States Constitution from threats to it by Islamic 
law, works to protect America’s Judeo-Christian norms, or supports the application of biblical principles in 
public life. 
 
Religious (Unifying or Divisive) Issues. To understand the unity, or lack thereof, of the 
PCJc, I created questions to investigate the religious issues that unite or divide Jews and 
Christians. Those Jews who identify Jewishness more with the Talmud than the Tanakh 
(Hebrew Scriptures) are less likely to be comfortable with Christians than those Jews 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
set of orally passed laws and traditions called the Halakha, and both written and oral laws are seen as 
universally present and applicable. Orthodox Jews strictly keep the Sabbath (choosing not to work from 
sunset Friday to sunset Saturday), wear yarmulkas, and hold strict conventions on gender (men and women 
are segregated in the synagogue, and women cannot become ordained rabbis). Orthodox Judaism attempts 
the maintenance of tradition in the face of modernity.”   
 
25 Christian Orthodoxy, or fundamentalist orthodoxy, is a set of beliefs which Christian Zionists tend to 
hold, including a literal interpretation of the Bible. I use James L. Guth’s (2007, 20) measure for 
fundamentalist orthodoxy, eight questions, which includes theological items such as belief in or support for: 
the virgin birth, literal existence of the Devil, the second coming of Jesus Christ, Jesus as the only way to 
salvation, opposition to gay clergy, Adam and Eve as historical persons, rejection of evolution, and 
inerrancy of Scripture. I evaluate a respondent as a Christian Zionist of the basis of responses to eight 
questions, giving scores from 0 to 100 percent with 75 percent (as passing), Guth’s (2007, 21) measurement 
of Christian Zionism determined by how strongly a person agrees or disagrees with the statement “Modern-
day Israel is a special nation blessed by God.” 
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who identify Jewishness more with the Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures), which would be the 
case because the Jews who identify Jewishness more with the Talmud than with the 
Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) have less in common with Christians (whose sole book in 
common with Jews is the Tanakh or Hebrew Scriptures) than those Jews who prefer the 
Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) to the Talmud. Thus I ask Jews: Which book best defines a 
Jew, the Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) or the Talmud? I also ask: When they disagree, 
which is more authoritative? The purpose of these questions is to understand the 
scriptural preferences of the Jews, which may unify the coalition if the Jews prefer the 
Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) with which the Christians are familiar.   
For Christians, the issue that would distinctively divide them from Jews in a 
coalition would be the doctrine of pre-tribulation rapture, which asserts that Christians 
will escape the coming wrath of God by being taken up into the air before the Great 
Tribulation.26 I ask a question that specifically tests for pre-tribulation belief; I ask the 
respondent to state the order in which certain events, including the tribulation and the 
rapture, occur. The Christian respondent who believes that he or she will be raptured 
(taken away by Jesus Christ before the Great Tribulation) is less likely to be endeared to 
Jews than the respondent who will be with Jews and others on earth throughout the very 
difficult time on earth. I also ask: How does your belief in a (pre- or post-trib) rapture 
affect your relationship to American politics, Jews and Israel? The purpose of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The theology of dispensationalism asserts that God acts through historical periods and he cannot be 
personally involved in both the lives of the Church and Israel at the same time. The last of those periods is 
yet to come and involves the Jewish people’s return to the land of Israel. The dispensationalists who seem 
to be most prominent among today’s Christian Zionists also tend to believe in a specific eschatology 
(pretribulationism) which foretells certain events in the following chronological order: 1) a rapture; 2) a 
tribulation; 3) the second coming of Jesus Christ; 4) a 1000 year period of peace and righteousness called 
the millennium on earth (Weber 1979). 
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questions is to understand better the eschatological belief composition of the membership 
of the PCJc that may prove to be an impediment to the group’s effectiveness in working 
together. 
Issues of Division for Christians. The conversion motive is of concern to Jews. I asked 
whether Christians can support Israel without trying to convert Jews. I present a list of 
pagan symbols followed by two Jewish religious symbols and I ask the Christian “which 
of the following are important religious symbols to you?” The question tests for the 
Christian’s identification with symbols of paganism (e.g., Christmas tree, Easter bunnies, 
Easter Eggs) and Judaism’s holiday symbols (e.g., the Seder meal and the Succah). 
Identification with the former will separate the respondent from Jews but identification 
with the Jewish symbols of Passover or the Succah (temporary booth) will bring 
Christians closer to Jews. 
Other Issues of Division for Jews.  As suggested above in my literature review, Jews 
generally avoid political participation with Republicans because of their aversion for 
Christians in that party. I test for that aversion by asking Jews “if given the choice 
between two presidential candidates, one a Muslim and the other an evangelical 
Christian, for whom would you vote?” Some Jewish persons, like Moshe Feiglin who 
strongly supports a Jewish Judea and Samaria, are not likely to accept funds from 
Christians because they seek to protect Jewish people from the influence of Christian 
missionaries (Feiglin 2011). I ask whether it is alright for Jewish organizations to accept 
Christian donations. Rabbi Tovia Singer, a Jew, and until 2010 a radio talk show host on 
Israel National Radio, now devotes full time to his anti-missionary organization, 
Outreach Judaism (2013). I ask the Jewish respondents if all Christians want to convert 
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Jews. Orthodox rabbinic teachings forbid Jews from entering churches because the claim 
is that there are idols there. I ask Jewish interviewees if they think it is alright for Jews to 
enter churches.  
For the second question, in order to describe the positions that have held this 
coalition together over time, and the issues that have divided it, I ask the respondents 
questions regarding Judea and Samaria (the policy issue). 
The Selection of a Jewish Judea and Samaria. The selection of this topic occurred in the 
course of a conversation about what aspect of Israel I wanted to focus on. The land of 
Israel came to mind because it is the presence of the Jewish people on a specific plot of 
land in the Middle East that makes the nation-state of Israel a topic of interest. Israel 
attracts attention because of its provocative territorial claim, on the basis of its historical-
religious connection (including its claim to be messenger of the Bible) to that land. 
Specifically, Israel’s Declaration of Independence states that “the Land of Israel, 
[Palestine] was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and 
political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values 
of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books” 
(Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1948). In these few sentences, the founders of Israel 
link the land of Israel to: 1) the birthplace of the Jewish people; 2) the place Jews first 
attained statehood; and 3) the site where Jewish delivery of the Book of Books (the 
Bible) occurred.  
The third claim points to the special relationship between the land of Israel, the 
Jewish people and their religious text. The term Book of Books, synonymous for “the 
Bible,” suggests both the worldwide reverence for the Bible, and Israel’s respect for the 
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Hebrew Scriptures. The Hebrew Scriptures are popular; indeed the Protestant King James 
Bible which includes the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament is the best-selling 
book of all time (Ryken 2011). Christians who make up 33 percent of the world 
population27 have an interest in Israel as the birthplace of their Savior Jesus Christ 
because of his story in the New Testament. Thus, the publication of the Declaration 
reveals the Jews’ attitude toward their land and gives reason for Christian interest in it. 
For Christian Zionists, the Jewish claim to the land may excite admiration or support for 
Israel. For those Christians who believe they are the new chosen people or 
supercessionists, the Jewish claim may provoke them to support an Arab claim to the 
land. 
As the Declaration states that the Jews were the messengers of the Bible in the 
land, the state of Israel thereby links together the Jews, the land, and their religious text. 
On the other hand, Muslim Arabs claim that the land belongs to Allah (God), or to the 
adherents of Islam. Thus, the ideas expressed in the Declaration help to inspire an 
interesting competition, by bringing forth two competing religious claims to the land: 1) 
Muslim Arabs’ claim to the land as belonging to Allah; 2) Israel’s claim to the land as the 
birthplace of the Jews and the site from which the Jews gave to the world the Bible. The 
competition is the basis for the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Biblical verses describe Abraham, the father of the Jewish people, his son and 
grandson, respectively, Isaac and Jacob, and their descendants as those who would inherit 
the land. They traveled through Judea and Samaria and left many religious landmarks of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Worldwide Adherents of All Religions” 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1731588/Religion-Year-In-Review-2010/298437/Worldwide-
Adherents-of-All-Religions (accessed October 7, 2013). 
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significance, such as Hebron (the burial place of Abraham and Sarah), Beth El, and other 
places which, according to the Bible, were visited by God or his angels, and were sites of 
miraculous events. Since 1967, the public conversation about whose land it is often turns 
to Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Since the Oslo Accords, negotiations between the Arabs and 
Israel focused on Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Since the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 
2005, bilateral discussions would refocus on, point to the fate of, the eastern territory or 
Judea and Samaria. In summary, because this land is of such political and religious-
historical significance, therefore, I chose to focus on Judea and Samaria.  
In The Israel Lobby (2007, 113-4), Mearsheimer and Walt define a pro-Israel 
person as one “who supports Israel’s right to exist, admires its many achievements, wants 
its citizens to enjoy secure and prosperous lives, and believes that the United States 
should come to Israel’s aid if its survival is in danger.” By conducting a qualitative study, 
I hoped to contribute to the body of knowledge on a small group of understudied 
individuals, advocates for Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria. I chose the word 
“Jewish” to precede “Judea and Samaria” because I wanted to suggest that the political 
activity would be generated by those supportive of a Jewish28 claim to Judea and 
Samaria. I chose “the American politics”29 of a Jewish Judea and Samaria on the basis of 
two reliable assertions: 1) the American people are collectively one of the best friends of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The word Jewish itself suggest even more than Israeli sovereignty to the land. It also touches on the 
national, religious, historical and biblical identity of the people, an identity that in fact has been costly for 
them to bear through centuries of persecution.  
 
29 Under the discussion below on the third research question, I will briefly explain the selection of 
“American politics” in regards to the land issue. 
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Israel; 2) within those people I would find some who support, and are politically active 
for, a Jewish Judea and Samaria. 
The Policy Questions (Advocacy). Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) is land that 
comprises areas south and north of Jerusalem that the sovereign Jewish state of Israel 
controls. The Oslo Accords consist of interim agreements between the government of 
Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to negotiate towards Arab 
autonomy or sovereignty over some of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. The United 
States began its support for Oslo in 1993, when President Bill Clinton hosted Prime 
Minister Yitzchak Rabin and Chairman of the PLO Yasser Arafat for the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles (DOP; the first Oslo Agreement) on the White House lawn. 
Since that time, the United States supports the Oslo Agreement by pressuring Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority (PA)30 towards a final status agreement. Additionally, the 
United States provides financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. According to Jim 
Zanotti of the Congressional Research Service, “Since the establishment of limited 
Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s, the United States 
government has committed over $4 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians” 
(Zanotti 2011). After preliminary questions inquiring why the respondents favor a Jewish 
Judea and Samaria, and what does a Jewish Judea and Samaria mean to them, I asked 
interviewees what percent of Judea and Samaria would they give up (or give to a 
sovereign entity) for peace. Should the United States continue to support the Oslo 
Accords? Should the United States continue funding the Palestinian Authority?   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 An administrative body established in 1994 to govern parts of the West Bank and Gaza (Jewish Virtual 
Library 2008b). 
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The potential coalition supports an undivided Jewish Judea and Samaria in 
contrast to United States Administrations over time. The United States has favored the 
two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, whereby Israel cedes parts of the West 
Bank (Judea and Samaria) to Arabs. For example, at Camp David II, President Clinton, 
on behalf of Ehud Barak, offered to the President of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser 
Arafat, 91 percent of the West Bank (Clinton 2004, 914; Ross 2004, 688-9). President 
George W. Bush gave a speech in June 2002 in which he presented his vision of “two 
states, living side by side in peace and security” (Bush 2010; The White House 2002). 
Later, Secretary of State Powell wrote the “Road Map to Peace” on the basis of Bush’s 
speech (Bush 2010). I asked interviewees if they favor the establishment of a Palestinian 
state in Judea and Samaria. Each American president since 1967 has formally agreed that: 
Israeli settlements beyond the 1967 armistice lines – the “green line”31 – are 
obstacles to peace. Until 1981 they were considered illegal under international 
law, but the administration of Ronald Reagan reversed position and declared they 
were not illegal. But Reagan, and especially George Bush, continued to oppose 
the creation of settlements. No American funds are to be used by Israel beyond 
the green line. (Quandt 2005, 5-6)  
 
I asked interviewees if they think that Jews should be allowed to live anywhere in Judea 
and Samaria. 
Why am I interested in “how – with what resources and methods – has this 
coalition attempted to influence U.S. policy on (a) the Middle East generally, and (b) the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in particular”? Of what import is the “American Politics” of a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria that uses resources and methods to try to influence U.S. policy 
especially on the Israeli-Arab relationship?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The 1967 armistice line is the line to which the Israeli military pushed back its enemies during the Six 
Day war. It serves as a border between Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and the rest of Israel. 
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Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) have credited the Israel Lobby (mostly in the 
United States) with working against the best interest of the United States in the Middle 
East. Respecting this dissertation’s topic, the interest of the United States is a negotiated 
Arab state (the two-state solution) in Judea and Samaria. I have chosen to study the 
political activism of one segment of the Israel Lobby – the activities of those who support 
a Jewish Judea and Samaria and who oppose United States policy on that topic. While the 
study is not an attempt to refute Mearsheimer and Walt’s assertions (2007) that the Israel 
Lobby works against U.S. interests, it will lend more understanding on the nature of a 
potential coalition that believes it does work with America’s and Israel’s best interest in 
mind on the policy issue of the land. I questioned respondents regarding their level of 
political activity, which helps to understand how involved this coalition is in regular 
electoral politics or on other political issues. I asked them what they have done to support 
a Jewish Judea and Samaria. I asked what have been the effects of their support for a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria; if they are Christians, how many activities include Jews and 
what is the ratio of Jews to all attendees; if they are Jews, how many activities include 
Christians and what is the ratio of Christians to all attendees. I also observed the 
coalition’s resources and methods during the 2012 election season when most of the 
members actively worked to oppose the re-election of President Obama. The importance 
of Florida in the 2012 election is suggested by where (Tampa, Florida) the Republicans 
held their national convention.  
Political Issue. The PCJc’s view of Obama’s friendship to Israel is a unifying or divisive 
issue and falls under the methods and resources question.  Unity among the members of 
the PCJc on this issue would be a resource of strength. The President’s views affect the 
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American politics of Judea and Samaria more than do any one politician’s views or any 
group of government officials’ views; for example, President Truman decided to 
recognize the state of Israel 11 minutes after its founding, in spite of the opposition of 
Secretary of State George Marshall and State Department officials, and the fact is often 
quoted as an example of friendly relations between the United States and Israel. Whoever 
occupies that office is seen as having a potential influence over the affairs of Israel. I 
asked the respondents to select a value, on a scale of one to five (best [one] to the worst 
[five]) to suggest the kind of a friend that President Obama is to Israel. The question is 
trying to ascertain the unity of the coalition through evaluating members’ opinions of 
President Obama’s relationship to Israel. 
To assess what appear to have been the successes or failures of this coalition’s 
advocacy, I observed the coalition for the entire 2012 election season up to November 7, 
2012 and beyond. I observed the role that the policy issue played in their goals for the 
2012 election. I interviewed members of the PCJc after the election to determine how 
successful they thought they were in achieving their goals. Also, I asked members of the 
PCJc about the influence of the 501c3/501c4 agreement32 on their political activities. 
Finally, to describe what this case reveals or informs about interest group politics more 
broadly in the United States, I compared the results of this study to what the literature has 
discovered about interest group politics and social movements in the United States.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 If the respondent was involved in a 501c4 nonprofit, I asked him or her about the influence of that 
organization on their activities. The difference between the 501c4 and 501c3 is that the former may lobby 
an unlimited amount on issues directly related to the organization’s mission whereas the latter may only 
lobby some. Neither may campaign for candidates, thus, their political activism is limited.  
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Conclusion 
Analytic Propositions  
 I would like at this point to offer three propositions of major expected findings. 
These propositions will be evaluated through follow up interviews with informants. The 
findings for Propositions One and Two will be reported in Chapter Three, which deals 
with religious issues of the potential coalition. The findings for Proposition Three will be 
covered in Chapter Six, which presents the successes or failures of the potential coalition. 
Propositions: 1) Within the PCJc, Jewish persons who identify Jewish more with the 
Talmud than with the Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) will want to work less with Christians 
than Jews who identify Jewish more with the Tanakh; 2) the post-tribulation rapture 
believer will make a partner for the coalition because Christians who believe in post-
tribulation rapture expect to be on earth with the Jews during the tribulation. Belief in 
pre-tribulation rapture separates Christians from Jews; 3) the 501c3 status of 
organizations may affect the political efficacy of its leaders, reducing their sense of 
influence over public policy.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The recent allegation that the U.S. tax agency has for several years been targeting conservative groups - 
arose in May 2013, well after the dissertation research had been conducted. I have incorporated the ongoing 
developments of this issue, quite relevant to this study, into the dissertation writing and analysis.   
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II. PALESTINE, JUDEA AND SAMARIA 
In this chapter I will review the history of the term “Palestine,” as its name is used 
in policy discussions. I will define the “Judea and Samaria” issue in historical-geographic 
terms. Additionally, a brief exposition of the international law of a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria will be presented.  
Palestine 
The History of Palestine. The name “Palestinians” derives from the Philistines, also 
called “The Sea Peoples” originally from western Anatolia and the Aegean (Stiebing 
1980, 13). Their migration was probably a consequence of political, social, and economic 
collapse (15). They are mentioned in Egyptian records as one of the Sea Peoples who 
invaded Egypt c. 1190 B.C.E. after attacking Anatolia, Cyprus, and Syria. Turned away 
by the Egyptians, they settled in the coastal plain of “Palestine” from Yaffa (near modern 
day Tel Aviv) to the Gaza Strip. They founded a series of city states (Parkes [1949] 1970, 
17): Gaza, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Gath, and Ekron.34  
From the end of the ancient Jewish state in 135 C.E. to the beginning of British 
mandate rule in 1920, the area referred to as Palestine was not a country and had no 
boundaries (Lewis 1975, 32). Indeed, from 135 C.E. to the 1900s, “Palestine” was not 
found on the political map of the world but was rather part of a larger province, whether 
Roman, Byzantine, Arab, or Turkish. Its people did not see themselves as a nation. They 
did not try to form a kingdom, unlike the early Israelite people. During the period of 
Islamic rule between 633 and 1099 C.E. (Peters 2002, 153) none of the rulers (caliphs) 
came from the Palestinian population. It was either the domain of dynasties governing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “Phillistine.” 
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from Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, or Istanbul (Parkes 1949, 13), or it was regarded by 
Arabs as part of a general pan-Arab territory. 
For example, according to the 1919 Arab Covenant of the Arab Congress in 
Jerusalem, Arab lands were a “complete and indivisible whole, and the divisions of 
whatever nature to which they have been subjected are” neither approved nor “recognized 
by the Arab nation.” On the other hand, in that same year, the General Syrian Congress 
ascribed a [national] Syrian rather than a pan-Arab identity to the land.  Later, the 1947 
Arab Ba’ath Party Constitution portrayed a pan-Arab outlook in its 1951 constitution: 
“The Arabs form one nation. This nation has the natural right to live in a single state and 
to be free to direct its own destiny.” The battle for Arab independence was thus seen as 
the “struggle to gather all the Arabs in a single, independent Arab state.”  
Finally, while leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Ahmed Shukeiry 
took an overtly nationalist position in 1952, stating to the U. N. Security Council that “it 
is common knowledge that Palestine is nothing but southern Syria” (Syrkin 1975, 200-
201; Bentwich 1952, 11). In sum, the area called Palestine bore national or pan-Arab 
attributes, depending on the time and actors, but the inhabitants ascribed no “Palestinian” 
identity to it. 
The Name of Palestine 
After the people of Israel35 departed from Egypt between 1304 and 1237 B.C.E.  
(Sanger 1980, 39), they entered into the land of Canaan. Historians have established their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The Bible refers to the descendants of Abraham, the father of the Jews, as “the children of Israel,” 
indicating the person “Israel,” originally, “Jacob,” the grandson of Abraham.  A biblical story tells how 
Jacob struggled with an angel of God and overcame him.  The angel then told Jacob “Thy name shall be 
called no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou power with God and with men, and hast prevailed 
(Genesis 32:28). However, instead of using the biblical appellation, “the children of Israel,” I have chosen a 
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presence there by 1232 B.C.E. (1980, 39). At the beginning of the monarchic period after 
the death of Solomon in 922 B.C.E. (1980, 44), the Jews divided into two kingdoms, 
“Israel and Judah” (Stone 1981, 10-11). Jewish connection to the land between the Nile 
and Euphrates River has a scriptural basis with references to God’s delineation of borders 
to the father of the Jews, Abraham: “the Lord made a covenant with Abram, saying: 
'Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the 
river Euphrates’” (Genesis 15:18). 
I turn now to the historical period from which the name “Palestine” evolved, the 
era of Roman domination of the land.  
After the people of Israel’s first war against Rome, 66-73 C.E. (Barnavi and 
Eliav-Feldon 1994, 52), the Romans may have believed that the destruction of the 
Temple, and the “confiscation and dedication to Jupiter Capitolinus of the tax previously 
paid by all Jews to the Temple,” would be punishment enough for the revolt (Parkes 
1949, 45). The second Jewish revolt of Bar-Kochba (132-5 C.E.) may have been a 
reaction to the intention of Hadrian to build a new Roman city Aelia Capitolina on the 
site of Jerusalem and a response to his edict forbidding mutilation such as circumcision 
(Parkes 1949, 45-6). Eshel, however, relates Dio’s account that Aelia Capitolina was 
founded in 130 C.E. prior to the revolt (2006, 107) rather than as a reaction to it. 
Bar Kochba, with 200,000 men, recaptured Jerusalem and villages around the 
area. The war lasted four years and as many as 580,000 men were killed (Peters 2002, 
141). The war made the emperors more determined to Romanize Palestine, and Hadrian: 
(1) re-founded Jerusalem as a pagan city, with the Temple of Jupiter in place of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
similar but perhaps modern name – “the people of Israel” – to refer not to the land of Israel but to the 
person Israel’s descendants.  
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Jewish Temple; (2) forbade the Jews to go near the city; and (3) renamed it Aelia 
Capitolina (Macalister 1921, 101-2; Parkes 1949, 54). As a further set of reprisals, Jews 
were forbidden to practice Jewish customs, and rabbinic seminaries were broken up. 
These laws proved impossible to enforce, however, with the exception of exclusion of 
Jews from Jerusalem, and they were revoked by Hadrian’s successor, Antoninus Pius 
(1949, 46).  
During this period some of the Jews driven from Jerusalem settled in Tiberias, 
where they wrote the Jerusalem Talmud (Macalister 1921, 101-2). Suggesting a new era 
of Roman domination, the Romans applied a new name, Syria Palestina (Palestine) to the 
area from south of Syria to the southern end of the Dead Sea, and from the Mediterranean 
past the Jordan River (Lewis 1975, 32). 
Following an Arab conquest of the area in the seventh century, Palestine – one of 
many social, cultural, economic and political entities – was a portion of “Syria.” Other 
such political units were Egypt, Jazira (Mesopotamia), Iraq, Arabia, and Yemen (Stone 
1981, 10-11). Between 1095 and 1291, Western Christian crusaders launched military 
expeditions against Muslims in order to take possession of the Holy City of Jerusalem 
and the places associated with Jesus Christ.36  
After the Muslims recaptured the land from the Crusaders in the 15th century, the 
term “Palestine” was not used even to designate a subdistrict of Syria. Indeed, 
subdistricts under Damascus of Syria were referred to by town names such as Gaza, 
Lydda, Qaqun, Jerusalem, Hebron, and Nablus. The practice continued when the area fell 
under Ottoman rule in 1516-1517, with subdistricts referred to by townships. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “The Crusades.”  
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northern area was distinguished as the Vilayet of Damascus, while both sectors belonged 
to Syria (Stone 1981, 10-11). 
Judea and Samaria 
Having presented background on Palestine, I will now focus in on a smaller area 
within it, specifically Judea and Samaria. I will present details that led to the existence of 
Judea and Samaria on a political map. As stated above, following the reign of King 
Solomon, the people of Israel divided into two groups, forming the Kingdom of Judah (to 
the south) and the Kingdom of Israel (to the north). Both polities were on the 
mountainous plateau, and the coastal plain to the east was occupied by the Philistines and 
the Phoenicians. Situated on that elevated plateau, the separate Kingdoms of Judea and 
Israel stretched from Jenin in the north to a point south of Hebron in the south (Bentwich 
1952, 12).  
 The collapse of the united monarchy of the 12 tribes of the people of Israel began 
in the town of Shechem. According to I Kings 12:17-20, King Rehoboam (from the tribe 
of Judah) sent his labor supervisor, Adoram, to enforce control over the north. However, 
the northern tribes (or the house, or Kingdom, of Israel; see I Kings 12:21) stoned 
Adoram. That killing marked the beginning of the northern Kingdom of Israel’s rebellion 
against, and separation from, the tribe of Judah. King Rehoboam maintained control over 
the territories of Judah and Benjamin, the latter a tribal area whose southern border 
touched Jerusalem. Jeroboam took control in the north centering his kingdom in the city-
state of Shechem; he strengthened first the city of Shechem and then a town, Penuel, 
across the Jordan River (Campbell 1998, 281). Thus, in 928 B.C.E., Jeroboam I (928-907 
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B.C.E.) led the tribes of the Israel polity, while Rehoboam (928-911 B.C.E.) ruled over 
Judah and Benjamin (Levine 1998, 598).  
 The next significant marker in the history of Judea and Samaria occurred during 
the reign of Omri over the northern tribes of Israel (882-87 B.C.E.). Omri founded the 
capital of Samaria in Israel (Levine 1998, 598). He fortified and named it “Samaria” after 
its previous owner, Shemer. Shechem and Tirzah thereafter diminished as important 
centers of the Kingdom of Israel (Campbell 1998, 288).   
 In 722 B.C.E., the Assyrians conquered the city of Samaria (1998, 316), and 
Judah awaited its fate at the hands of the conquerors. The Kingdom of Israel was 
destroyed, its leadership exported, and its remaining population left to occupation. The 
Assyrians devastated Tirzah, Shechem, and Samaria (317).  
In 586 B.C.E., the Babylonians overcame the capital of Judah, which was 
Jerusalem (Cogan 1998, 353) and exiled a majority of the Judeans, settling them between 
Assyria and Babylonia (357). Two centuries of Persian rule in the Near East followed, 
starting in 539 B.C.E. with the conquest of Babylon by the army of King Cyrus II (559-
530 B.C.E.) and culminating in 332 B.C.E. when Alexander the Great (336-323 B.C.E.) 
took control of the Levant after defeating the Persian king Darius III (Leith 1998, 371). 
During the Persian period (539-332 B.C.E.), in 538 B.C.E., some members of 
Judah returned to Jerusalem. The Second Temple in Jerusalem was built between 520 and 
515 B.C.E. (Coogan 1998, 600). The Jewish people of the area of Judea and Samaria 
throughout the Persian period comprised (1) the non-exiled Jews of Judah, (2) the exiled 
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Jews who had returned to Judah, (3) Samarians,37 (4) Galileans, and (5) a family in 
Ammon across the Jordan (Leith 1998, 387). The northern tribes, namely of the Kingdom 
of Israel, are considered “lost”; that is to say that as a result of the Assyrian occupation of 
the Kingdom of Israel in 722 B.C.E. and the latter’s destruction, scholars have not been 
able to find evidence of those people. Those whom the Assyrians had exported have not 
been identified as inhabitants of Samaria, wedged between Jerusalem and the Gallilee; 
and those few who had remained produced no descendants identifiable as the northern 
tribes of Israel.  
A Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria overall decreased between 722 B.C.E. 
and 132-5 C.E. Jews returned, however, in significant waves from the late nineteenth 
century to the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, and thereafter. It is to this more 
recent history of Judea and Samaria that I now turn.  
According to the Armistice agreements of 1949 with the Arab States of Lebanon, 
Syria, Egypt, and Transjordan, the boundaries of modern Israel on the north, south, and 
west were almost identical with those of the British mandated Palestine west of the 
Jordan. These boundaries were provisional because the Armistice agreements specified 
that they were to be “without prejudice to the rights, claim or position of the parties” and 
were to be replaced through a negotiated peace treaty. Between 1949 and 1952, border 
incidents increased between Israel and all of the Arab States, except Lebanon (Bentwich 
1952, 13). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 A people of mixed ancestry, possibly in part related to the people of Israel.  
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After Transjordan38 acquired land west of the Jordan River in the 1948 war, and 
until December 1967, both Transjordan and Israel applied the term “West Bank” to the 
area earlier known as Judea and Samaria. After 1967, the region’s official name (in 
Hebrew only) was changed to “Judaea and Samaria” (Gazit 1995, 2). 
West Bank 
Geographically, “Judea” describes a mountainous ridge situated in an area close 
to the major towns of Jerusalem, Hebron, and Bethlehem. Samaria is the area north 
centering on Jenin and Nablus. Gerson indicates that the term “Judea and Samaria” is 
geographically and historically accurate. While the “West Bank” is not neutral and 
implies Jordanian sovereignty, it has been and continues to be used generally (Gerson 
1973, 1).  Indeed, a glimpse at points in Jordanian history sheds light on the application 
of the term “West Bank.” 
King Abdullah of Transjordan convened the Jericho Conference on December 1, 
1948 (Massad 2001, 227). The renaming of central Israel as the “West Bank” occurred 
one year after the conference (229) and referred to the area west of the Jordan River. On 
January 1, 1950, King Abdullah annexed the West Bank. On April 25, 1950 he renamed 
his realm the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Sachar 2003, 451). Then in 1953, the 
government unified the laws of the east and west banks of the Jordan River under the 
jurisdiction of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Massad 2001, 229). The United States 
de facto accepted Abdullah’s annexation of the West Bank (United States Department of 
State 1950, 921).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 After April 25, 1950 Transjordan was known as Jordan. 
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In summary, I have related how following the two Jewish revolts the Romans 
assigned the name “Palestine” to a land upon which the Jews had established a nation. 
The usage of the terms “Judea” and “Samaria” to describe a part of that land would be 
acceptable on the basis of historical geography. However, the area has been generally 
described and partially accepted by Israel, following the Jordanian appellation, as the 
“West Bank.”  
International Law of the Land of Israel 
Between 1516 and 1917, the Ottoman Empire was sovereign over a large swath of 
land that included territory east and west of the Jordan River which the Romans had 
named Palestine. As a result of World War I, the Ottoman Empire, along with Austria 
and Germany, lost sovereignty over much of their extended territories.  
As recorded in the Versailles Treaty, signed on June 28, 1919 by Germany and 
the allied powers, the latter obtained sovereignty over the land of the former Ottoman 
Empire (Grief 2012). The date when the change of sovereignty occurred had to be on 
January 30, 1919 -- when it was “irrevocably decided by the Council of Ten in adopting 
the Smuts Resolution, that none of the ex-German and ex-Turkish territories would be 
returned to their former owners” (Grief 2004). 
Then in 1920, at the San Remo Conference in Italy, a decision was made by the 
principal allied powers to distribute the lands of the former Ottoman Empire to the 
ethnicities: Mesopotamia became Iraq; Syria including Lebanon to the east was 
considered as a separate entity (Grief 2013, 28). At the San Remo Conference, 
sovereignty over the land of Palestine was given to the Jewish people in its entirety, 
which made this a sui generis – a one of a kind case – as compared to other lands, such as 
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Mesopotamia or Syria, which went to inhabitants of those lands. In contrast, Palestine 
went to world Jewry (Benzimra 2013; Grief 2012). Palestine was defined as from “Dan to 
Beersheva,” which was not interpreted literally, as this specifies but north to south, but 
was shorthand for the historical biblical borders of Israel. The British Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George relied on George Adam Smith’s works, The Historical Geography 
of the Holy Land (1894) and Atlas of the Historical Geography of the Holy Land (1915) 
to determine the territorial boundaries of Israel (Grief 2013, 32-3). According to the San 
Remo Resolution, as found at the Council of Foreign Relations website: 
It was agreed –  
To accept the terms of the Mandates Article as given below with reference to Palestine, 
on the understanding that there was inserted in the proces-verbal an undertaking by the 
Mandatory Power that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed 
by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine; this undertaking not to refer to the question 
of the religious protectorate of France, which had been settled earlier in the previous 
afternoon by the undertaking given by the French Government that they recognized this 
protectorate as being at an end. 
 
That the terms of the Mandates Article should be as follows:  
 
The High Contracting Parties agree that Syria and Mesopotamia shall, in accordance with 
the fourth paragraph of Article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), be 
provisionally recognized as independent States, subject to the rendering of administrative 
advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The 
boundaries of the said States will be determined, and the selection of the Mandatories 
made, by the Principal Allied Powers. 
The High Contracting Parties agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 
22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the 
Principal Allied Powers, to a Mandatory, to be selected by the said Powers. The 
Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on 
November 8, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, 
in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it 
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and 
political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. (Council on Foreign Relations 
[1920] 2013) 
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 The Mandates System was established and governed by Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, in the Treaty of Versailles, and in other peace treaties 
signed with the Central Powers – Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 
 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, one of the internationally 
legally binding components of the San Remo Resolution upon which Jewish sovereignty 
over the land of Israel is established, states that “certain communities formerly belonging 
to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as 
independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of 
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to 
stand alone” (The Avalon Project [1924] 2008), which makes quite clear that the 
sovereignty of Palestine was at stake in establishment of the mandatory system.  
The country of Palestine was created at the San Remo Peace Conference (1920) 
where the Balfour Declaration was adopted by the Supreme Council of the Principal 
Allied Powers as the foundation for the future administration of Palestine which would 
thereafter be acknowledged as the Jewish National Home. 
The independent Jewish state evolved from three documents, or the founding 
documents of mandated Palestine. These were the “San Remo Resolution of April 25, 
1920, the Mandate for Palestine conferred on Britain by the Principal Allied Powers and 
confirmed by the League of Nations on July 24, 1922, and the Franco-British Boundary 
Convention of December 23, 1920” (Grief 2004). 
The San Remo Resolution on Palestine became Article 95 of the Treaty of Sevres, 
which was intended to end the war with Turkey. Although this treaty was never ratified 
by the Turkish National Government of Kemal Ataturk, the Resolution retained validity 
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as an independent act of international law when it was placed into the Preamble of the 
Mandate for Palestine and agreed upon by 52 states. The San Remo Resolution is thus the 
“base document upon which the Mandate was constructed and to which it had to 
conform” and serves as the pre-eminent foundation document of the State of Israel and 
the achievement of pre-state Zionism. Indeed, it has been correctly described as the 
Magna Carta of the Jewish people and stands as the most excellent proof that the whole 
country of Palestine and the land of Israel belong exclusively to the Jewish people under 
international law (Grief 2004). 
These former Ottoman Empire territories were placed in the hands of the Principal 
Allied and Associated Powers for their distribution. In the case of Palestine, that decision 
was made for the Jewish people at the session of the San Remo Peace Conference that 
took place on April 24, 1920 when the Balfour Declaration was adopted as the basis for 
creating and administering the new country of Palestine that, until that moment, had had 
no official existence. Insofar as the Balfour Declaration was made in favor of the Jewish 
people, it was the latter upon whom “de jure sovereignty was devolved over all of 
Palestine” (Grief 2004). However, during the Mandate period (1920-1948), the British 
government and not the Jewish people exercised the attributes of sovereignty, while 
sovereignty in the theoretical sense (i.e., de jure sovereignty) remained in the Jewish 
people, which is reflected in the Mandate Charter where the aspects of the title of 
sovereignty of the Jewish people over Palestine are explicitly mentioned in the first three 
paragraphs of the Preamble, namely, Article 22, the Balfour Declaration and the 
historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine (Grief 2004). 
71 
 
The General Assembly makes no binding international law, as stated in the United 
Nations Covenant (Kontorovich 2012). Neither Great Britain nor the United Nations (the 
successor to the League of Nations) have sovereignty over the land of Israel. The Jewish 
people were granted sovereign rights over the land of Israel.  
This changed in 1948, when Israel was declared a state by Jewish leaders; since 
then the state of Israel has been sovereign over the land of Israel (Grief 2013). In 1993, 
by signing the Oslo Accords with the PLO, the government of Israel agreed to move 
towards increasing Arab autonomy over parts of Israel, namely Judea, Samaria, and 
Gaza, and to move towards a final status agreement with the PLO that implied 
transferring sovereignty to the latter. The fact that the government of Israel, as a 
representative of the Jewish people, signed the Oslo Agreement with the PLO implies 
that indeed it holds sovereignty over the land of Israel including Judea and Samaria and 
that only it – not the United States or the United Nations – can concede territory to the 
Arabs. In short, Oslo presents an opportunity for Israel to give up sovereignty over the 
land of Israel. Of direct relevance to this study, however, the PCJc does not want Israel to 
relinquish its sovereignty, any of it, over the land of Israel.  
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III. THE PROFILES OF THE POTENTIAL CHRISTIAN JEWISH COALITION 
I will cover the material important to the nature of the coalition, particularly that 
on the religions of Judaism and Christianity. Next, relying on my primary research, I will 
discuss in more detail the nature and profiles of the coalition, including religious identity, 
denomination, profession, age, religious orthodoxy, and other religious issues of 
importance to the coalition’s unity or division.  
The Histories of Judaism and Christianity 
 Differences in religious beliefs – and the reasons or understandings/interpretations 
underlying those differences – are an important variable in explaining how groups may or 
may not be able to work together in the political world. The section is intended to 
increase understanding of the two religions with which most of the members of the PCJc 
identify. 
The following brief treatment of the histories of Judaism and Christianity will 
begin to explicate the religious nature of this coalition. More specifically, it will suggest 
how, from the beginning of the first century, the creation of and then the adherence to 
different religious texts – the Talmud and the New Testament – created a chasm between 
Jews and Christians. Additionally, these histories will point to the influence the 
leaderships of Judaism and Christianity have over the members of these religions. 
 At first, the Jewish membership was independent of its leadership but eventually 
the authority of rabbinic Judaism dominated. Also, at the beginning, Jewish synagogues 
and Gentile churches excluded the original Christians, who were Jewish by birth, 
sometimes referred to as Judeo-Christians (Christian Jews), those who ultimately would 
become, for the most part, extinct. Hence, the surviving religious entities were rabbinic 
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Judaism and its followers on the one hand, and Gentile Christianity and its followers on 
the other. Excluded were independent minded Jews and Judeo-Christians. 
One might imagine that this history implies a barrier between Jews who might 
choose to think independently and Christians of the Judeo-Christian type (seeking 
traditions of the early Christians) since the former and latter did not seem to survive. In 
fact, if they did not survive then cooperation is moot. However, a Christian Jewish 
coalition that supports a Jewish Judea and Samaria seems to suggest that ideologically-
speaking, independent minded Jews and Judeo-Christians perhaps did survive. In fact, 
one group that seems to resemble Judeo-Christians is the Messianic Jews.  
The potential Christian Jewish coalition (PCJc) is the unification of independent 
minded Jews who have perhaps a weak attachment to Judaism (and a stronger attachment 
to the Hebrew Scriptures than the Talmud, and are not repelled from Christians) and 
Christians whose support for Israel is important enough to liken them to the original 
Judeo-Christians whose sympathies would likely lie with the land of their origin, the land 
of Israel. I now turn to the histories of Judaism and Christianity to depict the barriers 
between the two. 
Judaism 
The story of Judaism begins with Abraham, the father of the Jews. The Hebrew 
Scriptures begin to tell that story. The first five books of the Hebrew Scriptures (the 
Pentateuch or the Torah) were written after the destruction of the First Temple of 
Jerusalem in 586 B.C.E. The writing was completed by Ezra the Scribe in c. 450 B.C.E. 
(Neusner 2006, 111-113).  
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Between 450 B.C.E. and 70 C.E. the story of Judaism focuses on the Essenes 
(from writing found at Qumran, near the Dead Sea) and the Pharisees, an important 
religious sect of the Jews (Neusner 2006, 115). Rabbinic Judaism came to dominate by 
giving people practical answers to questions of their times. For example, when in the 
nineteenth century, Jews thought that their position in politics had changed, they posed 
new questions and created new Judaic systems (for example, the Reform and 
Conservative and integrationist Orthodoxy movements) to answer those questions 
(Neusner 2006, 130). By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Judaism was divided 
amongst three branches – Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox – providing three 
movements in which Jews could adapt to the cultures of the countries in which they 
found themselves.  
Very briefly, Reform Judaism specialized in allowing its adherents to drop 
religious practices that separated the Israelite (Jew) from the rest of mankind – dietary 
laws, for example – and assimilate into their societies. Orthodox Judaism in its 
integrationist model articulated a Judaism that was unchanging but pressed the Israelite to 
pursue both study of the Torah and study of secular sciences. Conservative Judaism 
allowed that tradition could change, but depended on historical research in settling 
theological debates over the extent to which tradition would need to bend to meet the 
requirements of modern life. In addition, and outside the structure of Judaism as a 
religion, there was Zionism, which affirmed that a Jewish state should exist in Palestine, 
the land of Israel (Neusner 2006, 148-157). 
The religious sects of the first century C.E. consisted of two main groups. The 
first were those who sought a public following – the Samaritans, Pharisees, Sadducees 
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and the Fourth Philosophy (revolutionaries who wanted independence from Rome, 
through a Jewish state in the land of Israel). The second group was the separatists, the 
Essenes or the Dead Sea sect, and the Therapeutae. The Samaritans and the Sadducees 
both rejected the Oral Torah, which the Pharisees held to as commandments passed 
orally from God to Moses at Mount Sinai (Feldman 1992, 12-13). The Oral Law is said to 
clarify and provide details for many of the commandments in the Written Torah, the first 
five books of the Hebrew Scriptures (Donin 1991, 25). Ultimately, the Pharisees and 
Christians were the only survivors of the destruction of the Temple (Feldman 1992, 13). 
The Oral Torah was made tangible by compiling oral traditions of God’s 
communications to Moses and transmitting them into writing, the Mishnah. The 
transmission was accomplished in c. 200 C.E. by Rabbi Judah the Prince. The Gemara 
consists of commentaries on the Mishnah. The Mishnah and the Palestine Gemara 
(written in Palestine) constitute the Jerusalem Talmud (400 C.E.). The Mishnah and the 
Babylonian Gemara (written in Babylonia) make up the Babylonian Talmud (500 C.E.). 
The Babylonian Talmud is lengthier and contains more digressions (i.e., from the main 
points of the Hebrew Scriptures) than the Jerusalem Talmud (Feldman 1992, 14). While 
the Talmudim (most respected commentaries) on the Torah insist that the Mishnah 
derives from scripture (Cohen 1992, 222-223), this has not been established as fact or 
demonstrated.  
To the Jews the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 C.E. was the result of sin; for 
example, in the traditional Musaf service39 for the festivals, “because of our sins we have 
been exiled from our land” is chanted. To the Christians, the catastrophe was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Prayers said in place of sacrificing animals at the Temple in Jerusalem.  
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punishment to the Jews for their rejection of Jesus as Messiah (Levine 1992, 126). The 
migration of the Jews from Jerusalem, however, occurred before 70 C.E when the 
Pharisaic leaders concluded that resistance to the Roman armies of Vespasian and Titus 
was not supported by God.  They withdrew with the permission of the Roman authorities 
towards the coast, between Jaffa and Ashdod, to the town of Javneh (Parkes 1949, 44).  
Most other Jews migrated to areas outside of the Holy land where they established 
communities known as the Diaspora. Judea itself had been conquered by Rome in 63 
B.C.E. Although much authority had been granted to the Jewish King Herod (37-4 
B.C.E.), his influence diminished following Judea’s annexation as a Roman province in 6 
C.E.  Thus, outside of Jerusalem and some parts of Judea, the first Jewish revolt of 66-70 
C.E.40 did not cause much disruption either demographically or economically (Levine 
1992, 126-127). 
After the first revolt, the Romans imposed a tax on all Jews in place of their 
annual contribution to the Temple, the funds being assigned to the temple of Jupiter 
Capitolinus in Rome. The Eastern Jewish Christian community departed to Pella, Jordan, 
at the outset of the first revolt. After the fall of Jerusalem in 70 C.E., the group of sages 
that settled in the town of Yavneh entered either of two academies, Beth Shammai or 
Beth Hillel. During the mid-first century, the former supported a stronger assertion of 
Jewish nationhood in the land than the latter (1992, 127-133). Rabbinic Judaism follows 
the latter, the less nationalistic and more moderate Hillel school. Rabbinic Judaism was 
less supportive of a Jewish national Israel than was the more nationalistic school, Beth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Levine here has the end of the revolt at 70 C.E. as compared to Bernavi and Eliav-Feldon (1994) who 
have placed it at 73 C.E. 
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Shammai, whose teachings were not incorporated so much into traditional rabbinic 
Judaism. 
Rabbinic hostility towards Christians developed early, in the decades following 
the first revolt. During the Yavnean period (70-135 C.E.), Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai 
(from the Shammai School) and Rabban Gamaliel II (from Hillel) competed for 
influence; the latter predominated. Yavneh under Rabban Gamaliel II (c. 90-115) 
changed radically, most importantly in the sense that its rabbinic center acquired 
recognition and status, not just within the Jewish community but among the gentile 
population as well. His grandfather, Rabban Gamaliel the Elder, was a prominent figure 
in the Sanhedrin in the 30s C.E., when the priests and Sadducees contemplated bringing 
the early Christians to trial (Acts 5:34-9). Rome recognized Rabban Gamaliel II as a de 
facto leader of the Jews (1992, 136-8). 
Circa 100 C.E., the rabbinical leaders of Yavneh formally rejected Jesus as 
Messiah and sent copies of a letter to synagogues throughout the Diaspora. The letter 
authorized the synagogues to exclude Christians from membership. In the land of Israel, 
many of the Christians were Jews who had been life members of their synagogues, so to 
discern these Christians from Jews, a malediction was added to the thrice recited prayers. 
This chant called for a curse on the Nazarenes, as these Judeo-Christians were called, so a 
member who refused to participate in the chant could be suspected to be a Christian.  
When Christian Jews were excluded from the synagogues and the gentile church, 
the development of Christianity in the land of Israel suffered. Additionally, the Judeo-
Christians were excluded from Jerusalem by the Romans – Aelia Capitolina’s church was 
wholly gentile. The last home of the Judeo-Christians appeared to have been in 
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Transjordan, and according to Justin Martyr (c. 114-165), he was in the minority in 
accepting them into communion. By the third century the group was considered heretical 
and its literature destroyed. Two hundred years later the community had disappeared 
(Parkes 1949, 49). 
From 135-220 C.E., the Roman (Greek-speaking) Diaspora Jews and other 
Diaspora Jews survived without the rabbinic authority of Palestine (Cohen 1992, 205-
214) or at least did not recognize the rabbis as an authority (Parkes 1949, 45), but over 
the course of about a thousand years, 70 to about 1000 C.E., rabbinic Judaism became 
normative (Neusner 2006, 112). Modern day rabbis decide the legal status of marriage in 
Jewish religious courts in Israel; thereby they influence the reproduction of the Jewish 
race. Jews who do not follow the traditions of Judaism but who follow the belief system 
of the New Testament risk their children not being considered Jewish in the state of 
Israel. 
The Jews I have interviewed tend not to follow rabbinic Judaism but are 
independent-minded. They are thus able to work with Christians because, lacking 
rabbinical Judaism’s influence in their lives, they are less apt to be prejudiced towards 
Christians. 
Christianity 
According to the New Testament, Christianity is established on the basis of 
certain beliefs, namely that Jesus of Nazareth41 is the only begotten son of God, that he 
died on the cross for the sins of the world, and that he was resurrected from the dead for 
the salvation of anyone who would believe in him.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 He lived between B.C.E. 4 and C.E. 30. 
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Jesus Christ was born into the thriving young Roman Empire of the Middle East. 
In 63 B.C.E., the Roman General Pompey and his troops were invited into the land of 
Israel to intervene in a Jewish civil war for the throne. In 40 B.C.E., Herod was declared 
king by the Romans (Charlesworth 1992, 308). In the period from 70 to 132 C.E., 
Christianity centered on Jesus’ teachings, as remembered by those who believed in him, 
and his teachings were recorded in the first Gospels (1992, 315). 
After persecuting the early church, the Romans in 312 C.E. made Christianity the 
state religion (Neusner 2006, 126), and in 325 C.E. the Council of Nicaea set the beliefs – 
and the parameters – that defined it. For example, Easter was to be celebrated on the 
Sunday following the full moon after the vernal equinox (Attridge 1992, 159-60).  
Interestingly, different Christian groups had observed Easter on various different days, 
quite a few of them in consideration of the Jewish Passover. These groups relied on the 
Jewish leadership in Tiberius for the calculation of the Easter day (Gafni 1992, 236). 
The first renowned Christian leaders developed a Christianity which, as rabbinic 
Judaism, paid little attention to rituals of worship at the Temple. Justin Martyr (c. 100-
165), who admired the Greeks, was the first Christian to attempt to combine reason and 
faith. Justin’s student Tatian (in the second century), on the other hand, paid little homage 
to the Greeks. Another respected leader, Valentinus (in Rome from c.136-165) was one 
of the founders of Gnosticism as a philosophical system. Justin’s other famous student, 
Rhodo (also in the second century), professed an anti-Gnostic belief.   
The Orthodox Justin (c. 100-165) claimed that God’s covenant with Jews no 
longer held and that gentiles had replaced the Jews. Marcion (died c. 160) seems to have 
complied the first canon and threatened the coherency of Christianity. He claimed that the 
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canon should be cleansed of everything Jewish; he argued that the God of the Old 
Covenant law was incompatible with the God of love shown in Jesus Christ. What these 
famous Christians had in common and what steered Christianity far away from the 
Jewish people is that both Christians and Christianity ignored Romans 9-11, which 
stresses God’s eternal relationship with the house of Israel (Charlesworth 1992, 316-17), 
The distance between Christianity and the house of Israel created a gap between 
Christians and Jews, but as we will see in the present study, it also creates a space that 
independent Jews and Christians could bridge through a common commitment to a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria. 
In 367 C.E., Athanasius listed 27 books of the New Testament in the order in 
which they appear today (1992, 320-1). Jerome (342-420) created the Vulgate, the first 
complete Old and New Testaments. While during the years from 451 C.E. to 571 C.E. the 
institutionalism of Christianity progressed – for example, the Pope was declared Roman 
because Peter and Paul were said to be killed and buried in Rome – rabbinical Jewish 
authors nearly completed the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmudic texts (1992, 321-4). 
Thus, after the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, Christianity and Judaism developed 
their own traditions that roughly separated adherents, respectively, into a gentile group 
and a rabbi-led Jewish community. Rabbinical Judaism rejected the Jews who believed in 
Jesus Christ, and Christianity considered the Jews as cut off from the Lord. In these 
modern times with the Holy land in Jewish possession, however, support for a Jewish 
Judea and Samaria can establish an ideological common ground in the gap between 
religions.  
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Another aspect of religion that may affect the unity of Jews and Christians is pre-
tribulation or post-tribulation eschatology, specifically the timing of the rapture (a rising 
up in the air to meet the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ) of Christians, which would occur 
either before the Great Tribulation (i.e., a pre-tribulation rapture) or after the Great 
Tribulation (i.e., a post-tribulation rapture). Those who believe the rapture is before the 
Great Tribulation42 believe in pre-tribulation rapture; those who consider the rapture 
occurs after the Great Tribulation adhere to post-tribulation rapture doctrine. 
Dispensationalism includes the rapture doctrine.  
Dispensationalism. The concept of dispensationalism developed first with the writings of 
John Nelson Darby (1800-1882) and holds that God acts in the unfolding of events 
through seven historical periods. Eventually, most American dispensationalists followed 
the sevenfold scheme of the theologian Cyrus Ingerson Scofield (1843-1921). The 
historical scheme consists of: innocence (before the fall), conscience (fall to the flood), 
human government, promise (Abraham to Moses), law (Moses to Christ), grace (the 
church age), and the millennium or the 1000 year reign of Jesus Christ on earth (Weber 
2004, 20). The theology asserts that God cannot be personally involved in both the lives 
of the Church and Israel at the same time. When the Jews rejected Jesus as Messiah, the 
(church) age of grace began, and so God’s prophetic activities (as written about in the 
Bible) towards Israel ceased temporarily, which is what Darby referred to as the 
postponement theory: “when the Jews rejected (‘cut off’) Jesus as their Messiah, just as 
Daniel had said they would, God postponed Christ’s return (that would have been seven 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The explanation skips the mid-tribulation rapture eschatology which places the rapture in the midst of a 
seven year period of very difficult times, at the 3.5 year mark immediately before the Anti-Christ reveals 
himself and demands that every living person worship him during the final 3.5 years before Jesus Christ 
returns to destroy Satan and rule over the earth.   
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years later) and turned to the gentiles. God suspended the prophetic timetable for Israel at 
the end of Daniel’s sixty-ninth week43 and set to work building up a new and heavenly 
people – the church” (Weber 2004, 22). The relevant tenet here is that the return of the 
Jews to the land of Israel occurs just prior to the final seven year period, so because the 
Jews are back in the land of Israel now, the arrival of the seventh and last period of the 
end times may be at hand and the final week of trouble (seven years, the Great 
Tribulation) will occur, according to this belief. However, since “God would not deal 
with the two peoples or operate the two plans concurrently…God [will have to] remove 
[rapture] the church before proceeding with the final plans for Israel” (Weber 2004, 23). 
More specifically, the first coming of Jesus was completed at his crucifixion. As 
for the other comings, Weber (2004, 24) argues that  
Darby thought of the rapture and the second coming as two separate events. At 
the rapture, Christ will come for his saints, and at the second coming, he will 
come with his saints. Between these two events the great tribulation would occur. 
With the church removed, God could resume dealing with Israel, and Daniel’s 
seventieth week44 could take place as predicted.  
 
Most dispensationalists believe that through the pre-tribulation rapture the church 
is lifted from the earth,45 while the Jews stay behind for the Great Tribulation, and 
according to dispensationalist pre-tribulation belief, the order of events surrounding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 For a full account of the history of Israel leading to the arrival of the Messiah, see Daniel 7-9.  
 
44 Literally seven years. The term “week” used in Daniel 9 refers to seven years.  
 
45Before Darby, all premillennialists (those who believe that Jesus Christ will return to the earth prior to the 
1000 year period of peace and righteousness on earth that directly precedes the final time of judgment when 
all mankind is judged) believed that the rapture would occur at the end of the tribulation, at Christ’s second 
coming. Paul in his first letter to the Thessalonians described the rapture as the rising into the air of the 
church, some rising from the dead and others rising alive: “the Lord himself shall descend from heaven 
with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump [loud noise] of God: and the dead in 
Christ shall rise first: Then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the 
clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord” (1 Thessalonians 4:17). 
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second coming of Jesus is likely to be as follows: the rapture, the tribulation, the second 
coming of Jesus Christ, and the millennium. Of direct relevance to this study, Guth 
(2007) argues that “clergy in historically premillennialist and dispensationalist 
denominations should exhibit the strongest support for the state of Israel,” because in 
order for the seventh period to commence preceding the coming of Jesus, Jews need to be 
in Israel. 
Dispensationalism may not facilitate close working relationships between Jews 
and Christian denominations that follow this theological belief, however, because it 
supports Israel not necessarily for the Jewish people’s sake but only because it 
necessitates the presence of Jews in Israel in order that Jesus Christ will come to earth 
again to reign. On the other hand, a post-tribulation eschatology makes for a closer 
relationship between Christians and Jews, because such a belief envisions Christians and 
Jews suffering the woes of the tribulation together.  
Discord 
Historically, discord between Christians and Jews has roots in the theological 
differences between the doctrine of Jesus Christ and the traditions of the Pharisaic sect of 
the Jews, a popular sect at the time of Jesus’ birth. The Pharisees are the predecessors of 
today’s Orthodox Jewish rabbis.  
Jesus said that he was the son of man but also the son of God (Matthew 16:13-
18). The Pharisees rejected Jesus as the Messiah and turned him over to the Romans. 
Pontius Pilate, the Roman prefect of Judea 26-36 C.E., was willing to release Jesus but 
the Jews demanded instead the release of Barabbas (Matthew 27:16-26) and that Jesus be 
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crucified. Jesus was crucified. According to the New Testament, after three days in the 
grave, Jesus rose from the dead.  
 The new Christian religion’s initial followers were Jews. However, early on they 
opened the new covenant of God – Jesus Christ died for all of mankind – to gentiles. 
Peter was told to accept gentiles as clean and to be willing to spend time with them (Acts 
10:19-30). Paul was commissioned to preach to the gentiles. 
 After the Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed in 70 C.E., the Jewish religion led 
by the Pharisaic sect followed an oral tradition that the leaders held passed from God to 
Moses at Mount Sinai. Thus, the beginning discord between Christians and Jews centered 
on the proper connection to God, for Christians through Jesus Christ, and for Jews, 
through the Oral Torah. Early Christians were soon excluded from synagogues. As 
Christianity moved from being a persecuted sect by the Romans towards being accepted 
by Rome, it also began to exclude Jews from its communities. After Christianity became 
the official religion of Rome and throughout the centuries until the end of World War II, 
to a great extent the official Christian Church persecuted Jews.  
 After nearly 2000 years of exile, in 1948 the Jewish people found themselves 
back in the land in the modern state of Israel. Israel has passed its sixtieth anniversary 
and is a technologically thriving democracy. Christian Zionist believers in the Bible may 
have reason to agree with Amos (9:15) which states, “And I will plant them upon their 
land, and they shall no more be pulled up out of their land which I have given them, saith 
the LORD thy God.”  
 Disagreement between the Jewish and Christian members of PCJc might center 
on whether the messiah has already come or not. However, Danny Danon, a member of 
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Likud puts it in perspective: “One day, if the Messiah comes, we can ask him if it is the 
first or second time in Jerusalem” and then, he adds: “But, for now, we have to work 
together” (Purdum 2012). 
Scriptural Inerrancy and the Borders of Israel 
Creation, Resurrection and Reestablishment of Israel. In the mid to late 1800s, in the 
wake of the debate over how the universe and earth came into being, Darwin’s theory of 
evolution was accepted into scientific thought and challenged the biblical narrative of 
creation and hence the inerrancy of the Bible.    
Christians had believed in the inerrancy of scripture for 2000 years. That Jesus 
rose from the dead requires an inerrant scripture. Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield 
(November 5, 1851 – February 16, 1921) was the last leader at Princeton Theological 
Seminary to defend the inerrancy belief before it succumbed to evolution. His defense is 
valuable because he gave reasons for his belief at this critical time. His writings are 
important not as the source of this doctrine of inerrancy but as a coherent defense of it. In 
order to prove an error in the Bible, Hodge and Warfield argued that (1) an alleged faulty 
statement would have to be shown to have occurred in the “original autograph of the 
sacred book in which it is said to be found”; (2) it should be proved that the interpretation 
which caused the apparent “discrepancy is the one which the passage” was intended to 
express. (3) It must be shown that “the true sense of some part of the original autograph” 
contradicted a certain fact of “history, or truth of science, or some other statement of 
Scripture definitely understood and interpreted.” They argued that this had “never yet 
been successfully done in the case of one single alleged instance of error” of the Bible 
(Hodge and Warfield 1881). They thus argued for the inerrancy of the Bible.  
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At that time, three of the important scientific challenges to scripture were 
creation, resurrection, and the restoration of Jews to their homeland. Two of the 
disagreements between biblical and scientific theories are important for this dissertation: 
first, the resurrection of Jesus from the dead is the foundation of the Christian religion. If 
it is false, then Christianity is worthless. As the apostle Paul once explained to the 
Christians in Corinth: “But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen: 
And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain… ye are 
yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished. If in this 
life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable” (I Corinthians 15:13, 
18-19). 
Second, while the restoration of the nation of Israel and the Jewish homeland 
within its ancient borders was a subject of controversy (Matar 1985), some Christians 
consider it a fulfillment of biblical prophecy (e.g., see Isaiah 66:7-8; Ezekiel 36-37). 
Before the 1967 Six Day War, Jews in Israel, along with the rest of the world, believed 
that they would be destroyed by the overpowering Arab armies. The war had a 
significantly different outcome that many called miraculous. Israel defeated the Arab 
enemies who then cried for peace. Israel reclaimed Sinai, Gaza, Golan Heights, Judea and 
Samaria, and Jerusalem. This victory is important for Christians because it establishes 
divine intervention in worldly events and a reestablished nation of Israel is important for 
their eschatological return of the Messiah. For Jews the coming of a Messiah is also 
important as it will establish a right to the land over all opposition. The world’s attempt 
to wrestle Judea and Samaria from the Jewish people is important for the above reasons. 
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The dissertation studies the political struggle associated with ownership of Judea and 
Samaria in American politics.  
Scriptural Inerrancy. As I mentioned above, the inerrancy debate started with the 
introduction of Darwin’s evolutionary theory that conceptualized the earth as billions of 
years-old, and that denied the existence of Noah’s flood and its creation of the fossil 
record. The theory confronted the biblical story told in Genesis of God’s creation of the 
universe and earth in six 24-hour days. The biblical account of creation was the first and 
most obvious error in the minds of some; if it is wrong then a lot of other doctrines are 
wrong, for example the virgin birth, the requirement for salvation, and the resurrection 
from the dead. The main separation between modern Christianity and the Christian 
Zionists/fundamentalists is the evolution versus creation controversy.  
For Christian Zionism the inerrancy of the Bible is extremely important. Their 
whole religion is formed on the basis of the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. Next to 
creation, it is the most highly doubted scriptural event. But if it did not happen, 
Christianity is invalid (as stated above). Thus, Christian Zionism needs an inerrant Bible 
because the religion is dependent on two scientifically impossible events – the existence 
of God in human form and a resurrection of the dead. Jews do not need an inerrant 
scripture but they do need a homeland.  
The reestablishment of the nation of Israel in the land of Israel is evidence of the 
inerrancy of scripture. For the Jews Israel is important to prevent another Holocaust. For 
the Christians it establishes the authority of scripture which is the foundation of their 
religion. These are among the most important reasons why the issue of Judea and 
Samaria is so important to Jews and Christians.  
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The importance of inerrancy of scripture is important to Jews not in getting the 
land but in keeping the land. They face a united hostile world that for 46 years has been 
trying to reverse the miraculous victory of 1967. They need God’s existence and will to 
keep Judea and Samaria and greatly appreciate Christian Zionistic support as evidence of 
this will.  
Jews and Christians’ belief in God comes from different sources. Christians 
believe in the God of the Bible. Through faith in the Bible their religion is established. 
Jews’ belief in God is formed on the basis of their survival as a blessed or persecuted 
people. Christians believe in a God who promised to save them after they die because of 
their belief in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ for their sins. Jews believe in a God who will 
save them on earth before they die from annihilation. When Christians and Jews gather 
together, they benefit from each other’s evidence of God’s existence.  
Which Borders of Israel? Another issue here is the biblical borders of the reestablished 
nation of Israel. I include three examples.  
First, the borders delineated in Genesis 15:18 portray a vast expanse from the 
river of Egypt (the Nile River) to the Euphrates (Aharoni and Avi-Yonah 1977, map 25) 
where God promised territory to Abraham and his descendants.   
Second, before the people of Israel entered the land of Canaan, the Lord spoke to 
Moses and said that he should tell the “children of Israel” (the people of Israel) what the 
land of their inheritance would be. Specifically, recorded in Numbers 34:1-15 are the 
borders: they start at the southeastern shore of the Dead Sea and then head to the west to 
Kadesh-barnea and to the “Brook of Egypt” which extends to the “Great Sea” (the 
Mediterranean Sea), which forms the western border. The northern border extends from 
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Mt Hor to the East at Lebo-hamath and even further east, all of which is far north and 
somewhat east of Damascus. The border then falls due south and then west to the Sea of 
Chinnereth (Kinneret Sea, Sea of Galilee) and returns to the Dead Sea through the Jordan 
Valley (Aharoni and Avi-Yonah 1977, map 50).  
Third, in the twenty-fifth year of the captivity of the house of Judea in Babylon, 
God provided visions to Ezekiel in which he showed him the future borders of the tribes 
of Israel (Ezekiel 47:13 - 48:29). The borders encompass territory similar in area to that 
depicted in Numbers 34:1-1546 (Aharoni and Avi-Yonah 1977, map 166). 
These three descriptions are all of the future borders of Israel and all include the 
current lands of Judea and Samaria. 
The Profiles of the PCJc 
Introduction  
The first stage of interviewing was conducted before the 2012 U.S. presidential 
election between January 2, 2012 and November 6, 2012; the second stage was 
conducted after the election between November 7, 2012 and January 17, 2013. Initially, 
129 persons were asked four policy questions; 81 then agreed to follow-up with long-
form interviews. On the basis of answering four policy questions in the manner described 
in Chapter One (and covered at length in Chapter Four), being willing to answer 
questions to determine religious identity, and self-identifying as “politically active,” 28 
persons are members of this case study of the PCJc, which is thus both inclusive, 
requiring but a few characteristics for inclusion, and exclusive, requiring specific answers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid., Map 50. 
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to qualify. Belonging to the PCJc, as for interest groups, requires members to share 
attitudes or goals in common (Berry 1990, 4; Truman [1951] 1971, 33). 
As I said in Chapter One, this chapter will present the interview data for 28 
members of the PCJc in order to better understand the basic religious and other types of 
characteristics that are detailed below.  
I will now present responses to the first research question – what are profiles of 
the individuals who constitute this coalition. For each individual of the PCJc, the profiles 
are created on the basis of answers to interview questions which are stated below with 
results explained and compiled in tables that follow. Persons remain anonymous; each 
individual was assigned a “person key,” a combination of three letters and when 
necessary ending with a number.  
To qualify as a Christian, the respondent meets at least one of the following 
requirements: 1) the informant states that he or she is Christian; 2) the respondent’s 
answers to the religious orthodoxy questions define the person as a highly orthodox or a 
Christian Zionist, namely the respondent believes in at least six out of eight components 
which measure the extent of a person’s Christian fundamentalist orthodoxy, to what 
extent the person interprets the Bible literally (Guth 2007, 20).47 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 As I explained in Chapter One, Christian Orthodoxy, or fundamentalist orthodoxy, is a set of beliefs 
which Christian Zionists tend to hold that suggests a literal interpretation of the Bible. I use James Guth’s 
(2007, 20) measure for fundamentalist orthodoxy, eight questions, which includes theological items such as 
belief in or support for: the virgin birth; the literal existence of the Devil; Jesus as the only way to 
salvation; opposition to gay becoming clergy; Adam and Eve as historical persons; rejection of evolution as 
an explanation for how the universe/world came into being; belief in the inerrancy of Scripture; belief in 
the second coming. I evaluate a respondent as a Christian Zionist on the basis of responses to eight 
questions, scoring from 0 to 100 percent with a 75 percent as sufficient to define a respondent as a 
Christian Zionist. I also used Guth’s (2007, 21) measurement of Christian Zionism determined by how 
strongly a person agrees or disagrees with the statement “Modern-day Israel is a special nation blessed by 
God” to further measure the respondents Christian Zionistic attitude. 
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First, I will show that the Christian element of the PCJc is highly fundamentalist 
orthodox. The basic characteristics are covered directly afterwards.  
Measuring Christian Orthodoxy (Table 3:1a below) 
 In a test for Christian Zionism, with eight out of eight yeses indicating a 100 
percent Christian Zionistic, only the Unitarian received a 20 percent score.48 The others, 
if not receiving perfect scores, received passing scores (at least 75 percent). Ninety-four 
percent of the Christians are Christian Zionists.   
I have provided a table (Table 3:1a) that shows to what degree each Christian 
member of the PCJc is a Christian Zionist. The table is ordered by scores, with 12 
Christians with the highest score – eight out of eight or 100 percent – placed at the top 
part of the table. Of the remaining six Christians at the bottom, the first four have a score 
of seven out of eight, or about 88 percent. The last two have, respectively, six of eight (75 
percent) and two of eight (25 percent), the lowest scores. The last, CCD, is the only non-
Christian Zionist of the potential coalition. The average Christian Zionist score for the 
Christian members of this study’s PCJc is about 92 percent, well above the 75 percent 
minimum I have established for determining classification as Christian Zionist. These 
eight measures of Christian Orthodoxy will be covered further under the topic of 
Christian Religious Orthodoxy below. I wanted to present the data on determination of 
Christian orthodoxy here so that the reader can visualize one way that a Christian was 
defined, the other being self-identification as Christian (which the non-Christian Zionist, 
the Unitarian, used).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 In the test for a more specific quality of Christian Zionism, only one respondent, CRE3, failed to qualify 
as a Christian Zionist, however, she passed this more crucial orthodoxy test.  
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Basic Characteristics of the PCJc (religion, denomination, profession and age) 
 I now turn to the most basic characteristics of the 28 members of the PCJc for this 
study. 
What is your religion (Table 3:1b below)? 
Christian Religious Identity. According to these two rules for determining a Christian 
identity, from the 28 interviewed, there are 18 Christian members of the potential 
coalition. Fourteen Christians self-identified as Christians while four members described 
their religion in more individualist terms. The three members who did not use the word 
“Christian” to identify themselves, although their religious orthodoxy responses defined 
them as “orthodox Christians,” were a “believer in the holy living God” (CLA), a 
Messianic Jew (CRA), and a respondent who is both an Orthodox Jew and a Pentecostal 
(CJC). The Unitarian (CCD), however, is not a Christian Zionist by the Christian 
orthodoxy measures but because he described his denomination as “liberal Christian,” he 
qualifies as a Christian. An analysis of these Christians portrays those in the PCJc case 
study as Christian with a minority of four standing out as individualistic Christians. 
Jewish Religious Identity.49 In defining a person as Jewish, I follow certain rules: 1) the 
informant has self-identified as Jewish when asked about religion; 2) the person has 
disclosed that he/she has a Jewish background (the person’s mother is Jewish, or the 
person has converted, so that by Jewish law she/he is  considered Jewish). According to 
these rules, the PCJc includes 13 Jews, including one of “Jewish background” who 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 There is an overlap of Christian and Jewish membership because three of the Christians are also Jews by 
their own testimony and Jewish law.  
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Table 3:1a Measuring Christian Orthodoxy 
P Key Q key Denomination 1a 2b 3c 4d 5e 6f 7g 8h 
CAR PR1a non yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CCO PR1a non yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CCU PR1a non yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CDN PR1a non yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CES PR1a non yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CHR PR1a Pentecostal yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CJC PR1a Pentecostal/Jew Orthodox yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CLA PR1a no response yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CLC PR1a non yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CPA PR1a non yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CRA PR1a Messianic Jewish yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CRE1 PR1a Catholic yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CRE2 PR1a non yes yes yes yes yes dk yes yes 
CRE4 PR1a non yes yes nc yes yes yes yes yes 
CRE5 PR1a Baptist yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
CRT PR1a Christian yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
CRE3 PR1a Catholic yes yes yes nc yes yes no yes 
CCD PR1a liberal Christian yes no no no no no no yes 
a1= Belief in Virgin Birth? 
b2= Belief in literal existence of the Devil? 
c3= Belief in Jesus as the only way to salvation? 
d4= Opposition to gay becoming clergy? 
e5= Belief that Adam and Eve are historical persons? 
f6= Rejection of evolution as explanation for how the universe/world came into being? 
g7= Belief in the inerrancy of Scripture?  
h8= Do you believe in the Second Coming of Jesus Christ? 
shared this confidentially, one Orthodox Jew who also requested anonymity, and one 
Messianic Jew.  
Additional Observations. Four Christians’ responses have been characterized as “active,” 
conditional upon, and weighted heavily by, my participant observation of these 
respondents. I would suggest that very politically active Christian Zionists tend to 
describe their religion as indicated by CRE2, CES, CRE5, and CRT, with more creativity 
than those who would use the label “Christian.” The terms they used were, respectively, a 
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“Christian, believer follower of Jesus,” a “Christian, believer [in] Jesus,” a “Christian, 
born again,” and a “Christian…born-again believer.”  
Ten Jews testified that their religions were “Jewish,” a simple enough answer but 
in comparison to those offered by Christians, a response worthy of notation. I have noted 
that analytically “chosen” best describes the response “Jewish.” I would remark that the 
Jew has experienced a unique position that, depending on viewpoint, makes him or her 
feel different. According to the first viewpoint, a Jew may feel that he or she is unique on 
account of the special persecutions the Jewish people singularly suffered (e.g., the 
Holocaust) or, according to the second view, because of the biblical belief that the Jews 
are a peculiar (Exodus 19:5; Deuteronomy 14:2, 26:18, Psalm 135:4) or chosen 
(Deuteronomy 7:6, 14:2, 1 Kings 3:8, Psalm 105:43) people. My analysis suggests that 
because of the deep experiential, historical meaning of “Jewish,” and the honor bestowed 
upon Jews, either chosen as blessed or cursed (Deuteronomy 28), the word “chosen” 
appropriately describes the response “Jewish.”  
 Seven respondents answered “Christian” for the question of religion type, and I 
have characterized that response as “standard.” 
What is your denomination (Table 3:2 below)? 
Christian Denominational Identity. My analysis for the denominations of the Christians is 
determined by the interviews and participant observations of them at activist meetings 
before the 2012 U.S. election. In interviews, one person stated that she was Baptist. Two 
persons self-identified as Catholic. Nine persons stated their denominations as non-
denominational. Two said that they were members of the Pentecostal denomination. Two 
persons claimed “Christian” as their denomination; the first stated “Christian” and the 
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second claimed “liberal Christian.” The first is a personality who tends to be an 
independent thinker, self-defining her denomination rather than reporting the usual “non-
denomination” as a response; the second is a Unitarian. Unitarians, according to a Pew 
Forum on Religious Life, do not belong to a Christian denomination but are classified as 
belonging to “other faiths,” and only 0.3 percent of all U.S. adults consider themselves 
Unitarians (Pew Research Center 2008). The Unitarian who claimed liberal Christian as 
his denomination is part of a minority religion in the United States and, as befitting a 
member of a small group and his particular religion, he is able to respond 
individualistically.  
One Christian is a Messianic Jew. Another respondent, a new Christian, offered 
no response, probably because as a new Christian and also as a lover of Messianic 
Judaism, she has not yet identified with a denominational subgroup.  
One of those nine non-denominational Christians, CPA, stated that he is both non-
denominational and Jewish. Of the two Christians who are Pentecostal, one identifies as 
Orthodox Jewish. Thus, two Christians (the Pentecostal and the Messianic Jew) are both 
Christian and Jewish, and one Christian (CPA) stated that he is both non-denominational 
and Jewish.  
In summary, nine of 18 Christians, or 50 percent, are non-denominational. Of the 
other somewhat sizable sub-groups, three out of 18, one-sixth or 17 percent, are both 
Christian and Jewish. Two of 18, or about 10 percent, are Catholic; two of 18 are 
Pentecostal. The Christian element of the PCJc is thus diverse but with 50 percent non- 
denominational, indicating a fairly non-committal tendency toward institutional 
denominations. 
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Table 3:1b What is your religion? 
P Key Q key Religion Analysis 
CLA PR1b believer holy living God new believer 
CCU PR1b Christian standard 
CDN PR1b Christian standard 
CHR PR1b Christian standard 
CLC PR1b Christian standard 
CRE1 PR1b Christian standard 
CRE3 PR1b Christian standard 
CRE4 PR1b Christian standard 
CPA PR1b Christian (Jewish background) off record Jew 
CRE2 PR1b Christian, believer follower of Jesus active 
CES PR1b Christian, believer Jesus active 
CRE5 PR1b Christian, born again  active 
CAR PR1b Christian, born again  descriptive 
CRT PR1b Christian, born again believer active 
CCO PR1b Christian, politics & religion Kings 1,2 living Bible 
JCT PR1b Jewish chosen 
JDP PR1b Jewish chosen 
JED PR1b Jewish chosen 
JFM PR1b Jewish chosen 
JHO PR1b Jewish chosen 
JLI PR1b Jewish chosen 
JRE1 PR1b Jewish chosen 
JRE2 PR1b Jewish chosen 
JRE3 PR1b Jewish chosen 
JRE4 PR1b Jewish chosen 
CRA PR1b Messianic Jewish marginalized 
CJC PR1b Pentecostal & Orthodox Jew  need identify both 
CCD PR1b Unitarian individualistic 
 
Jewish Denominational Identity. The analysis is formulated on the basis of the interviews 
and participant observation of the Jewish respondents at activist meetings before the 2012 
U.S. election. The denominational range of Jewish members of the PCJc is such that 
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when the persons’ denominations are arranged left to right,50 from non-traditional and 
Reform (considered liberal) to the most Orthodox (considered conservative), the median 
value is the Conservative denomination. From left to right, the distribution is: one 
Messianic Jewish, one Jewish/non-denominational Christian, one non-denominational, 
two Reform, one Reform/Conservative, one Conservative, one Pentecostal 
Christian/Orthodox Jew, 51  one Conservative Orthodox, one modern orthodox, two 
Chabad (branch of Judaism that does outreach and observes Orthodox traditions – 
keeping Shabbat, kosher, etc.) and one Orthodox. 
The Conservative denomination median value makes evident that the Jewish 
religious consistency of the PCJc is not of a strict observance of rabbinic rules but one 
that is more lenient. The less stringent religious climate of the Jewish members of the 
PCJc makes for a more inclusive environment fostering intellectual diversity but also 
permits trust to develop between Jews and Christians.  
Professional Identity (Table 3:3 below) 
Christian Professional Identity. Of the 18 Christian members, five persons are retirees 
(from the fields of entrepreneurship, administration, business, law enforcement, and 
education); six individuals work in fields that require extensive education such as legal, 
architectural, media (radio), psychological counseling, and human resources 
(management). Two persons are educators (including one who is also Jewish) and one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The left to right continuum in this case was constructed as follows: to the left are the denominations that 
are the least orthodox by the standards of Jewish orthodoxy belief as defined by Paul A. Djupe and Anand 
E. Sokhey (2006, 906-907), see Chapter One of this dissertation. Starting at the left are the denominations 
of those who are Jewish but hold Christian beliefs; to the right are non-denominations; and continuing 
progressively to the right the level of adherence to Orthodox Judaism increases.   
 
51 Respondent CJC, as a Pentecostal and Orthodox Jew, is a combination of two extremes, respectively, 
very unorthodox Jewish (Pentecostal) and very Orthodox Jewish. Thus I placed her denominationally in the 
middle of the continuum.  
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person is a contractor. There are two members of the clergy (one pastor who is Jewish as 
well, and one messianic rabbi) and two leaders of counter-terrorism organizations. Thus, 
three of the 18 Christians are also Jewish. In general, these Christian members of the 
PCJc are purveyors of knowledge, specialized in their particular fields.  
Jewish Professional Identity. The breakdown of the professions of the Jews is: two are a 
financial manager and a librarian. Two are clergy, a pastor and a rabbi. Four are in 
education, an educator of Jewish-Christian studies, an executive director of a non-profit, 
a director of a pro-Israel think tank and a counter terrorist researcher/writer. One is a 
housewife and four are retired persons (including a former school principal, aerospace 
engineer, and marketing CEO). Of the 13 Jews, three are also Christian. As seen below, 
the median age of the Jews of the PCJc is higher than the median age of the Christian 
members of the PCJc; not surprisingly, thus, a slightly greater percent of the 13 Jewish 
members of the PCJc are retired (31 percent), compared with the percentage of all 
Christians of the PCJc who are retired (28 percent). 
What is your Age (Table 3:4 below)? 
Christian Ages. To identify the typical age of the Christian members of the PCJc, it is 
best to calculate the median, which is 55.5. According to Lewis-Beck et al. (2011, 355), 
“advancing years (especially 55 and older) influence vote participation independent of 
the citizen’s educational attainment.” While voting is not a proxy for political 
participation (which includes more than voting and is an element studied here), it is not 
surprising that the typical Christian activist in the PCJc is 55 years old, within the age 
bracket that is the most, or very, likely to vote, suggesting that the Christian element is 
politically active.  
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Table 3:2 What is your denomination? 
P Key Q key Religion Denomination 
CRE5 PR2 C Baptist 
CRE1 PR2 C Catholic 
CRE3 PR2 C Catholic 
CRT PR2 C Christian 
CCD PR2 C liberal Christian 
CRA PR2 C Messianic Jewish 
CLA PR2 C no response 
CAR PR2 C non 
CCO PR2 C non 
CCU PR2 C non 
CDN PR2 C non 
CES PR2 C non 
CLC PR2 C non 
CPA PR2 C non  
CRE2 PR2 C non 
CRE4 PR2 C non 
CHR PR2 C Pentecostal 
CJC PR2 C Pentecostal/Jew Orthodox 
JCT PR2 J Chabad 
JED PR2 J Chabad 
JRE1 PR2 J Conservative 
JRE4 PR2 J Conservative Orthodox 
JDP PR2 J Modern Orthodox 
JRE3 PR2 J non 
JFM PR2 J Orthodox 
JHO PR2 J Reform 
JRE2 PR2 J Reform 
JLI PR2 J Reform Conservative 
 
Jewish Ages. To identify the typical age of the Jewish members of the PCJc, it is best to 
calculate the median, which is 58 years old, similar to the 55.5 median for the Christians. 
While voting is not the equivalent of  political participation, it is not surprising that the 
typical Jewish activist in the PCJc, at 58 years old, is within the age bracket that is the 
most, or very, likely to vote, which suggests also that these members would tend to be 
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politically active. According to my participant observation these Jewish members of the 
PCJc are very active, seen frequently at meetings of political and educational import.  
 I will propose just a few reasons why the median age is high for both Christians 
and Jews. First, 25 out of 28 members of the PCJc reside in Florida where the average 
age is higher than many areas of the United States as a consequence of the relatively large 
population of retired persons residing in the state. Second, the support for a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria, being a controversial position on a highly disputed issue, requires an 
intensity of commitment that more mature individuals with more leisure time might be 
able to maintain. Indeed, intensity is one of qualities that facilitates the formation and 
survival of interest groups (Nownes 2013, 52). 
Christian Fundamentalist Orthodoxy (eight measures) 
 I will now report and evaluate the Christians on the basis of the eight measures of 
fundamentalist orthodoxy. The Christian respondents were evaluated for their adherence 
to certain theological beliefs that shows a literalist interpretation of the Bible. A complete 
adherence to eight measures of fundamentalist orthodoxy would suggest that the 
respondent is a Christian Zionist. For the purpose of this dissertation, to be defined as an 
Christian Zionist the respondent answers six out of eight of the fundamentalist orthodoxy 
questions in the affirmative (showing a strong tendency towards a literalist interpretation 
of the Bible).  
A briefing on Unitarianism is in order, however, given that one PCJc member, 
CCD, self-identifies religiously as a “Unitarian” and denominationally as a “liberal 
Christian.” “Unitarian Universalism is a liberal religious tradition that was formed from 
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Table 3:3 What is your profession? 
P Key Q key Religion Profession 
CAR PR3 C Architect 
CCD PR3 C communications director  
CCO PR3 C contractor  
CCU PR3 C Counselor 
CDN PR3 C director non-profit counter terrorism  
CJC PR3 C education Jewish Christian studies 
CES PR3 C education sales marketing 
CHR PR3 C human resources management 
CLA PR3 C Lawyer 
CLC PR3 C legal  
CPA PR3 C Pastor 
CRA PR3 C Rabbi 
CRT PR3 C radio talk show host 
CRE1 PR3 C Retired 
CRE2 PR3 C Retired 
CRE3 PR3 C Retired 
CRE4 PR3 C Retired 
CRE5 PR3 C Retired 
JCT PR3 J counter terrorist researcher 
JDP PR3 J director pro-Israel think tank 
JED PR3 J executive director non-profit 
JFM PR3 J financial manager  
JHO PR3 J Housewife 
JLI PR3 J librarian  
JRE1 PR3 J Retired 
JRE2 PR3 J Retired 
JRE3 PR3 J Retired 
JRE4 PR3 J Retired 
 
the consolidation of two different religions: Unitarianism and Universalism” (Unitarian 
Universalist Association of Congregs. 2013c; emphasis added). 
While the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life classifies Unitarians as “other 
liberal faiths” (Pew Research Center 2008, 162), according to the Unitarian Universalist 
Association of Congregations, Unitarian Universalism is not just a liberal religion but one 
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with Jewish-Christian roots (Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregs. 2013a; 
emphasis added). Using words such as liberal and Christian to define himself as 
Unitarian, CCD’s definition of Unitarian is fairly in line with the Unitarian institution’s 
definition.   
The Universalist worship includes respect for “Jewish and Christian teachings” 
(Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregs. 2013d). Unitarian Universalists may 
also identify with Atheism and Agnosticism, Buddhism, Christianity, Humanism, 
Judaism, Paganism, and other religious or philosophical traditions (Unitarian Universalist 
Association of Congregs. 2013b). Originally, all Unitarians were Christians who did not 
believe in the Holy Trinity of God (Father, Son, and Holy Ghost), but in a singular God. 
Later, Unitarian beliefs emphasized “rational thinking, a direct relationship with God, and 
the humanity of Jesus.” As a belief of Unitarians, Universalism began as a Christian 
denomination that holds to universal salvation whereby all people will eventually be 
“reconciled with God” (Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregs. 2013c). The 
Unitarian member of the PCJc holds to the virgin birth of Jesus and to the second coming 
of Jesus Christ, which indicates the Christian foundation of the respondent’s worship; he 
does not, however, believe that Jesus is the only way to salvation. His tolerance of other 
beliefs might help him to unify with the Jewish members of the potential coalition.  
Do you believe that Jesus was born of a virgin (Table 3:5 below)? 
There was complete consensus on the answer to this question with all responding, 
“Yes.” All Christian members of the PCJc believe in the birth of Jesus to a virgin, and all 
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Table 3:4 What is your age (in 2012)? 
P Key Q key Religion Age 
CLC PR4 C 28 
CLA PR4 C 41 
CCU PR4 C 43 
CHR PR4 C 45 
CCD PR4 C 50 
CCO PR4 C 52 
CJC PR4 C 53 
CPA PR4 C 54 
CAR PR4 C 55 
CES PR4 C 55 
CRT PR4 C 58 
CRE4 PR4 C 59 
CDN PR4 C 61 
CRA PR4 C 62 
CRE2 PR4 C 69 
CRE3 PR4 C 69 
CRE1 PR4 C 71 
CRE5 PR4 C 72 
JLI PR4 J 38 
JCT PR4 J 42 
JDP PR4 J 50 
JED PR4 J 50 
JRE3 PR4 J 58 
JFM PR4 J 60 
JRE4 PR4 J 72 
JRE1 PR4 J 79 
JRE2 PR4 J 79 
JHO PR4 J 83 
 
but the Unitarian believe in the existence of a devil. These two doctrines are very basic 
components of orthodox Christian belief – Guth (2007) shows that these two beliefs have 
the highest correlation to fundamentalist belief – and accordingly only a denomination 
that allows great leeway, such as the Unitarian, would tolerate abstention from belief in 
the existence of the devil.  
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Do you believe there is a Devil (Table 3:6 below)? 
Only the Unitarian expressed a “nay.”  
Do you believe that Jesus is the only way to salvation (Table 3:7 below)? 
The Unitarian stated “no,” and CRE4,52 a Christian Zionist non-denominational 
activist who volunteers for a Christian Zionist Washington D.C. lobby group, could not 
answer “yes” or “no,” which for my purposes I construed as a “no comment” or “nc.” It 
is evident that CRE4 has given a lot of thought to the question of whether Jesus is the 
only way to salvation. He explained to me that before the first coming of Jesus, Jews such 
as King 
Table 3:5 Do you believe that Jesus was born of a virgin? 
P Key Q Key Born of Virgin? 
CAR PR5 yes 
CCD PR5 yes 
CCO PR5 yes 
CCU PR5 yes 
CDN PR5 yes 
CES PR5 yes 
CHR PR5 yes 
CJC PR5 yes 
CLA PR5 yes 
CLC PR5 yes 
CPA PR5 yes 
CRA PR5 yes 
CRE1 PR5 yes 
CRE2 PR5 yes 
CRE3 PR5 yes 
CRE4 PR5 yes 
CRE5 PR5 yes 
CRT PR5 yes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Here I emphasize CRE4’s connection to Christian Zionism through his identification with a Christian 
Zionist Washington D.C. lobby group. 
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David and Moses received salvation. A lot of “Old Testament” people had salvation. 
“Salvation is between the person, God and the Savior,” he commented. It seems that as 
befitting a Christian Zionist, CRE4 has adopted a very sensitive approach to a touchy 
issue for Jews. As an active volunteer for the Zionistic lobby group, he probably thinks a 
lot about the Israeli and Jewish people his organization is seeking to benefit. His speech 
reflects a desire to unite with Jews. 
Do you believe that gays should not be clergy (Table 3:8 below)? 
Four Christians did not lend support to this statement. The “rights” discourse, 
which entertains topics such as gay marriage, has entered into the Christian church. 
Christian Zionists tend to oppose gays being able to become members of the clergy. 
However, this opposition may be becoming less politically correct for several reasons. 
First, opinion polls show the public more accepting of gay marriage (Silver 2012). 
Second, starting in 1993, states have begun to legalize same sex marriage (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2013).  Four Christians did not oppose gays becoming 
clergy, including three from denominational churches, a Baptist, Catholic, and Unitarian, 
and one non-denominational media professional, the radio talk show host. Given the 
socio-political warming towards gay marriage, it is not surprising that the PCJc includes a 
strong minority of those who question the opposition to gays becoming members of the 
clergy.  
Do you believe that Adam and Eve are historical figures (Table 3:9 below)?  
Except for the Unitarian’s rejection of Adam and Eve as historical, there is 
complete consensus on Adam and Eve as historical figures among the potential coalition. 
The Unitarian denomination allows freedom of thought and abstinence from 
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Table 3:6 Do you believe there is a Devil? 
P Key Q Key Devil? 
CAR PR6 yes 
CCO PR6 yes 
CCU PR6 yes 
CDN PR6 yes 
CES PR6 yes 
CHR PR6 yes 
CJC PR6 yes 
CLA PR6 yes 
CLC PR6 yes 
CPA PR6 yes 
CRA PR6 yes 
CRE1 PR6 yes 
CRE2 PR6 yes 
CRE3 PR6 yes 
CRE4 PR6 yes 
CRE5 PR6 yes 
CRT PR6 yes 
CCD PR6 no 
 
fundamentalist thinking including the principle that the Bible is God’s handiwork. Thus, 
departure from the belief that Adam and Eve existed is within the realm of Universalist 
thinking as practiced by Unitarians. 
Do you reject evolution as an explanation (Table 3:10a below)?  
All except one non-denominational Christian and the Unitarian reject evolution as 
an explanation for how the universe/world came into being. A content analysis53 of 
interviews with the 18 Christian members of the PCJc (see Table 3:10b below) reveals a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The methodology used is as follows: 1) for each response to the interview questions “Are you politically 
active? If yes, in what way, list types of activities?” I selected those words which best summarized the 
meaning of the response;2) I organized the words into subgroups, and calculated  which words were used 
most frequently; 3) the words used most frequently suggested which political activities the respondents 
engaged in most frequently.  
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Table 3:7 Do you believe that Jesus is the only way to salvation? 
P Key Q Key Jesus Salvation 
CAR PR7 yes 
CCO PR7 yes 
CCU PR7 yes 
CDN PR7 yes 
CES PR7 yes 
CHR PR7 yes 
CJC PR7 yes 
CLA PR7 yes 
CLC PR7 yes 
CPA PR7 yes 
CRA PR7 yes 
CRE1 PR7 yes 
CRE2 PR7 yes 
CRE3 PR7 yes 
CRE5 PR7 yes 
CRT PR7 yes 
CCD PR7 no 
CRE4 PR7 nc 
 
strong interest in discussion meetings, educating others, voting and communicating with 
politicians. It is possible that the abundance of discussions allows the 16 members to 
question and reject the science of evolutionary theory as an explanation for the existence 
of the universe. 
Do you believe in the inerrancy of Scripture (Table 3:11 below)? 
One of the major elements of Christian Zionist belief is the inerrancy of Scripture. 
All but one Catholic and the Unitarian concurred that Scripture is inerrant. The Catholic 
Bible version of the Hebrew Scriptures includes books not found in the Protestant Bible, 
namely Tobias, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus [Sirach], Baruch, First and Second 
Machabees, parts of Esther (10:14 to 16:14) and Daniel (3:24-90; 13; 14; Catholic and 
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Table 3:8 Do you believe that gays should not be clergy?  
P Key Q Key Gays Clergy? 
CRE4 PR8 yes 
CRE2 PR8 yes 
CRE1 PR8 yes 
CRA PR8 yes 
CPA PR8 yes 
CLC PR8 yes 
CLA PR8 yes 
CJC PR8 yes 
CHR PR8 yes 
CES PR8 yes 
CDN PR8 yes 
CCU PR8 yes 
CCO PR8 yes 
CAR PR8 yes 
CRE5 PR8 no 
CCD PR8 no 
CRE3 PR8 nc 
CRT PR8 dk 
 
Protestant 2005; Frequently Asked 2013). Put another way, the Hebrew Scriptures do not 
include books present in the Catholic version (The Catholic Bible n.d.). A Catholic might 
have more reason to doubt the inerrancy of Scripture with the added complexity of 
interpreting additional chapters. 
Do you believe in the Second Coming of Jesus Christ (Table 3:12 below)? 
The question also received a 100 percent unanimous “yes” as all Christian 
members of the PCJc believe in the second coming of Jesus Christ. There is a messianic 
fervor to the group (in the sense of an apparent desire to see a leader elected who follows 
Jesus’ teachings), as perceived through the energy exerted and excitement exuded during 
the U.S. 2012 election season when the PCJc worked so hard to oppose the reelection of 
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Table 3:9 Do you believe that Adam and Eve are historical figures?  
P Key Q Key Adam Eve 
CRE4 PR9 yes 
CRE2 PR9 yes 
CRE1 PR9 yes 
CRA PR9 yes 
CPA PR9 yes 
CLC PR9 yes 
CLA PR9 yes 
CJC PR9 yes 
CHR PR9 yes 
CES PR9 yes 
CDN PR9 yes 
CCU PR9 yes 
CCO PR9 yes 
CAR PR9 yes 
CRE5 PR9 yes 
CRE3 PR9 yes 
CRT PR9 yes 
CCD PR9 no 
 
Obama; expectations and hopes were high that Romney would be elected. On November 
13, 2012, one week after the U.S. presidential election, a post-election meeting was held, 
consisting of about 50 persons including mostly Christian women, a few men and four 
Jews. Those assembled expressed their reactions to the election’s results. The general 
consensus was that the reelection of Barack Obama suggests a new era of deepened 
deception and that he is a figure antithetical to the concept of a godly leader. One of the 
themes of the guest speaker for that evening was that “we [should] obey rather than 
merely pray.”54 In the wake of the electoral defeat, the need to work for the next election 
of politicians who uphold Judeo-Christian ethics was recommended. The view of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54In the context of this meeting “obey” rather than just “pray” emphasizes doing over talking. 
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Christians leans toward a messianic view of politics where religion and power could be 
combined by government to implement the precepts of Jesus as taught in the New 
Testament and the Hebrew Scriptures.  
Jewish Orthodoxy 
 I will now evaluate the Jewish members on the basis of religious orthodoxy. 
Do you view the Torah as recorded law (Table 3:13 below)?  
Eleven out of thirteen Jews view the Torah as recorded law. 
Do you believe in a set of orally passed laws and traditions called the Halacha 
[literally “the way” and best summarized in the compilation called the Talmud] 
(Table 3:14 below)?  
Nine of thirteen believe in the Halacha. 
Propositions One and Two 
 I will now report the results of the data for Propositions One and Two, which 
investigate possible issues of disunity. To recall, Proposition One asserts that within the 
PCJc, Jewish persons who identify Jewish more with the Talmud than with the Tanakh 
(Hebrew Scriptures) will want to work less with Christians than Jews who identify 
Jewish more with the Tanakh. Proposition Two states that the post-tribulation rapture 
believer will make a partner for the coalition because Christians who believe in post-
tribulation rapture expect to be on earth with the Jews during the tribulation. Belief in 
pre-tribulation rapture separates Christians from Jews. 
 For Proposition One I utilize a series of interview questions about the Tanakh and 
the Talmud. 
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Table 3:10a Do you reject evolution as an explanation for how the universe came 
into being?  
P Key Q Key Evolution 
CRE4 PR10 yes 
CRE1 PR10 yes 
CRA PR10 yes 
CPA PR10 yes 
CLC PR10 yes 
CLA PR10 yes 
CJC PR10 yes 
CHR PR10 yes 
CES PR10 yes 
CDN PR10 yes 
CCU PR10 yes 
CCO PR10 yes 
CAR PR10 yes 
CRE5 PR10 yes 
CRE3 PR10 yes 
CRT PR10 yes 
CCD PR10 no 
CRE2 PR10 dk 
 
Which book best defines a Jew, the Tanakh55 or the Talmud (Table 3:15 below)? 
Six of thirteen define a Jew by the Tanakh. Only two would say that the Talmud 
defines a Jew better than does the Tanakh.  
When they disagree, which is more authoritative (Table 3:16a below)? 
Even fewer, four of thirteen, venture to call the Tanakh more authoritative when it 
disagrees with the Talmud. Two Jews, however, could say that the Talmud is more 
authoritative than the Tanakh when they disagree.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 As stated in Chapter One, the term “Tanakh” is used in place of “Hebrew Scriptures” when interviewing 
Jews for whom the former term is more familiar than the latter. For all other references to the Testament 
originally written in Hebrew, the term Hebrew Scriptures (by some known as the Old Testament) is used. 
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How has your preference for the Tanakh/Talmud affected your relationship to 
Christians (Table 3:16b below)? 
Proposition One. After covering the questions defining Jewishness by preference for the 
Tanakh or the Talmud, it is appropriate to cover Proposition One, which asserts: within 
the PCJc, Jewish persons that identify “Jewish” more with the Talmud than with the 
Tanakh will want to work less with Christians than Jews who identify “Jewish” more 
with the Tanakh. The data available for addressing this proposition are from a few 
interviews I was able to conduct with six of the PCJc members.  
For CRA, a messianic rabbi, commitment to the Tanakh over the Talmud only 
affects his relationship with those Christians, supersessionists, who believe that 
Christians have replaced Jews as God’s chosen people. His statement suggests that the 
value he places on the Tanakh may irritate those Christians who believe that the book of 
the new chosen people, the New Testament, essentially supersedes the Hebrew 
Scriptures, which they refer to as the Old Testament.  
Respondent CJC is a Pentecostal Christian who is also an Orthodox Jew. She feels 
that her preference for the Tanakh over the Talmud is an asset in her relationship with 
Christians because of her fluency with the Hebrew language, her understanding of Jewish 
history and culture, and her enhanced understanding of the Messiah.56 
Respondent JFM is a Jew and a financial manager. While JFM does feel that the 
Talmud defines a Jew better than the Tanakh does, JFM acknowledges that the Talmud is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 I posed a question to CJC that used “Hebrew Scriptures,” which she understood as the Old Testament 
originally written in Hebrew. The “Tanakh” would have been a more appropriate word to use. However, 
since CJC is extremely enthused about working with Christians, the reasons for her preferring the Tanakh 
(or Hebrew Scriptures) over the Talmud are less significant and thus my use of the word Hebrew Scriptures 
rather than Tanakh is a relatively minor incident.   
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not very applicable to modern times. He also stated that on the content of the Tanakh he 
has shared pleasant conversations with Christians, who have learned more from these 
encounters about the common origins of Jews and Christians. He has been pleased with 
these encounters in so far as they have emphasized commonalities rather than differences.  
Respondent JED is Jewish and an executive director of a non-profit. She prefers 
the Tanakh only very slightly over the Talmud for defining a Jew. For JED, Jews and 
Christians share a lot of things, they care about their connection to stories in Torah, and 
they get along great if they share concerns, and help suffering people. 
Respondent JRE4 is Jewish, and retired. She prefers the Talmud over the Tanakh 
for defining a Jew. Her bonds with Christians from childhood are important to her 
notwithstanding the lack of scriptural commonality she has with Christians because she 
prefers the Talmud. She stated that her preference for the Talmud over the Tanakh for 
defining a Jew does not affect her relationship to Christians because she belongs to a lot 
of Christian groups.  
Respondent JLI is Jewish and a librarian. For him the Tanakh is God’s original 
Word and an historical document. The Talmud is commentary by Rabbis. Jews and 
Christians are people of the book. As such, they may take the Old Testament and Ten 
Commandments seriously, and this provides them with a commonality. Evangelical 
Christians, a type of Protestants, are more pro-Israel than some of the Jewish left. Indeed, 
JLI knows from firsthand experience that some Jewish people are more anti-Israel than 
gentiles. In summary, Jews and Christians share a common set of beliefs that gives them 
a religious commonality. While Jews do not hold Jesus as Messiah, “[Christians and 
Jews] hold Tanakh as a common book with its set of beliefs,” according to him. His 
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Table 3:10b Content Analysis: Persons and types of activities 
activism words P P P P P P total 
discussing CAR CCO CRT CCU CLC CCD 6 
educating CDN CES CRE5 CRA CJC CCD 6 
voting CLA CAR CCO CRT CRE5  5 
politicians CPA CRT CCU CLC CRE4  5 
campaigns CRT CCU CLC CES   4 
building bridges CPA CHR CLC    3 
donations CLA CRT CES    3 
defense CRE3 CDN     2 
fundraising CAR CRE2     2 
letters/phone CRT CRA     2 
missionaries Jews CRE1 CRE5     2 
partisan CHR CRA     2 
petition CRT CJC     2 
pray peace Israel CHR CRE5     2 
seder CHR CLC     2 
tea party CRE1 CRE5     2 
videos CRT CCD     2 
voter registration CRE5 CCD     2 
candidates CHR CRE3     2 
America CRE3 CDN     2 
Israel CDN CRE5     2 
research CRE2 CRE5     2 
aliyah CRE2      1 
Americans 
Prosperity 
CRE1      1 
assembling CRT      1 
Constitution CES      1 
CUFI CRE1      1 
guns CCO      1 
holocaust CRE5      1 
Israeli government CPA      1 
organizer  CPA      1 
poll watcher CRE5      1 
precinct CHR      1 
Tallahassee CPA      1 
wake-up Christians CDN      1 
wake-up Jews CDN      1 
visit Israel CRA      1 
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Table 3:11 Do you believe in the inerrancy of Scripture?  
P Key Q Key Inerrancy 
CRE4 PR11 yes 
CRE1 PR11 yes 
CRA PR11 yes 
CPA PR11 yes 
CLC PR11 yes 
CLA PR11 yes 
CJC PR11 yes 
CHR PR11 yes 
CES PR11 yes 
CDN PR11 yes 
CCU PR11 yes 
CCO PR11 yes 
CAR PR11 yes 
CRE5 PR11 yes 
CRT PR11 yes 
CRE2 PR11 yes 
CRE3 PR11 no 
CCD PR11 no 
 
preference for Tanakh over the Talmud creates a sense of commonality between him and 
Christians, because Christians hold to the Tanakh but not to the Talmud. As JLI implied, 
because he and some Christians both respect the Tanakh as holy, his relationship to 
Christians is affected in so far that he now has common ground upon which he can 
dialogue with them. 
Proposition One stated that within the PCJc, Jewish persons who identify 
“Jewish” more with the Talmud than with the Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) will want to 
work less with Christians than Jews who identify “Jewish” more with the Tanakh 
(Hebrew Scriptures). However, I find on the basis of these six responses – two that prefer 
the Talmud to the Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) for defining a Jew and four that prefer the  
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Table 3:12 Do you believe in the Second Coming of Jesus Christ?  
P Key Q Key Second Coming 
CRE4 PR12 yes 
CRE1 PR12 yes 
CRA PR12 yes 
CPA PR12 yes 
CLC PR12 yes 
CLA PR12 yes 
CJC PR12 yes 
CHR PR12 yes 
CES PR12 yes 
CDN PR12 yes 
CCU PR12 yes 
CCO PR12 yes 
CAR PR12 yes 
CRE5 PR12 yes 
CRT PR12 yes 
CRE2 PR12 yes 
CRE3 PR12 yes 
CCD PR12 yes 
 
Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) – that in fact all seem about equally enthused with 
Christians, making it less likely that they would find working with Christians 
problematic. It seems that their common view in favor of a Jewish Judea and Samaria 
overcomes differences more than I had anticipated. 
There are three Christian Zionists who have also stated in interviews that they are 
Jews. Their answers on the first four text related questions indicate that: 1) all view the 
Tanakh as recorded law; 2) two of three do not believe in the Talmud as law; 3) all 
believe that the Tanakh better defines a Jew than the Talmud; 4) all believe the Tanakh is 
more authoritative than the Talmud when the two disagree. These responses make sense 
when it is understood that Christian Zionists generally use the Protestant Bible  
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Table 3:13 Do you view the Torah as recorded law? 
P Key Q key Religion Denomination Torah Law 
JCT PR13 Jewish Chabad yes 
JED PR13 Jewish Chabad yes 
JRE1 PR13 Jewish Conservative yes 
JRE4 PR13 Jewish Conservative-Orthodox yes 
CRA PR13 Messianic-Jewish Messianic-Jewish yes 
JDP PR13 Jewish Modern Orthodox yes 
CPA PR13 Christian/Jewish non yes 
JRE3 PR13 Jewish non yes 
JFM PR13 Jewish Orthodox yes 
CJC PR13 Christian/Jewish Pentecostal/Orthodox Jew  yes 
JLI PR13 Jewish Reform-Conservative yes 
JHO PR13 Jewish Reform dk 
JRE2 PR13 Jewish Reform dk 
 
Table 3:14 Do you believe in a set of orally passed laws and traditions called the 
Halacha? 
P Key Q key Religion Denomination Talmud 
JCT PR14 Jewish Chabad yes 
JED PR14 Jewish Chabad yes 
JRE4 PR14 Jewish Conservative-Orthodox yes 
JDP PR14 Jewish Modern Orthodox yes 
JRE3 PR14 Jewish non yes 
JFM PR14 Jewish Orthodox yes 
CJC PR14 Christian/Jewish Pentecostal/Orthodox Jew  yes 
JLI PR14 Jewish Reform-Conservative yes 
JRE2 PR14 Jewish Reform yes 
CRA PR14 Messianic-Jewish Messianic-Jewish no 
CPA PR14 Christian/Jewish non no 
JRE1 PR14 Jewish Conservative dk 
JHO PR14 Jewish Reform dk 
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Table 3:15 Which book best defines a Jew, the Tanakh or the Talmud?  
P Key Q key Religion Denomination Preference 
JED PR15 Jewish Chabad Tanakh 
JDP PR15 Jewish Modern Orthodox Tanakh 
CJC PR15 Christian/Jewish Pentecostal/Orthodox Jew  Tanakh 
JLI PR15 Jewish Reform-Conservative Tanakh 
CRA PR15 Messianic-Jewish Messianic-Jewish Tanakh 
CPA PR15 Christian/Jewish non Tanakh 
JRE4 PR15 Jewish Conservative-Orthodox Talmud 
JFM PR15 Jewish Orthodox Talmud 
JCT PR15 Jewish Chabad dk 
JRE3 PR15 Jewish non dk 
JRE2 PR15 Jewish Reform dk 
JRE1 PR15 Jewish Conservative dk 
JHO PR15 Jewish Reform dk 
 
Table 3:16a When they disagree, which is more authoritative?  
P Key Q key Religion Denomination Authoritative 
JDP PR16 Jewish Modern Orthodox Tanakh 
CJC PR16 Christian/Jewish Pentecostal/Orthodox Jew  Tanakh 
JLI PR16 Jewish Reform-Conservative Tanakh 
CRA PR16 Messianic-Jewish Messianic-Jewish Tanakh 
JFM PR16 Jewish Orthodox Talmud 
JED PR16 Jewish Chabad Talmud 
CPA PR16 Christian/Jewish non na 
JCT PR16 Jewish Chabad na 
JRE4 PR16 Jewish Conservative-Orthodox dk 
JRE3 PR16 Jewish non dk 
JRE2 PR16 Jewish Reform dk 
JRE1 PR16 Jewish Conservative dk 
JHO PR16 Jewish Reform dk 
 
 (the Hebrew Scriptures and New Testament), which they believe is inerrant, but do not 
consider the Talmud as part of the Holy Scriptures. 
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Table 3:16b How has your preference for the Tanakh/Talmud affected your 
relationship to Christians? 
P Key Q key Religion Denomination Preference Feel 
JED PR16b Jewish Chabad Tanakh warm 
CJC PR16b Christian/Jewish Pentecostal/Orthodox Jew  Tanakh warm 
JLI PR16b Jewish Reform-Conservative Tanakh warm 
CRA PR16b Messianic-Jewish Messianic-Jewish Tanakh warm 
JRE4 PR16b Jewish Conservative-Orthodox Talmud warm 
JFM PR16b Jewish Orthodox Talmud warm 
JDP PR16b Jewish Modern Orthodox na na 
CPA PR16b Christian/Jewish non na na 
JCT PR16b Jewish Chabad na na 
JRE3 PR16b Jewish non na na 
JRE2 PR16b Jewish Reform na na 
JRE1 PR16b Jewish Conservative na na 
JHO PR16b Jewish Reform na na 
 
For Proposition Two, I utilize interview questions about which tribulation theory 
the respondent prefers.  
Christians’ Pre-Tribulation or Post-Tribulation Belief (Table 3:17 below) 
On this issue I first asked a series of questions to determine understanding of 
dispensationalism and belief in the rapture pre/post-tribulation doctrine. The respondents 
were asked whether they believed in the millennium, tribulation, rapture, and the second 
coming of Jesus Christ. They were asked to put those events in chronological order. 
When they place the tribulation after the rapture, they qualify as professing “pre-
tribulation rapture” eschatology. In follow up in depth interviews, I asked respondents 
how belief in either a pre-tribulation or post-tribulation rapture affected their relationship 
to American politics, Jews, and Israel.  
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Given the list of events as millennium, tribulation, rapture, and the second coming 
of Jesus Christ, and the placement of these to define pre or post-tribulation rapture, six 
Christian members of the PCJc believe in the pre-tribulation rapture doctrine and five 
members believe in the post-tribulation rapture. A substantial number, six, do not know 
where to place the rapture chronologically. The respondent CCD, the Unitarian, a liberal 
Christian, did not believe most of the events (except for the second coming of Jesus 
Christ), and thus the pre/post-tribulation question is not applicable (na) to that 
respondent.  
A noteworthy observation is that of the five members who believe in post-
tribulation rapture, two have a Jewish background. In other words, two of the three 
Jewish members, who had an opinion on this question and are also Christians, believe in 
post-tribulation rapture. It could be that Christians with a Jewish background perceive 
themselves going through the tribulation before the rapture, because Jews are convinced 
through history and experience that in life perseverance of difficulties is more likely to be 
called for than escapism through miraculous events – such as the rapture. However, since 
one Christian Jew believes in pre-tribulation rapture, it is evident that some Jews follow 
an eschatological belief that would separate them from Jews or others left behind for the 
Great Tribulation.   
How does your belief in a [pre-trib or post-trib] rapture affect your relationship to 
American politics, Jews and Israel? (Table 3:18a below) 
I asked how the respondent’s belief in either pre-tribulation or post-tribulation 
rapture affected the person’s participation in American politics, and his or her 
relationship to Jews and Israel. The section addresses Proposition Two: the post-
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tribulation rapture believer will make a partner for the coalition because Christians who 
believe in post-tribulation rapture expect to be on earth with the Jews during the 
tribulation. Belief in pre-tribulation rapture separates Christians from Jews.  
Of the five (out of 18) Christians who believe in post-tribulation eschatology, 
there were two Christians that are also Jewish who were able to participate in this 
Table 3:17 Christians’ Pre-Tribulation or Post-Tribulation Belief 
P Key Q Key Denomination Tribulation 
CRE5 PR17 Baptist pre 
CRT PR17 Christian pre 
CCU PR17 non pre 
CAR PR17 non pre 
CPA PR17 non/Jewish pre 
CHR PR17 Pentecostal pre 
CRA PR17 Messianic-Jewish post 
CRE4 PR17 non post 
CCO PR17 non post 
CRE2 PR17 non post 
CJC PR17 Pentecostal/Orthodox Jewish post 
CCD PR17 liberal Christian na 
CRE1 PR17 Catholic dk 
CRE3 PR17 Catholic dk 
CLA PR17 na dk 
CES PR17 non dk 
CLC PR17 non dk 
CDN PR17 non dk 
 
interview question. These two Christian Jews both believe that their post-tribulation 
rapture belief blesses all components – American politics, relationship to Jews, and 
Israel.  The third Christian Jew believes in pre-tribulation rapture and was not available 
for this interview question. One Christian does not know what they believe regarding 
tribulation theory. One Christian also believes that her post-tribulation belief blesses all 
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components of the question. Only CCO, one out of five post-tribulation believers 
suggested a coming tribulation punishment for mankind. However, CHR and CRT, two 
of the six persons57 who believe in a pre-tribulation rapture believe that there will be 
punishment for the unfortunate. Thus, the case study suggests that it is possible that a 
post-tribulation belief leads to a more liberal view of punishment vis-à-vis the tribulation, 
while a pre-tribulation belief leads to a harsher view of punishment vis-à-vis the 
tribulation. Also, this case study suggests that it is possible that Christian Jews tend to 
believe in post-tribulation rapture.  
The question arises as to how this affects the evaluation of Proposition Two: the 
post-tribulation rapture believer will make a partner for the coalition because Christians 
who believe in post-tribulation rapture expect to be on earth with the Jews during the 
tribulation, while belief in pre-tribulation rapture separates Christians from Jews. There is 
no certain answer, however, because Jews have less information on Hell, or Heaven, and 
thus know less about a tribulation or final great punishment, it is possible that Christians 
with a less harsh view of punishment during the end times would be of comfort to the less 
knowledgeable Jews. In this sense, Proposition Two appears to remain reasonable.  
Christian Zionism 
 I now report results from the second measure of Christian Zionism.  
Modern-day Israel is a special nation blessed by God (Table 3:18b below)? 
 Respondents were asked if they strongly agreed, agreed, did not know, disagreed, 
or strongly disagreed with the statement “Modern-day Israel is a special nation blessed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Four persons in total were interviewed, with two respondents who answered dk and neutral. 
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God.” All but CRE3 strongly agreed. She did not know. Thus, by the second measure of 
Christian Zionism, 17 of 18 Christians are Christian Zionists.  
Other Potentially Divisive Issues 
 I now turn to the other issues that may be potentially divisive to the potential 
Christian Jewish coalition.  
Can Christians support Israel without trying to convert Jews (Table 3:19 below)? 
All but one Christian of the PCJc believes that Christians can support Israel 
without trying to convert Jews. The one person who differed expressed that “Christians 
have to apply the cultural mandate – in every aspect [of] life [we] should be living as 
Christians and [we] should be living a life so that others would want to join us in it and 
also come to salvation. Jews are not obliged to convert for Christian support, yet all 
should be done for God’s glory, the respondent noted. Apparently, this respondent’s 
words suggest that Christians are obliged to attract persons to salvation but that 
Christians’ financial donations to Jews or to Jewish organizations should not be 
conditional upon Jews converting to be Christians. 
Which of the following are important religious symbols to you (Table 3:20 below)? 
I queried the Christians regarding Christian pagan symbols such as the Christmas 
tree, Easter bunny, Easter egg, and Jewish religious symbols. The ability to enjoy several 
Jewish holidays’ religious symbols – eating a Passover meal or feasting in a temporary 
booth (succah) for the holiday of the Feast of Tabernacles (Succoth) – might lend to 
comfortable relations between the Christians and Jews of the group. I asked the Christian 
respondents, “Which of the following are important religious symbols to you?: a) a 
Christmas tree; b) Easter bunnies; c) Easter eggs; d) a Seder meal; e) a succah?” 
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Table 3:18a How does your belief in a [pre-trib or post-trib] rapture affect your 
relationship to American politics, Jews and Israel?  
P Key Q Key Denomination tribulation Analysis 
CRE1 PR18 Catholic dk na 
CRE3 PR18 Catholic dk na 
CLA PR18 na dk na 
CLC PR18 non dk na 
CDN PR18 non dk na 
CES PR18 non dk na 
CCD PR18 liberal Christian na na 
CRA PR18 Messianic-Jewish post blessing all 
CRE2 PR18 non post blessing all 
CJC PR18 Pentecostal/Orthodox Jewish post blessing all 
CRE4 PR18 non post dk 
CCO PR18 non post punishment politics 
CHR PR18 Pentecostal pre only Church no judgment 
CRE5 PR18 Baptist pre dk 
CAR PR18 non pre na 
CPA PR18 non/Jewish pre na 
CCU PR18 non pre neutral all 
CRT PR18 Christian pre punishment politics & Israel 
 
Compared to the other pagan symbols – Easter bunnies and eggs – the culturally popular 
Christmas tree was relatively important to the 18 Christians; four responded “yes.” 
Only one respondent felt that all Christian pagan symbols were important. Most of the 
respondents find the Jewish religious symbols important. 
Having covered the major components of Jewish religious belief, I now turn to 
lesser, but still important, ones, “other religious issues.”  
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Table 3:18b Modern-day Israel is a special nation blessed by God 
P Key Q key Religion Denomination Christian Zionist 
CRE5 PR2 C Baptist yes 
CRE1 PR2 C Catholic yes 
CRT PR2 C Christian yes 
CCD PR2 C liberal Christian yes 
CRA PR2 C Messianic Jewish yes 
CLA PR2 C no response yes 
CAR PR2 C non yes 
CCO PR2 C non yes 
CCU PR2 C non yes 
CDN PR2 C non yes 
CES PR2 C non yes 
CLC PR2 C non yes 
CRE2 PR2 C non yes 
CRE4 PR2 C non yes 
CPA PR2 C non /Jewish yes 
CHR PR2 C Pentecostal yes 
CJC PR2 C Pentecostal/Jew Orthodox yes 
CRE3 PR2 C Catholic dk 
 
Only one respondent felt that all Christian pagan symbols were important. Most of the 
respondents find the Jewish religious symbols important. 
Having covered the major components of Jewish religious belief, I now turn to 
lesser, but still important, ones, “other religious issues.”  
Given the choice between two presidential candidates, one a Muslim and the other 
an Evangelical Christian, who would you vote for? (Table 3:21 below) 
As indicated in the literature review in Chapter One, Uslaner and Lichbach (2009) 
found for the 2004 election that negative feelings toward evangelicals influenced Jewish 
voting for Democrats more than any factor other than partisanship. Also, a 2007 Pew 
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Table 3:19 Can Christians support Israel without trying to convert Jews?  
P Key Q Key Denomination Support 
CRE1 PR19 Catholic yes 
CRE3 PR19 Catholic yes 
CLA PR19 Na yes 
CLC PR19 Non no 
CDN PR19 Non yes 
CES PR19 Non yes 
CCD PR19 liberal Christian yes 
CRA PR19 Messianic-Jewish yes 
CRE2 PR19 Non yes 
CJC PR19 Pentecostal/Orthodox Jewish yes 
CRE4 PR19 Non yes 
CCO PR19 Non yes 
CHR PR19 Pentecostal yes 
CRE5 PR19 Baptist yes 
CAR PR19 Non yes 
CPA PR19 non/Jewish yes 
CCU PR19 Non yes 
CRT PR19 Christian yes 
 
Center survey, which found Jews much more likely than the rest of the population to vote 
for gay, female, black, Hispanic, Mormon, Muslim and atheist presidential candidates, 
also found Jews less likely to vote for an evangelical Protestant. In particular, Jews were 
three times as likely as the general population to say they would be less likely to vote for 
a candidate who was an evangelical Christian. My next question thus focuses on the 
possible Jewish aversion to vote for evangelical Christian candidates, and I asked “given 
the choice between two presidential candidates, one a Muslim and the other an 
Evangelical Christian, for whom would you vote?”  
All but two of the 13 Jewish members of the PCJc would vote for an evangelical 
Christian. The two Jewish PCJc members who would not necessarily prefer an 
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evangelical Christian over a Muslim at the polls were a candidate for a seat in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and one person who in conversations has suggested having 
voting preferences that lean towards the Democratic Party. Given that preferring a 
candidate on the basis of religion is sometimes seen as non-politically correct (and may 
even be thought to be “racist”), the political candidate chose to voice an opinion that 
would not risk his candidacy. The Democratic leaning person may have been intending to 
vote for Obama (who has a Muslim background) and because the person is biased for a 
candidate who happens to have a Muslim background, that person would perhaps not 
prefer an evangelical Christian over a person with a Muslim background. Thus, with 
these exceptions noted, 11 out of 13 Jewish members of the PCJc favor evangelical 
Christian candidates for the office of U.S. president.  
The result suggests that it is possible for the PCJc to be composed of Jews who, 
different from most Jews, exhibit a preference for Christian Zionists in politics. 
The final three questions test for Jewish opinion on intermingling with Christians in 
particular contexts and situations.  
Jews’ feelings about Christian donations (Table 3:22 below)? 
The first question tests for Jewish vulnerability over accepting Christian money. 
All Jewish members are comfortable with Christian donations to Jewish organizations. 
Do all Christians secretly seek to convert Jews (Table 3:23 below)?  
The second question tests for Jewish fear of Christians seeking conversions of 
Jews. Only one Jewish member offered that all Christians secretly seek to convert Jews. 
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Table 3:20 Which of the following are important religious symbols to you: 
Christmas tree, Easter bunnies, Easter eggs, a Seder, a Succah? 
P Key Q Key Denomination Tree Bunny  Easter Eggs Seder Succah 
CRE1 PR20 Catholic yes no no no  dk 
CRE4 PR20 non yes no no yes yes 
CHR PR20 Pentecostal yes no no yes yes 
CRE2 PR20 non yes yes yes yes na 
CRE5 PR20 Baptist no no no yes yes 
CRE3 PR20 Catholic no no no  yes dk 
CRT PR20 Christian no no no  yes yes 
CCD PR20 liberal Christian no no no no no 
CRA PR20 Messianic-Jewish no no no yes yes 
CLA PR20 na no no no  yes yes 
CAR PR20 non no no no yes yes 
CCO PR20 non no no no no no 
CCU PR20 non no no no yes yes 
CDN PR20 non no no no  yes yes 
CES PR20 non no no no yes yes 
CLC PR20 non no no no  yes yes 
CPA PR20 non/Jewish no no no yes yes 
CJC PR20 Pentecostal/Orthodox Jew no no no yes yes 
 
How do you feel about Jews entering Christian Churches (Table 3:24 below)? 
The third question probes for Jewish anxiety over conversions arising from 
entering Christian places of worship. Only one Jew is not comfortable with Jews entering 
Christian churches. These results reveal comfort levels of Jews in relationships with 
Christians financially (when accepting donations), spiritually (considering the possibility 
of Christians seeking conversions), and physically (when risking conversion through 
entering churches). Jewish members of the PCJc are comfortable in financial and spiritual 
relationships with Christian Zionists; and in physical proximity of the latter. 
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Table 3:21 Given the choice between two presidential candidates, one a Muslim and 
the other an Evangelical Christian, who would you vote for? 
P Key Q key Religion Denomination Presidential Candidates 
JCT PR21 Jewish Chabad dk 
JED PR21 Jewish Chabad nc 
JRE1 PR21 Jewish Conservative Evangelical Christian 
JRE4 PR21 Jewish Conservative-Orthodox Evangelical Christian 
CRA PR21 Messianic-Jewish Messianic-Jewish Evangelical Christian 
JDP PR21 Jewish Modern Orthodox Evangelical Christian 
CPA PR21 Christian/Jewish non Evangelical Christian 
JRE3 PR21 Jewish non Evangelical Christian 
JFM PR21 Jewish Orthodox Evangelical Christian 
CJC PR21 Christian/Jewish Pentecostal/Orthodox Jew  Evangelical Christian 
JRE2 PR21 Jewish Reform Evangelical Christian 
JHO PR21 Jewish Reform Evangelical Christian 
JLI PR21 Jewish Reform-Conservative Evangelical Christian 
 
Table 3:22 How do you feel about Christian donations to Jewish organizations?  
P Key Q key Religion Denomination Christian Donations 
CPA PR22 Christian/Jewish non yes 
CJC PR22 Christian/Jewish Pentecostal/Orthodox Jew  yes 
JCT PR22 Jewish Chabad yes 
JED PR22 Jewish Chabad yes 
JRE1 PR22 Jewish Conservative yes 
JRE4 PR22 Jewish Conservative-Orthodox yes 
JDP PR22 Jewish Modern Orthodox yes 
JRE3 PR22 Jewish non yes 
JFM PR22 Jewish Orthodox yes 
JRE2 PR22 Jewish Reform yes 
JHO PR22 Jewish Reform yes 
JLI PR22 Jewish Reform-Conservative yes 
CRA PR22 Messianic-Jewish Messianic-Jewish yes 
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Summary 
In answering the first research question – what are the profiles of the individuals 
who constitute this coalition? – I focused on 28 persons who constitute a case of the 
potential coalition. There are 17 Christian Zionists and 13 Jews (with an overlap of three 
persons who are both Christians and Jews) in the potential group. Most of the Christian 
Zionists are non-denominational, and the median position for the Jews is the 
Conservative denomination. The distribution of professions for the Christians and Jews 
displays diversity. The PCJc leans towards the mid-aged category that falls within those 
who are most likely to vote among the general population.  
Table 3:23 Do all Christians secretly seek to convert Jews?  
P Key Q key Religion Denomination Secretly Convert 
CPA PR23 Christian/Jewish non no 
CJC PR23 Christian/Jewish Pentecostal/Orthodox Jew  no 
JCT PR23 Jewish Chabad no 
JED PR23 Jewish Chabad no 
JRE1 PR23 Jewish Conservative no 
JDP PR23 Jewish Modern Orthodox no 
JRE3 PR23 Jewish non no 
JFM PR23 Jewish Orthodox no 
JRE2 PR23 Jewish Reform no 
JHO PR23 Jewish Reform no 
JLI PR23 Jewish Reform-Conservative no 
CRA PR23 Messianic-Jewish Messianic-Jewish no 
JRE4 PR23 Jewish Conservative-Orthodox yes 
 
Christians. In a test for Christian Zionist, with eight out of eight yeses indicating 100 
percent Christian Zionistic, only the Unitarian received a 20 percent score. The others, if 
not receiving perfect scores, received passing scores (at least 75 percent). Ninety-four 
percent of the Christians are Christian Zionists.  
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Table 3:24 How do you feel about Jews entering Christian Churches? 
P Key Q key Religion Denomination Churches 
JRE2 PR24 Jewish Reform no 
CPA PR24 Christian/Jewish non yes 
CJC PR24 Christian/Jewish Pentecostal/Orthodox Jew  yes 
JCT PR24 Jewish Chabad yes 
JED PR24 Jewish Chabad yes 
JRE1 PR24 Jewish Conservative yes 
JRE4 PR24 Jewish Conservative-Orthodox yes 
JDP PR24 Jewish Modern Orthodox yes 
JRE3 PR24 Jewish non yes 
JFM PR24 Jewish Orthodox yes 
JHO PR24 Jewish Reform yes 
JLI PR24 Jewish Reform-Conservative yes 
CRA PR24 Messianic-Jewish Messianic-Jewish yes 
 
Of the 18 Christians, there are five individuals who believe in post-tribulation 
doctrine; three of five Christians believe that their post-tribulation rapture belief blesses 
American politics, relationship to Jews, and Israel. Only one post-tribulation believer 
thought that this view meant things would still be rough for non-believers in Jesus Christ. 
Two of the four pre-tribulation believers I interviewed, however, saw difficult times for 
primarily those left behind. It seems, thus, that the post-tribulation believer would be 
better for a Christian Jewish coalition and that there were more of these persons in my 
case study group.   
All but one Christian of the PCJc believes that Christians can support Israel 
without trying to convert Jews. Most of the respondents find the Jewish religious symbols 
important. 
Jews. The Conservative denomination median value makes evident that the religious 
consistency of the PCJc is not of a strict observance of rabbinic rules but one that is more 
	  132 
	  
lenient. The less stringent religious climate of the Jewish members of the PCJc makes for 
a more inclusive environment fostering intellectual diversity. 
Six out of 13 Jews, including three Jews who are also Christians, believe that the 
Tanakh defines a Jew better than does the Talmud. Jews in the PCJc may lean towards 
identifying with the Tanakh as revealing who they are; Christian Zionists in the PCJc, 
who tend to believe that the Bible is inerrant, composed of God’s words, will be more 
drawn to the Hebrew Scriptures than they are towards the Talmud (not part of the Bible 
canon they respect), which suggests the potential of commonality between Jews and 
Christians of the PCJc in regards to the Hebrew Scriptures as a source of identity; for the 
former, as the book that better defines who they are; for the latter as Part One of the book 
that teaches of their salvation. The study showed that the number of Jews that prefers the 
Tanakh is four compared to the two who prefer the Talmud (for defining a Jew) but all 
are equally warm towards Christians, suggesting that their working with Christians is not 
likely to be problematic and that the land issue can trump religious differences. 
There are three Christian Zionists who have also stated in interviews that they are 
Jews. Their answers on the first four text-related questions indicate that: 1) all view the 
Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) as recorded law; 2) two of three do not believe in the 
Talmud as law; 3) all believe that the Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) better define a Jew 
than the Talmud; 4) all believe the Hebrew Scriptures are more authoritative than the 
Talmud when the two disagree. Of the other 10 Jews, those most similar to the three 
Christian Jews are those who are least orthodox; that is, they are of the denominations 
Reform-Conservative (JLI), Modern Orthodox (JDP) or Chabad (JED). There are two 
Jews, one Reform-Conservative (JLI) and one Modern Orthodox (JDP), who are almost 
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identical to the Christian Zionists in their preference for the Hebrew Scriptures over the 
Talmud as defining a Jewish person and as being more authoritative, except for the fact 
that they believe in the Talmud as orally passed law. The lesson from these data is that 
among the 28 Jews and Christian Zionist members of the PCJc there is a potential for 
cooperation for the reason that a minority has a common respect for the Hebrew 
Scriptures. The minority that shares respect for the Hebrew Scriptures can form the basis 
of leadership for formation of an actual Christian Jewish coalition. 
All but two of the 13 Jewish members of the PCJc would vote for an evangelical 
Christian over a Muslim. Thus, with these exceptions noted, 11 out of 13 Jewish 
members of the PCJc favor evangelical Christian candidates (over Muslims) for the office 
of U.S. president, which result suggests that it is possible for the PCJc to be composed of 
Jews who, different from most Jews, exhibit a preference for Christian Zionists in 
politics. 
All Jewish members are comfortable with Christian donations to Jewish 
organizations; only one Jewish member states that all Christians secretly seek to convert 
Jews; and just one Jewish member does not favor Jews entering Christian churches. 
These results reveal comfort levels of Jews in relationships with Christians financially 
(accepting donations), spiritually (lack of concern for the possibility of Christian 
proselytizing), and in physical proximity (by risking conversion through entering 
churches).  Jewish members of the PCJc are comfortable in financial, spiritual, and in 
face-to-face relationships with Christian Zionists. 
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Conclusions 
From these data, it is not possible to draw conclusions about a PCJc in the general 
population. What these data show, however, is that for this case study of Christians and 
Jews who support a Jewish Judea and Samaria, Jews and Christians share commonalities 
in their professional experiences and ages. 
The Christians are strongly Christian Zionistic, which means most of them 
interpret the Bible literally. Half the Christians are non-denominational, which allows 
them the freedom to think more freely about theological beliefs. Most of the Christians 
would financially support Jews without seeking Jewish conversion to Christianity. Jews 
would prefer an evangelical candidate over a Muslim candidate, indicating that this group 
is not composed of typical Jews who avoid the Republican Party because of the Christian 
Zionistic presence. Many factors tested for, among which are, for Jews, comfort with 
Christian donations to Jews and comfort with Jews entering churches, show that the 
members of the group are culturally, spiritually, and politically compatible. 
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IV. THE POLICY POSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL CHRISTIAN JEWISH 
COALITION  
The chapter will explicate in more detail the policy positions of this coalition58 
over time. The first question that arises is what the policy positions of this coalition over 
time are. The PCJc supports an undivided Jewish Judea and Samaria, in contrast to the 
position of United States Administrations over time. The United States has favored the 
“two-state solution” to the Arab-Israeli conflict, whereby Israel cedes parts of the West 
Bank (Judea and Samaria) to the Arabs. For example, at Camp David II, President 
Clinton, on behalf of Ehud Barak, offered to the President of the Palestinian Authority, 
Yasser Arafat, 91 percent of the West Bank (Clinton 2004, 914; Ross 2004, 688-9). 
President George W. Bush gave a speech in June 2002 in which he presented his vision 
of “two states, living side by side in peace and security” (The White House 2002; Bush 
2010). Later, U.S. Secretary of State Powell wrote the “Road Map to Peace” on the basis 
of Bush’s speech (Bush 2010). I asked interviewees if they favor the establishment of a 
Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria.  
For this research, the PCJc includes persons who answer four of the Judea and 
Samaria land (JSL) policy questions in a manner to be described and who are willing to 
provide answers to several questions on Jewish religion (to determine Jewish belief) or 
on Christian religion (to determine Christian belief) and who self-identify as being 
“politically active.” For the JSL questions, the answers (following the questions) which 
define the group as most supportive of a Jewish Judea and Samaria are as follows: The 
first question asks “What percent of Judea and Samaria would you give up (or give to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The coalition that resembles as closely as possible the attributes of the PCJc described in the study. 
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sovereign entity) for peace?” The answer is “zero” or any word denoting an equivalent 
value (e.g., “none”). The second question is “Should the United States continue 
supporting the Oslo Agreements?” The answer is “no.” The third question asks whether 
the United States should continue funding the Palestinian Authority. The answer is “no.” 
The fourth question inquires whether the respondent is in favor of an Arab state in Judea 
and Samaria. The answer is “no.” 
From my interviews, it is evident that there are few leaders of pro-Israel interest 
groups, for example ZOA, or other institutions, such as churches, that are willing to take 
a public stand for a Jewish Judea and Samaria. I have already suggested that the 501c3 
status of organizations is a factor in reducing the political activity of the organizations’ 
leaders. For 501c3 organizations that oppose the U.S. Administration’s policy on 
settlements in Judea and Samaria, political activism on this should be an intimidating 
initiative. I suspect, therefore, that the literature on the political activity of members of 
501c3 organizations that support a Jewish Judea and Samaria (or Israeli sovereignty over 
the West Bank) will be thin.  
First, this chapter will explicate in more detail the history of support for a Jewish 
Judea and Samaria, or the policy positions of those most ideologically aligned to this 
coalition, over time. Specifically, what follows is a review of the extant literature 
specifically and narrowly on individuals or groups that have supported Jewish settlement 
of Judea and Samaria over time. The chapter necessarily examines American Jewish and 
Christian Zionist support for Israel, in particular for Judea and Samaria within a Jewish 
State, going back to the times when this support was historically evident. The chapter will 
highlight personages, events and significant points in time, including Ze’ev Jabotinsky, 
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Former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the 1967 War, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, 
and the Oslo Accords, that speak to the issue of a Jewish Judea and Samaria. Second, I 
will explicate what has prevented, and continues to prevent, the PCJc from being 
absorbed into one or more of the larger and more formally organized components of the 
Israel Lobby. Third, Chapter IV will report the results of interviews/participant 
observations of six members of two subgroups of the potential coalition.  
History of Support for a Jewish Judea and Samaria 
In the United States, American Zionism received its first boost with the founding 
of the Federation of American Zionists (FAZ) in 1898. The second time the support was 
evident occurred during the 1930s, when the American Jewish community was called to 
support world Jewry during a crisis. Christian support for world Jewry, however, was 
rather weak at that time. From the 1930s through today, Jewish-Christian relations have 
not been smooth. Jews understandably perceived that during the Holocaust European 
Christians turned their backs on them. American Jewish support, however, for the 
founding of a Jewish state in Palestine sharpened because of the Holocaust. In From 
Philanthropy to Activism, Shpiro (1994) narrates the growth of the American Jewish 
Zionist movement during the crucial years, 1933-1945, to track the growth of the 
movement in those years leading to the Holocaust. It is important to look at the formation 
of American Jewish support for a Jewish state at the greatest time of crisis for world 
Jewry in modern history. It is then that we understand better the motivation for the 
development of a modern pressure group in America for a Jewish state in the Middle 
East. Another reason for the importance of looking at American Jewish Zionism from 
1933-1945 is that the climate facing world Jewry today is similar to what it was about 80 
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years ago. There are two elements present today that were present in 1933. In 1933 there 
was a worldwide depression just as today the world economy and the United States 
economy is very fragile. Second, American politics is extremely polarized between the 
left, embodied in activists in the Democratic Party, and the right, as seen in activists in 
the Republican Party, just as politics in Germany was polarized during the 1930s between 
the rising socialists and the conservative German party that, along with those blamed for 
hard times (such as the Jews), was the former’s target. During the Holocaust, however, 
there were “righteous gentiles” (Christians) who helped to save some Jews.  
The third point in time when support for Israel surged  was following the 1967 
War, when the state of Israel acquired territories, including  Judea and Samaria, sites of 
ancient Jewish kingdoms. Americans supported the victorious Israel following the 1967 
war, and Christian Zionists could potentially see this occasion as  heralding the last 
dispensation before the second coming of Jesus Christ.  
A fourth point in time was the signing of the Olso Accords between the 
government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). That event 
propelled the ZOA and other organizations that opposed Oslo to action in Washington 
D.C. Christian organizations that opposed Oslo included CIPAC and the Unity Coalition 
for Israel.  
A Beginning (1898) 
One year following the founding of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) by 
Theodore Herzl in Basle Switzerland in 1897, American Zionism gained notice with the 
founding of the Federation of American Zionists (FAZ) in 1898. In 1918, the Zionist 
Organization of America (ZOA) replaced the FAZ and a single organization was 
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established to which every American Zionist could belong directly (Shpiro 1994, xviii-
xxi). With the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany, Morris Rothenberg, President of the 
ZOA, described the situation in 1933 as a “new day in the history of the movement 
(Shpiro 1994, xxviii). 
Dawn of Trouble (1930s) 
Americans tended towards isolationism as a consequence of their resentment of 
the financiers’ and armament manufacturers’ role in gaining support for the Great War 
and because of the domestic economic Depression. Congress and the Roosevelt 
Administration, thus, largely ignored pleas by Jewish groups that called for military 
action even on humanitarian grounds (Shpiro 1994, xxxiii).  
At the same time, the American Jewish community confronted a choice between 
two kinds of internal political leadership: one in favor of personal intervention in high 
places, and the second – organized community-based political activity for specified 
political causes. Between 1944 and 1945, the majority of American Zionists preferred 
communal political activity under the Emergency Council, which strain of American 
Jewish Zionism was supported by a majority of American Jewry, and these communal 
activities established patterns of identification and action that organized Jewry in the 
United States has been implementing for over four decades (Shpiro 1994, 182). 
While the American Zionist movement was focusing on a new Jewish state, 
Jabotinsky and the right-wing Revisionist movement would establish itself as the New 
Zionist Organization of America (NZOA). In the mid-1920s, ZOA pressed Jabotinsky not 
to establish a United States wing of the Revisionist movement. On the other hand, ZOA 
stated that their June 1926 convention was likely to endorse 99 percent of the Revisionist 
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platform (Medoff 2002, 8). Notwithstanding their ideological commonalities, relations 
between the American Revisionists and ZOA deteriorated steadily during the early 1930s. 
While ZOA President Szold did apologize for the tone of the 1931 New Palestine 
editorial criticizing Jabotinsky, the ZOA leader did not significantly alter its content. 
Concurrently, the local ZOA New York region newsletter slammed the Revisionists as 
Fascists, Hitlerites and Blackshirts. The irony of the Hitlerite accusation was that the 
Revisionists were among the first in the Jewish world to warn of the approach of fascist 
anti-Semitism in Europe (Medoff 2002, 18). 
Notwithstanding tension between NZOA and ZOA, the former’s importance in 
America in the mid-1930s was as a consequence of the same factors that led to increases 
in membership of the latter: Arab massacres of Jews in Palestine, the rise of Nazism in 
Germany, and the spread of domestic American anti-Semitism. Jabotinsky seceded from 
the World Zionist Organization and headed the NZOA in 1935. Moreover, he attracted 
two Reform leaders disenchanted with Reform’s anti-Zionism (Medoff 2002, 25-7). 
While the Jewish American pro-Israel movement had become a grass roots 
organization, Israeli leadership turned to diminish the prestige and influence of the 
Zionist Organization of America. At the twenty-third Zionist Congress in 1951, Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion defined Zionists as Jews who immigrated to Israel; non-Zionists 
were thus defined as those outside of Israel, the Diaspora. The prime minister sought to 
replace ZOA as Israel’s fundraiser with non-Zionist Jewish community leaders who 
would appeal to a wider spectrum of American Jewry, especially to wealthy Jews 
uncommitted to Zionism. Consequently, ZOA’s charismatic Abba Hillel Silver retired to 
his congregation in Cleveland and the United Palestine Appeal managed fund-raising for 
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the whole American Jewish community (Rosenthal 2001, 24-26). In 1951, “Si” Kenen 
founded the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA) that in 1954 
became the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC (Schwartz 2006; 
Yuravlivker 2010),59 which took over the ZOA role as policy lobbyist (Rosenthal 2001, 
25-6; see also Tivnan 1987, 30-31).  
Forty years later, in January 1991, as Prime Minister Shamir prioritized the 
absorption of Soviet immigrants into the territories (non-annexed Israeli land), President 
Bush made a $10 billion loan guarantee to Israel for the absorption of these immigrants 
conditional upon Israel’s freezing of Jewish community building in those areas 
(Rosenthal 2001, 117). In opinion polls, even those American Jews who supported the 
Jewish communities found it difficult to accept Shamir’s desire to continue community 
expansions for the immigrants. When the guarantees issue resurfaced in Congress after 
the four-month moratorium, there was “hardly a pro-Shamir lobbyist” in the assembly. 
Bush’s rejection of the guarantees in mid-March 1992 created few protests (Rosenthal 
2001, 119-120). 
The brief overview of the history of the American Jewish pro-Israel community 
started with the 1898 founding of ZOA’s predecessor, FAZ, and ended in 1992 with 
American Jewry hardly supportive of Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria. I will 
now continue the historical voyage, focusing on events that mark support for the Jewish 
character of the land. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59Tivnan (1987, 39) sets the date of the renaming of the American Zionist Council of Public Affairs to the 
American Israel Public Affairs Committee to 1959. 
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From the 1967 War to more Recent Times 
After the 1967 war, the son of Rabbi Avraham Kook, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, 
called on his yeshiva students to participate in the liberation of Greater Israel.60 Rabbi 
Kook thought that the liberated territories, namely the Gaza Strip, Judea, Samaria, and 
the Golan – had to be incorporated into the State of Israel (Goldman 2009, 280). 
Within a few weeks of the end of the war, the Israeli government supported 
Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan’s decision to allow control of the Temple Mount and 
the Al-Aqsa mosque on top of it to be in the hands of the city’s Muslim religious 
authorities. Rabbi Kook and his followers were enraged. Dayan’s decision was one of 
several disappointments that led the growing settler movement into confrontation with 
Israeli authorities. Also disappointed was Rabbi Goren, chief rabbi of the Israeli army, 
who told Dayan that he should have blown up the Al-Aqsa mosque on top of the Temple 
or that Goren himself would have destroyed it if permitted (Goldman 2009, 280-1).   
During the six years between the wars of 1967 and 1973 the stage was set for the 
growth of Kook’s political-religious movement, Gush Emunim (Bloc of Faithful). With 
its messianic religious themes, Gush Emunim was eventually founded in 1974 (Goldman 
2009, 282). 
Before the 1967 War, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook described the Arabs as “pure 
monotheistic people closer to God than the idolatrous Christians; the conflict with them is 
temporary.” According to classical rabbinic thought, Christianity is a heretical sect that 
broke off from rabbinic Judaism. According to Rabbi Zvi Kook and his father, the earlier 
conflict with the Arabs over the land of Israel was ethnic-based strife rather than a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Greater Israel signified the lands west and east of the Jordan River included in the original British 
Mandate of Palestine.  
	  143 
	  
religious quarrel. In the late 1970s, the discourse grew increasingly provocative, with 
Arabs described as Amalekites.61 Some fundamentalist evangelicals characterized both 
Arabs and Muslims similarly (2009, 285).  
A year before Zvi Kook’s death in 1982, his movement experienced a setback. 
Because of the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace agreement, Israel agreed to evacuate a Sinai 
community, Yamit, and turn over control of the peninsula to Egypt. Later in 2005, Israel 
pulled out of Gaza (2009, 287-8).  
Christian Zionist support for Jewish communities in the territories at that time 
may be exemplified by Reverend Jerry Falwell, who said, “There is no question that 
Judea and Samaria should be part of Israel,” that the land of Israel will include the area 
promised to Abraham in Genesis 15:18, the Bible. In the era of Likud Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin (1977-1983), the Israeli government regularly used the biblical names 
Judea and Samaria62 in place of the term West Bank (2009, 294-5).  
 The Camp David Accords of 1978 proposed granting administrative autonomy to 
the Arab residents of Judea and Samaria. Jewish residents in Judea and Samaria rejected 
the agreement, calling for the immediate annexation of the territories to the State of Israel 
(Goldberg and Ben-Zadok 1986). Thus, the proposition of giving authority to the Arab 
residents over Judea and Samaria met resistance from Jewish persons living there. They 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The Amelekites are eternal enemies of the Jewish people according to the Hebrew Scriptures: “And the 
LORD said unto Moses, Write this for a memorial in a book, and rehearse it in the ears of Joshua: for I will 
utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven. And Moses built an altar, and called the 
name of it Jehovahnissi: For he said, ‘Because the LORD hath sworn that the LORD will have war with 
Amalek from generation to generation’” (Exodus 17: 14-16).   
  
62 As well as having historical validity (see Chapter Two), Judea and Samaria are mentioned in both the 
Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament. 
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attempted to annex the territories to Israel, strongly indicating their support for a Jewish 
Judea and Samaria.  
Christian Organizational Support 
In 1980, Bridges for Peace and International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (ICEJ) 
supported Israel’s right to live in the biblical land. The ICEJ sponsored several 
international Christian Zionist Congresses, the first of which assembled in Basle, 
Switzerland, and was held where Herzl gathered his First Congress (Perko 2003). In 
1996, the third Christian Zionist Congress asserted that “The Jewish People have the 
absolute right to possess and dwell in the Land, including Judea, Samaria, Gaza and the 
Golan” (Christian Action for Israel 1996). In 2001, the fourth Christian Zionist Congress 
declared that “Christians must take courageous action to support the return of the Jewish 
people to the Land of Israel in all its parts” (Christian Action for Israel 2001). According 
to these statements, the ICEJ’s support of Judea and Samaria under Israeli sovereignty 
had weakened if only slightly. Next I will review positions of U.S. Presidential 
Administrations to place PCJc positions in context with the opposition it faces. 
U.S. Presidential Administrations and a Jewish State 
President Carter did not prefer Israeli over Arab interests (Ariel 2011) and 
Presidents after him have varied in their support. Christian Zionists from the Democratic 
Party were disappointed in Carter and turned to the Republican candidate President 
Reagan. However, as a policy matter, the Reagan Administration opposed the Israeli 
Government’s 1981 strike against Osirak, the Iraqi nuclear facility. President George 
H.W. Bush opposed Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria and made United States 
loan guarantees that Israel needed for incoming Russian immigrants conditional upon 
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Israel’s cessation of community building. President Clinton supported the two-state 
solution, and his first success was to preside over the signing of the Oslo Accords. His 
next attempt at Israeli land concessions was the Camp David II summit in 2000, but he 
failed to convince Yassir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Barak to agree to a final status 
agreement. Prime Minister Barak was willing to give to the Palestinian Authority 91 
percent of Judea and Samaria, but Arafat would not accept the deal on the partition of 
Jerusalem. Arafat could not agree to anything except Jerusalem as the capital city of an 
Arab state. 
President George W. Bush was supported by Christian Zionists. He supported 
Israel’s 2002 raid into terrorist cells in the West Bank. However, he also supported the 
Israeli withdrawal, the Disengagement, from Gaza in 2005. On the other hand, he 
supported the 2008-2009 Israeli strike in Gaza, which the next president, Barack Obama, 
opposed.  
During his first term, President Obama has supported the “Arab Spring,” which 
has resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood gaining control over the Middle East, including 
Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. He has called for Israel to negotiate with the Palestinian 
Authority for mutually agreed borders starting from the 1949 lines. The position puts 
Israel in a place where if it and the PA do not agree on borders, Israeli borders would be 
the 1949 cease-fire lines. Thus, U.S. Administrations since Carter have at most supported 
the concept of Israel’s security, but have not shown evidence of support for a Jewish 
Judea and Samaria.  
Thus far the writing has suggested the weakness of what organizational support 
there is for a Jewish Judea and Samaria over time. I will now present a closer look at 
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those personages and events that exemplify the policy positions of the PCJc over time or 
provide contextual information important to understand the environment in which the 
PCJc operates. 
Jabotinsky 
The leader of the Revisionist movement was born in Odessa, Russia (now in the 
Ukraine) on October 18, 1880. Jabotinsky became an active Zionist after the Kishinev 
Pogroms in 1903 and later. He was elected as a delegate to the Sixth Zionist Congress. 
Known for his personal toughness, Jabotinsky fought to maintain his status as a citizen in 
a country where he was an enemy (The Knesset 2008). 
 In 1921 Jabotinsky was elected to the Executive of the Zionist Organization (later, 
the World Zionist Organization). Two years later he withdrew from the Executive over 
policy differences with Chaim Weizmann, whom he felt was not sufficiently Zionistic. In 
1923 he founded and led the Betar Movement in Riga, Latvia – with the goal of 
educating youth towards a militant and nationalistic stance (The Knesset 2008).  
Jabotinsky wrote in 1921 that “the first aim of Zionism is the creation of a Jewish 
majority on both sides of the Jordan River” (Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz 1995, 594). 
While the majority of Zionists favored Weizmann’s approach for slowly building the 
Jewish national home, Jabotinsky demanded that the Zionist movement establish as its 
objective the establishment of a sovereign Jewish State within its historic boundaries and 
prepare for the immigration of the Jewish masses to this entity (Mendes-Flohr and 
Reinharz 1995, 597n). 
Jabotinsky lived in Eretz Yisrael (the land of Israel) in 1928, editing the daily 
newspaper “Doar HaYom.” In 1929 he left the country to lecture but the British forbade 
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his return. In 1934, he and David Ben-Gurion signed three documents to reduce the 
tensions between the right-wing and left-wing factions in the Yishuv (settled areas of the 
land of Israel) and the Diaspora. When his Zionistic aspirations for the establishment of a 
Jewish state were rejected, Jabotinsky together with some of his followers retired from 
the Zionist Organization and formed the New Zionist Organization (NZO). In 1937 
Jabotinsky served as the Supreme Commander of the Etzel, the militant branch of the 
Revisionist Zionist Alliance, and opposed the policy of restraint towards the Arab rioters 
who opposed Jewish presence in Palestine or the land of Israel. Moreover, he also 
objected to the Partition Plan presented by the Peel Commission and accepted for 
negotiations by the Zionist Organization. As Chairman of the New Zionist Organization, 
and on behalf of securing a Jewish presence in the land of Israel, Jabotinsky approached 
foreign governments and political organizations. As head of the Betar Movement he was 
active in educating Jewish youth. His three organizations – the Etzel, NZO and Betar – 
promoted illegal immigration to Eretz Yisrael (the land of Israel). Before the beginning of 
the Second World War, Jabotinsky warned that the Jewish people faced destruction and 
called to the Diaspora Jewry to “exterminate the Diaspora before it exterminates them,” 
suggesting the urgency of Jewish immigration to the land of Israel.  As the war began, he 
lobbied in the United States and Great Britain for the creation of a Jewish defense force 
to join the Allied Forces against Nazi Germany. Jabotinsky died in 1940 in New York 
State (The Knesset 2008). 
Menachem Begin 
Menachem Begin was a member of Etzel, the militant branch of Jabotinsky’s 
Revisionist Zionist movement. He saw Great Britain, with its policy of resisting Jewish 
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immigration to Israel during World War II, as an enemy to the survival of the Jewish 
people.  
Menachem Begin was born in Brest-Litovsk, Poland on August 16, 1913. Begin 
was 16 when he joined Betar, the nationalist youth movement of Jabotinsky’s Zionist 
Revisionist Movement. In 1932, Begin became head of the Organization Department of 
Betar for Poland. He traveled for it through the country, and wrote articles for the 
revisionist press. He went to Czechoslovakia to head the movement. In 1937 Begin 
returned to Poland. He was imprisoned for leading a demonstration against British policy 
in Palestine, which limited Jewish immigration to the Jewish Homeland, which was 
supposed to be built up under terms of the League of Nations [British] Mandate for 
Palestine. 63  He organized groups of Betar to enter Palestine, skirting the British 
authorities. In 1939, he headed the Polish branch.  
At the beginning of World War II, Begin was arrested by Russian officials. In 
1940-41 he was imprisoned in concentration camps in Siberia and elsewhere. He was 
released under the terms of the Stalin-Sikorski agreement. After his release, he joined the 
Polish army and served in the Middle East. In 1943, he commanded another of 
Jabotinsky’s organizations, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization) or 
“Etzel.” Begin directed Etzel's operations against the British. The Palestine government 
offered a reward of 10,000 British pounds for information leading to his arrest. However, 
he avoided capture by living incognito in Tel Aviv.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The Mandate for Palestine (League of Nations 1922) states that “Whereas His Britannic Majesty has 
accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of 
Nations…The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative 
and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home.” 
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After the founding of the State of Israel, Begin established the Herut Movement, 
together with his associates, and headed the party's list of candidates for the Knesset. On 
June 1, 1967, Begin joined the Government of National Unity in which he served as 
Minister without Portfolio until August 4, 1970. On June 20, 1977, Begin, as head of the 
Likud party, became Prime Minister of Israel. Menachem Begin died on March 9, 1992 
(Nobelprize.org 1978). 
While initially Begin resisted British barriers to Jewish settlement of the land of 
Israel, unlike Jabotinsky he obtained the office of Prime Minister and from that position 
he compromised the nationalistic principles of his earlier years. Begin agreed to the 
Camp David I Accords and turned over the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Without the power 
and position to concede land, Jabotinsky would be remembered for his fierce 
commitment to Jewish sovereignty over Greater Israel. 
The Six Day War 
The PLO was formed in 1964. Its 1964 Palestine Charter was later amended in 
1968. Its goal was “[t]he liberation of Palestine [as a national duty]…the elimination of 
Zionism [the Jewish state] in Palestine” (The Avalon Project 1968). The PLO called for 
the destruction of the Jewish State of Israel.  
Between 1966 and 1967, Palestinian guerrillas attacked Israel over her borders. 
Syria and Egypt provided them haven. Syria attacked Israel from the Golan Heights, 
shelling Israeli civilians; these strikes increased in 1965 and 1966.  The President of 
Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, declared the goal of Israel’s destruction. In a retaliatory 
attack against Syria on April 7, 1967, Israel shot down six Soviet-supplied Syrian fighter 
planes. Syria and Egypt, uniting in hostilities toward Israel, signed a defense treaty. On 
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May 15, Nasser moved Egyptian troops to the Sinai-Israeli border and succeeded in 
convincing Secretary-General U Thant of the UN to withdraw the UN Emergency Force 
(UNEF) from the Sinai.  
By May 18, Syrian troops massed on the Golan Heights and Nasser proclaimed 
the coming victory over the Zionists. On May 20, Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad 
called for the removal of the Zionists. On May 22, Egypt blocked the Straits of Tiran, 
Israel’s supply route with Asia and the entryway for imported Iranian oil. King Hussein 
of Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt on May 30. On June 4, 1967, Iraq joined 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria in an alliance. Arab hostilities intensified and Egyptian troops 
moved with military equipment to the Sinai border. After being on alert for about three 
weeks, on June 5, 1967, Israel preemptively attacked Egypt. The war lasted six days and 
saw Israeli acquisitions of Judea, Samaria, Gaza, the Golan Heights, Sinai, and East 
Jerusalem. A united Jerusalem under Israeli control was now accessible to all religions, 
whereas under previous Jordanian control Christians had limited, and Israel had no, 
access to the Old City (Jewish Virtual Library 2013). Bible-believing Christians 
perceived these results as a sign that God was with the Jews in Israel, and Americans and 
American Jews were inspired by the courageousness of the victorious Israel as a David 
against the Goliath of the Arab nations. Tourism to Israel after 1967 increased.  
The American public supports Israel because it sees Israel as a successful pioneer, 
similar to America before and through the revolutionary war; the early American pilgrims 
left persecution in England and then a crowded living space in Holland for economic 
freedom in America, just as the Jewish forefathers left slavery in Egypt for freedom in the 
land of Canaan.  
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Thus, the 1967 War, a victory for Israel, would energize American Christian and 
Jewish support for Israel, just as it would pit Arabs and Arab-sympathizers against Israel 
because of territories lost.  
Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook 
Rabbi Zvi Kook’s father, Abraham Kook, was the first Chief Rabbi under the 
British Mandate. Rabbi Zvi Kook was born on April 23, 1891 and moved to Palestine in 
1904. Unlike the first Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion, Rabbi Kook believed that the 
land of Israel belongs to the entire Jewish people both in Israel and outside in the 
Diaspora. In his view, the Jewish people were not conquerors but rather inheritors who 
had returned. No one, not any Prime Minister, should give up any part of the land of 
Israel, thought Rabbi Kook; Arabs were entitled to civil rights but were not to be granted 
national authority or statehood. From 1922 until a few years before his death on March 9, 
1982, Rabbi Kook was head of the Yeshiva Merkaz Harav. Of the residents of Judea, 
Samaria or the Sinai, hundreds were activists and graduates of that religious institution. 
Rabbi Kook’s yeshiva opposed military service exemptions for yeshiva students: it was a 
religious duty for all Israelis to serve in the military (Special to the New York Times 
1982). Rabbi Kook was considered the spiritual head of “ultranationalists,” those who 
believed that the Jewish claim to the land of Israel, on the basis of biblical scriptures, was 
legitimate. While Jabotinsky was secular but Kook a rabbi, both were unwilling to 
concede the land of Israel to non-Jewish sovereign entities. 
The Oslo Accords 
As I mentioned in Chapter One, by 1995, Christian and Jewish-American 
organizations had worked on or advocated such measures as the Jerusalem Embassy 
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Relocation Act. Also, the National Unity Coalition for Israel (an alliance of Christian and 
Jewish organizations) and the Christians’ Israel Public Action Campaign (CIPAC) 
lobbied against aid for the Palestinian Authority. Since the 1990s, some Jews and 
Christians have opposed a division of land in Israel (the two-state solution) that the 
United States Government and the Oslo Accords support. However, these organizations 
have neither ended Oslo nor succeeded in convincing American Administrations to move 
the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. 
Summary: History of Support for a Jewish Judea and Samaria  
 Throughout history, organizations have at most weakly supported a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria. First, ZOA was defeated as the voice of the pro-Israel community and 
replaced with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Second, Jabotinsky warned 
against Hitler and was in unison with ZOA in its concern with the World War II plight of 
European Jewry. Third, the fruit of AIPAC replacing ZOA has not been a strengthening 
of support for a Jewish Judea and Samaria. Thus, it would appear that the history of pro-
Israel organizations shows the weakness of organizational support for a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria.64 Also, Christian organizational advocacy for a Jewish Judea and Samaria 
probably weakened over time as was seen above with the statements of the ICEJ. 
 The opposition of U.S. Administrations to a Jewish Judea and Samaria is strong. 
That, together with the power of the IRS to deny a voice to nonprofits during the election 
season, makes the work of an unorganized interest that opposes U.S. foreign policy on 
the West Bank difficult and of seemingly little impact.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 There are other smaller pro-Israel organizations such as One Israel Fund which supports Jewish 
settlement of Judea and Samaria. The dissertation, however, has focused on the development of the major 
organizations that support a Jewish Judea and Samaria to present a broad picture as background for this 
work’s research questions. 
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Outside of Formal Organizations 
The third research question of this dissertation is why the PCJc remains “outside” 
of more formal organizations that advocate on Jewish or Israeli issues. First, individuals 
who make up the potential coalition cannot find enough persons of the coalition within 
any one organization. Second, opportunities for discussion at any one organization can 
only occur after the meeting time.  
Third, on the right side of the continuum I introduced in Chapter One (Waxman 
2010) are organizations such as ZOA and Americans for a Safe Israel. According to a 
conversation with a ZOA representative, ZOA’s mandate is not to argue for Israeli 
sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, and thus the PCJc would not fit into that 
organization. As for AFSI, while its website states that it exists to assert “Israel’s right – 
historic, religious and legal – to the territories won in the 1967,” its organization is not 
widespread enough to cover members around the country who wish to be active in their 
locations. Part of the reason for the stunted growth of AFSI may lay in their 501c3 status 
which inhibits lobbying. In the center is AIPAC, which supports the two-state solution. 
The PCJc does not support ceding Jewish territory to Arabs.  
The fourth reason the PCJc is not absorbed into groups like Z-Street is because 
the U.S. government has targeted conservative groups and pro-Israel groups using the 
IRS to audit organizations or delay responding to applications for tax exemptions. The 
IRS has been in the news lately (since May 2013) because of revelations that they have 
been targeting 501c4 conservative Tea Party groups since 2010. As a result, the Z-
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Street65 case (mentioned in Chapter One) has received much more coverage and the 
founder, Lori Lowenthal Marcus, has been speaking out. In interviews on Fox News, she 
has made clear that the IRS itself spoke to their targeting of Z-Street when they claimed 
that Z-Street’s application for a 501c3 status had to be scrutinized because applications 
having to do with Israel were to receive this treatment.  
I will further assess why the PCJc does not organize in Chapter Six where I 
discuss the successes or failures of this potential Christian Jewish coalition.  I will 
explicate there how a successful lobby group, AIPAC, dominates the foreign policy space 
in Washington, D.C. and will present a case study of how AIPAC was able to block the 
policy position of the PCJc at the August 2012 Republican Platform committee meetings.  
Additionally, the mainstream media may focus inordinate attention to groups in 
favor of a Jewish Judea and Samaria to inhibit their effectiveness and the extent of their 
organizing. Finally, I will cover the IRS controversy and its implications for the lack of 
organizing of the potential coalition. These topics will be covered more extensively in 
Chapter Six.  
The Policy Positions of the PCJc 
 I interviewed 28 persons who qualify as members of the potential coalition. These 
persons provided responses66 to the policy questions: 1) Why do you favor a Jewish 
Judea and Samaria?  2) What does a Jewish Judea and Samaria mean to you? 3) What 
percent of Judea and Samaria would you give up (or give to a sovereign entity) for peace? 
4) Should the U.S. continue supporting the Oslo Agreements? 5) Should the U.S. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 It favors Jewish people living in all of Israel. 
  
66 As indicated in Chapter One, in the Methodology section, the policy responses were such that they 
typified anti-concession attitudes.  
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continue funding the Palestinian Authority? 6) Should there be a sovereign Arab state in 
Judea and Samaria? 7) Should Jews be allowed to live anywhere in Judea and Samaria?  
Disclosure  
The primary goal of the data collection was not to test the knowledge of the 
members of the PCJc but rather to obtain their opinions. For most of the interviewing 
period, I would define interview terms when respondents stated that they were uncertain 
about their meaning. To the best of my ability, I chose to define them in an unbiased 
manner, trying to state the basic facts and no more. For example, if a person did not know 
the meaning of the “Oslo Agreements,” I would explain that “In 1993 the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization signed the Oslo Agreement with the Government of Israel for the 
purpose of moving towards the Arab-Palestinians having more control over Judea, 
Samaria and Gaza.” Towards the very end of the interviewing period, on January 8, 2013, 
I met a scholar who informed me that the interviewer should not define terms. After that 
point and until January 17, 2013, there were a few more post-election interviews still to 
conduct and I did not define any terms. Thus, the methodology for defining terms stayed 
consistent for all but a few short interviews during which, in any case, the few latter 
respondents rarely requested explanations.  
 While the interview data on the 28 members of the PCJc are rich in information 
on each individual, for the purposes of the dissertation it is necessary to analyze in a way 
to draw connections between this case study of a potential Christian Jewish coalition and 
American Politics. For this reason, I have chosen to make the data more manageable and 
have limited the presentation of the PCJc interview data to two subgroups that together 
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consist of six individuals.67 These subgroups were chosen because their leaders have 
explicitly continued activism in the face of the dramatic loss of the 2012 election.  In fact, 
the educational subgroup has increased activism since that election.  
The first subgroup consists of three PCJc members (CES, CCU, and CRE5) who 
attend meetings of a non-profit (501c3) led by CES, whose mission is to educate persons 
from a biblical perspective about issues of faith, family, and freedoms that impact the 
United States. The nonprofit organization attracts mostly Christians – and now a growing 
number of Jews since the 2012 election – to meetings that since the defeat of the 
Republicans have grown in frequency to occur several times a month. I shall call this 
group the Educational Subgroup (ES). 
The second subgroup consists of three PCJc members (CDN, CCD, and JRE1), 
where the second person works for an Internet broadcast organization led by the former, 
CDN.  The third person associated with this subgroup, JRE1, sometimes appears as a 
guest on the broadcast organization. A retired school principal, JRE1 is mostly 
distinguishable for being a Jewish activist who has maintained his motivation to 
participate in politics after the 2012 election, is active within the Republican Party, and 
regularly sends out writings to members of his personal and activist network. The mission 
of the Internet broadcast organization is decided on the basis of Judeo-Christian views. 
The organization seeks to use its communication media to save the United States from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 As stated earlier, this is a case – not a statistical – study. The dissertation focuses on the basic 
characteristics of the entire membership of the PCJc in Chapter One. In Chapters Four through Six, 
however, the dissertation studies the most likely leaders of a future actual Christian Jewish coalition. This 
is important because in political life and society, organizations are managed by leaders; politics and society 
do not function in the absence of leaders.  
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application of Islamic law and socialism over, respectively, a Constitutional government 
and capitalistic society. I am calling this second subgroup the Media Subgroup (MS). 
The Educational Subgroup 
 For ES, the primary individual whose activism stands out is CES, the founder of a 
nonprofit educational organization. Her activism has increased after the presidential 
election. The secondary individuals, CCU and CRE5, also attend CES’s nonprofit 
educational meetings.  
The Policy Responses of CES. Respondent CES is a Christian who describes herself as 
active in education and sales. She favors a Jewish Judea and Samaria because all [the 
land of Israel] belongs to Jews, deriving from the Abrahamic promises and covenant – 
the promise [of God to] Abraham and his seed. Therefore, she concluded, the land should 
be “all one but not divided” and she stated that “a Jewish Judea and Samaria means the 
heart of Israel; it is where Abraham was with Isaac; [it is the site of] biblical prophecy; [it 
is where] our forefathers drove out the Canaanite nations. I believe in [the Bible] from the 
beginning to the end.” 
Respondent CES would give up zero percent of Judea and Samaria for peace 
because in her view, the Arab mindset is that if Jews are not eradicated, then there will be 
no peace. She would neither have the U.S. continue supporting the Oslo Agreements nor 
continue funding the Palestinian Authority. She does not believe there should be a 
sovereign Arab state in Judea and Samaria, and she believes that Jews should be allowed 
to live anywhere in Judea and Samaria. 
Her reason for supporting a Jewish Judea and Samaria can be summarized as 
being established on the basis of her belief in a literal reading of the Bible. Judea and 
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Samaria is where the birth of the forefathers (e.g., Abraham) of her Judeo-Christian 
beliefs occurred. She would not relinquish any of Judea and Samaria for peace because 
that would mean supporting the destruction of the Jewish people at the hands of the 
Arabs.  
The Policy Responses of CCU. The respondent CCU is a Christian who describes himself 
as a counselor. He favors a Jewish Judea and Samaria because according to Bible 
scripture, God gave [the land] to Abraham and his descendants and, according to CCU, 
that is an important piece to remember. A Jewish Judea and Samaria signifies that a 
Jewish state exists on the ground of Judea and Samaria because God gave that land to 
Abraham. 
Respondent CCU would give up zero percent of Judea and Samaria for peace. The 
U.S. should not continue supporting the Oslo Agreements because Israel needs to govern 
on that land.  In other words, it would not be consistent with God [to continue supporting 
the Oslo Accords when he gave] that land to Abraham and his descendants. The U.S. 
should not continue funding the Palestinian Authority because funding them is a waste of 
money. There should not be a sovereign Arab state in Judea and Samaria because God 
gave the land to the Jews, his people, and not to anyone else. Jews should be allowed to 
live anywhere in Judea and Samaria.  In short, for CCU, Judea and Samaria is Jewish 
because God has given the land to the Jews.  
The Policy Responses of CRE5. Respondent CRE5 is a retired school teacher. CRE5 
favors a Jewish Judea and Samaria because that it is the land that God gave to Israel. The 
Jews conquered and inhabited it and it belongs to them on account of a covenant with 
God that is never ending. 
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For CRE5, a Jewish Judea and Samaria means an affirmation of God’s plan as 
foretold in the Bible: the land is really important. 
She would give zero percent of Judea and Samaria for peace, and would neither 
have the U.S. continue supporting the Oslo Agreements nor continue funding the 
Palestinian Authority. She does not believe there should be a sovereign Arab state in 
Judea and Samaria. Jews should be allowed to live anywhere in Judea and Samaria. 
Again, CRE5 supports a Jewish Judea and Samaria because God gave the land to the 
Jews.  
General Analysis for the ES Members. Respondents CES, CCU, and CRE5 support a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria because they believe that God gave that land to the Jews. All 
other responses seem to follow from that premise. Since God has given Judea and 
Samaria to the Jews, zero percent should be given up for peace, the U.S. should not 
continue supporting increasing autonomy to the Arabs on it, the U.S. should not continue 
funding the Palestinian Authority, there should be no Arab state there, and Jews should 
be able to live in that land that God gave to them. Their political positions then follow 
from their biblical beliefs.  
The Media Subgroup 
The primary individual whose activism stands out is CDN, the founder of this 
subgroup. His activism has maintained a steady flow as he produces and disseminates his 
Internet broadcast regularly. The Director of Communications, CCD, is part of his 
organization. Respondent JRE1 continues his work writing short essays, attending 
Republican meetings, and guest appearing on the media organization’s shows from time 
to time.  
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The Policy Responses of CDN. Respondent CDN is a Christian who describes himself as 
a director of a non-profit counter terrorism educational organization, the work of which is 
to expose and provide attention to terrorists in the United States. His work now, 
primarily, is as director of the Internet media outlet, which was founded after the 
educational organization and just before the 2012 presidential election. He favors a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria, first, because of the biblical theological mandate of the land to 
Israel, and second, because of the political fact that the land was won in a legitimate war, 
namely, because of the doctrine of classical western war where the victor keeps the 
spoils. According to this explicitly political point of view, therefore, the land is Jewish-
owned and controlled.   
To maintain a secure Jewish Judea and Samaria, Israel must control its territory 
for at least 50 years while implementing a change in the educational processes in 
Palestinian schools to mandate a prohibition of the teaching of the destruction of Israel. 
There should be a mandate for factual teaching about Israel in Palestinian schools for the 
benefit of receiving from Israel water supplies, [clean] air, food, medicine. There is an 
obligation of this generation of Arabs to retrain their children to not hate Israel. In 50 
years there might be a prospect of peace, but until then no peace is possible and Israeli 
security should be the objective.  
Respondent CDN would give zero percent of Judea and Samaria for peace. He 
would neither have the U.S. continue supporting the Oslo Agreements nor have them 
continue funding the Palestinian Authority. He does not believe there should be a 
sovereign Arab state in Judea and Samaria, and Jews should be allowed to live anywhere 
in Judea and Samaria.  In short, CDN’s reasons for supporting a Jewish Judea and 
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Samaria are biblical and political. However, he considers the existence of a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria as (instrumentally) necessary for security.  
The Policy Responses of CCD. Respondent CCD is the communications director of 
CDN’s Internet Media organization.  He favors a Jewish Judea and Samaria because it is 
a shining light of prosperity that represents United States values and principles in the 
Middle East.  
Judea and Samaria is Jewish in a technological and social sense. What can this 
logically imply? One cannot say precisely what CCD meant without further clarification 
through interviewing, but it seemed that  CCD is referring to Jewishness as it exists in 
Judea and Samaria, namely in that Israeli region. What is technologically and socially 
Jewish? First, Jewish technology in Israel is quite advanced as Israel is considered 
innovative (Boroson 2011; Senor and Singer 2011). Second, I propose that Jewish Israeli 
society tends to emphasize a good quality of life. Indeed, according to the latest OECD 
poll, life satisfaction in Israel (which certainly alludes to quality of life) is above average 
(OECD Better Life Index n.d.). Thus, a Jewish Judea and Samaria socially may imply a 
socially satisfactorily life there. In sum, a Jewish Judea and Samaria for CCD is both 
advanced technologically and socially satisfactory.  
He would give zero percent of Judea and Samaria for peace. He would neither 
have the U.S. continue supporting the Oslo Agreements nor continue funding the 
Palestinian Authority. He does not believe there should be a sovereign Arab state in 
Judea and Samaria, and Jews should be allowed to live anywhere there.  In sum, CCD’s 
reason for supporting a Jewish Judea and Samaria is guided by his pride in their 
prosperity and advanced development, both technologically and socially.  
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The Policy Responses of JRE1. Respondent JRE1 is a retired school principal. JRE1 
favors a Jewish Judea and Samaria because it has been Jewish since biblical days and 
Israel will keep it free, democratic, and will use it properly – not for warfare, but for 
living.  He sees a Jewish Judea and Samaria as a Jewish homeland where people can live 
freely and can work in safety. It is a place where the religions of Christianity, Judaism, or 
Islam may be practiced, and it is a haven for targeted people. 
Respondent JRE1 would give zero percent of Judea and Samaria for peace. He 
would neither have the U.S. continue supporting the Oslo Agreements nor continue 
funding the Palestinian Authority. He does not believe there should be a sovereign Arab 
state in Judea and Samaria, and Jews should be allowed to live anywhere in Judea and 
Samaria.   
General Analysis for the MS Members. Respondents CDN, CCD, and JRE1 support a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria for biblical and political reasons. Security of that land is seen 
as a bonus to the people of the area, something that CDN thinks should be strengthened. 
CCD, in particular, admires a Jewish Judea and Samaria for its technology and social life. 
The MS group, perhaps because it is entirely composed of men, emphasizes security or 
technological concerns as an additional reason to support Jewish settlement of Judea and 
Samaria.  
Overview of the Subgroups 
Respondents CES and CDN are leaders of organizations, respectively, an 
educational nonprofit and an Internet media outfit. Within the PCJc, they are each joined 
by two individuals active in their respective organizations. We have examined altogether 
six individuals here who were chosen for two reasons. First, CES and CDN have 
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maintained activism more than any of the other 26 members of the PCJc in this case 
study. Second, CCU and CRE5 are members of CES’s education organization, and CCD 
and JR1 participate in CDN’s organization. As persistent activists, these six are most 
likely to be leaders in a possible future actual organized Christian Jewish coalition that 
supports a Jewish Judea and Samaria.  That is, they are the likely founders and leaders of 
an eventual Christian Jewish coalition (CJc).  
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V. THE RESOURCES AND METHODS OF THE POTENTIAL CHRISTIAN 
JEWISH COALITION 
The chapter explores how – with what resources and methods – the PCJc has 
attempted to influence U.S. policy on (a) the Middle East generally68 and (b) the Arab-
Israeli conflict in particular. Resources are the sources, physical or non-physical, that an 
entity uses to attain a goal, for example funds, contacts, media access, personal 
relationships, and other such assets. Whereas resources conjure up images of substances 
relied upon for a task, methods bring to mind the tactics for, or approaches to, using 
resources to fulfill a goal.  
To explore the resources and methods of the PCJc in pursuit of its policy goals, 
however, a brief contextual background is in order on how United States policy evolved 
toward the “two-state” solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. Then I will 
report the resources and methods of the potential coalition. 
United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
 Early United States involvement in the Middle East began with the administration 
of President Thomas Jefferson when the United States attempted to stop pirating by the 
North African provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, during the nineteenth 
century, U.S. missionaries and merchants were active in the region. In the twentieth 
century, as World War I came to a close, the United States took an interest in the 
allocation of the Middle East provinces of the defeated Ottoman Empire to the victors, 
the principal allied powers. Nonetheless, no U.S. administration gave the region the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The study will give attention to the PCJc’s efforts to influence policy in the Middle East generally as 
much as possible and appropriate, although the main focus of the dissertation is on their efforts to influence 
U.S. policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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highest priority between 1918 and 1939, though some attention was paid to the increasing 
involvement of multinational oil companies in the Middle East (Lesch 2007, 1). 
As Michael Oren (2007) shows, preceding the work of Jewish Zionists, altruistic 
Protestant missionaries endeavored to support a Jewish state in the land of Israel. As 
noted above, while the United States Navy sought to resist pirates in North Africa, the 
first real entry into the region was in 1818 by the American missionaries Pliny Fisk and 
Levi Parsons, who traveled to the Middle East to convert Jews and Arabs. When they 
failed, they instead planted schools, for example the American University of Beirut, the 
American University in Cairo, and Roberts College in Turkey [today Bogazici 
University]. Other missionaries came to teach, and learn Arabic; in fact, their descendants 
went on to serve in the State Department and became the first Arabists. Later, a number 
of them worked for oil companies.  
Earlier supported by John Adams and later by Abraham Lincoln, the somewhat 
popular Restorationist idea promoted the return of Jews to their homeland, and motivated 
in no small part by this ideology, in the 1830s, some American Christians ventured to 
create colonies in the Middle East, striving to help Jews to farm. In 1948, within minutes 
of Israel declaring its independence, President Harry S. Truman recognized the Jewish 
state, making the United States the first nation to do so (Oren and Myers 2007).  
Even before World War II and in order to protect its petroleum interests, the 
United States was invested in oil agreements such as the Red Line and the Anglo 
American Petroleum Agreement. Irvine Anderson notes that by the early twentieth 
century the United States went from being a net exporter to a net importer of petroleum, 
fundamentally altering U.S. interests in the region (Anderson 1981, 36). 
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Finally, the mid-twentieth century saw the United States more embroiled in the 
politics of Middle Eastern states. In 1949, in particular, the U.S. participated in a lesser 
known military coup that overthrew the elected government of Syria (Little 1990, 51). 
Four years later in a much better known event, the U.S. toppled Iranian Prime Minister 
Mohammed Mossadeq. Then in 1956, during the Suez Affair, the U.S. reached a turning 
point in Middle Eastern power politics when in order to protect Gamal Abdel Nasser, it 
thrust itself between Egypt on the one hand, and Britain, France and Israel on the other 
hand. The milestone event was followed by Eisenhower’s 1957 containment policy, 
which granted the president the authority to intervene in the Middle East to thwart a 
communist threat to any nation, without having to obtain Congressional approval (Attie 
2004, 110). As United States interest in the Middle East increased, the U.S. containment 
policy inspired other policy formulations to facilitate continued U.S. presence in that 
region.   
During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan sought to achieve a balance of power between 
Iraq and Iran. He thus supported Saddam Hussein to weaken the Iranians, but then sold 
arms to the latter to discourage kidnapping of Americans in Lebanon. In 2003, George 
W. Bush entered Iraq in the name of instilling democracy in a culture not accustomed to 
the principle (Oren and Myers 2007).   
United States-Israel Relations 
 Since 1985, the United States has granted to Israel about three billion dollars per 
year (Sharp 2013, 28).  
Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World 
War II. To date, the United States has provided Israel $118 billion (current, or 
non-inflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance. Almost all U.S. bilateral aid 
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to Israel is in the form of military assistance, although in the past Israel also 
received significant economic assistance. (Sharp 2013) 
 
Initial U.S. support for Jewish settlement in Palestine was seen in the passage and 
signing of the 1922 U.S. Lodge-Fish Joint Resolution by, respectively, both Houses of 
Congress and President Harding. Later, after World War II, in the context of a bi-polar 
world, the United States faced competition with its adversary, the Soviet Union. Its 
decisions on Israel reflected a number of factors including resisting Soviet world 
dominance and negotiating oil agreements with Arab nations that challenged Jewish 
settlement in the Middle East.  
The 1937 British Peel Commission Report, the first proposal for a partition of 
Palestine, was not implemented because the British government determined that as a 
consequence of political, administrative, and financial difficulties, the “proposal to create 
independent Arab and Jewish states inside Palestine” would be impracticable (Geddes 
1991, 184). In 1947, the United States supported the second partition plan, UN 
Resolution 181, which called for the partitioning of Palestine into a Jewish state and an 
Arab state. Following the Arabs’ rejection of the partition plan, increased violence ensued 
between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine. After the state of Israel was established on May 
14, 1948, President Truman extended de facto recognition to it. The 1948 Israeli War of 
Independence between Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Israel lasted from May 
15, 1948 to March 10, 1949. U.S. de jure recognition was extended on January 31, 1949.  
During the Eisenhower administration, while Israel received its military support 
from France, the United States provisioned food as aid. Sharp (2013, 23) noted that “from 
1949 through 1965, U.S. aid to Israel averaged about $63 million per year, over 95% of 
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which was economic development assistance and food aid. A modest military loan 
program began in 1959.” 
In 1968, under the Johnson administration, the United States sold Phantom fighter 
aircraft to Israel. Since then the U.S. often sold advanced arms (e.g., F-15s, AWACS and 
Stinger missiles) to Israel’s adversaries that lessened Israel’s qualitative edge (Bard 1991, 
194-209). The following year, named for its creator U.S. Secretary of State William P. 
Rogers, the 1969 Rogers Plan called for a cease fire to the war of attrition between Egypt 
and Israel on each side of Suez. Israel, Egypt and the Soviet Union rejected the plan 
(Quandt 2005, 68). 
The 1973 Yom Kippur War was fought between Soviet and U.S. proxies, 
respectively, Egypt and Israel. Just hours before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War on 
October 6, 1973, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir recognized the Egyptian and Syrian 
military threat but in a nod to the United States’ apparent rejection of preemption, the 
Israeli Prime Minister abstained from an advance strike (Quandt 2005, 105). During the 
war, Kissinger stalled an arms delivery to Israel for three days to force her “to accept a 
cease-fire in place to end the war in military stalemate” (Spiegel 1985, 251). While 
initially the Egyptians gained territory, by the end of the war, the Israelis had regained it. 
Nonetheless, the Israeli victory was indecisive as Kissinger persuaded the Israelis to 
allow the resupply of Egypt’s Third Army (1985, 265). After the war, the Nixon 
Administration was poised to control negotiations between Egypt and Israel. In the end, 
Nixon and Kissinger “created the conditions for and initiated a new Arab-Israeli peace 
process” starting with a limited settlement; assisted Egypt’s move away from Moscow 
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and toward Washington; and “improved the American diplomatic position in the area at 
the Kremlin’s expense” (1985, 314).   
In early 1975 the Israeli government turned down the Ford Administration’s 
initiative for further Israeli redeployment from the Sinai. In March, Ford wrote to the 
Israelis, asserting that Israeli intransigence had caused problems for the United States 
worldwide, and U.S. arms shipments to Israel were halted. Finally, in September 1975 the 
Israeli-Egyptian disengagement of forces agreement was formalized and the U.S. Israeli 
diplomatic crisis passed (Quandt 2005, 162-8). 
The Carter years are most famous for the Israel-Egypt peace treaty by which 
Israel conceded the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in exchange for a cold peace, in effect 
Egyptian pledges to cease belligerency.  
The Reagan administration included cabinet members, Weinberger and Schultz, 
who had worked for Bechtel, a corporation with connections to Arab nations and which 
most likely influenced U.S. Middle East policy and therefore, U.S. relations with Israel.69 
The Reagan years provided many cooperative agreements between the United States and 
Israeli militaries, specifically enhancing Israel’s military capability (Bard 2004). 
However, the United States also strongly objected to the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi 
nuclear facility, Osirak, and the Lebanon siege of Beirut in 1982. In December 1988, the 
United States opened a dialogue with the PLO towards the goal of negotiating peace to 
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, while the U.S. and Israeli militaries coordinated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The purpose of this research is not to focus on the effect of U.S. oil interests on U.S.-Israel relations. I 
merely want to keep in mind that since Weinberger and Schultz, key members of Reagan’s Administration, 
had ties to corporations that worked with Arab nations, the reader should note their probable influence over 
U.S. decision-making on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, I include these facts in the narrative.  
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their operations, U.S. policy and U.S. decision-making opened up the possibility of 
Israeli land concessions to the PLO.  
On May 22, 1989, Secretary of State James Baker, under George H. W. Bush (the 
first Bush administration), told AIPAC that settlement building should cease (Quandt 
2005, 296). On March 3, 1990, at a press conference, President Bush stated that East 
Jerusalem was occupied territory (Mark 2004, 3). During the 1991 Gulf War, Bush told 
Israel not to defend itself against Iraqi scuds falling within her territory.  
President Bush and Secretary Baker were successful in arranging the Madrid 
Conference in October 1991, facilitating the attendance of the parties and their 
subsequent negotiations; however, the forum did not succeed in producing an actual 
agreement for Israeli land concessions (Mark 2004, 3). In a speech to Congress on March 
6, 1991, President Bush referred to a new world order. Michael B. Oren summarized this 
new world scenario as a millennial era of peace, an international fraternity. The United 
States would have a permanent presence in the Gulf, but the centerpiece of this new 
world would be an Arab-Israeli treaty agreed upon on the basis of the land for peace 
policy (Oren 2007, 569). 
President Clinton announced on September 10, 1993, that the United States and 
the PLO would continue a dialogue (U.S. Government Printing Office 1993). During the 
Clinton administration agreements were signed between the PLO and Israel, for example 
Oslo I and II and the Wye Accords, which would create relations between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. 
Contrary to what many in the pro-Israel organizations write or say, the Oslo 
Accords and related agreements of the 1990s accomplished the goal of the first Oslo 
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peace treaty – to be an interim document upon which to eventually solidify Israeli-Arab 
(Palestinian) relations towards a permanent status agreement. In 2000, a first final status 
accord was attempted at Camp David II but Arafat held off for a better deal. That offer 
would be made under the Prime Ministry of Ehud Olmert. In 2008, he offered the new 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas some 94 percent of Judea and Samaria. That was 
still not good enough for the Palestinian Authority.  
George W. Bush supported an Israeli operation into the West Bank in 2002 to 
cleanse the territory of terror cells. In 2004, in a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon, Bush stated that any final status agreement would include established 
settlements. Bush supported the 2005 Gaza disengagement and supported Israeli strikes 
in Lebanon in 2006 as a response to Hezbollah’s kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. 
Additionally, Bush supported the 2008-2009 Israeli engagement in Gaza as a response to 
rocket fire from Hamas-controlled territory into Israel. 
Under the Obama Administration, starting on July 14, 2009, Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to a 10 month settlement building freeze. As the freeze did 
not include construction in East Jerusalem of 3000 units pre-approved for building, and 
the removal of scattered outlying housing, the Palestinians rejected the freeze and 
declined negotiations. Obama authorized the sale of bunker buster bombs to Israel in 
2009, weapons which Bush had earlier promised (Borger 2011). 
In March 2010, U. S. Vice President Joseph Biden visited Israel just as plans were 
announced for the future building of 1500 apartments in Ramat Shlomo (East Jerusalem). 
According to UN Security Council 478, adopted in 1980, Jerusalem is Israeli occupied 
territory. Obama’s anger over Israel’s announcement of building suggests perhaps that 
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just like UN Security Council 478, he may consider Jerusalem as Israeli occupied 
territory rather than as a sovereign Israel’s capital city.  
Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton demanded of Israel – 1) 
cancellation of construction approvals; 2) a freeze on construction in Jerusalem; 3) the 
release of Palestinian prisoners; and 4) a discussion of the partition of Jerusalem and the 
Arab refugee issue (Glick 2010). Reportedly, on March 26, 2010, Netanyahu was 
snubbed at the White House after being presented with demands from Obama – a 
construction moratorium in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; a promise to discuss 
final-status issues such as refugees, borders, and Jerusalem in talks; and concessions to 
the Palestinian Authority such as the removal of additional checkpoints and the freeing of 
Palestinian security prisoners (Hornik 2010). Then in March 2011, Obama called for 
Israel’s return to 1967 borders with mutually agreed swaps. 
Through this history of United States-Israel relations, we see that Oren’s (2007) 
characterization of the themes of United States policy in the Middle East – a combination 
of power, faith, and fantasy – is apt.  
United States policy on Israel is strongly positioned to enhance its power in the 
Middle East. Its decisions on Israel reflected resisting Soviet world dominance and 
negotiating oil agreements with Arab nations that challenged Jewish settlement in the 
Middle East. The United States has favored the two-state solution since 1947, when it 
supported, UN Resolution 181, the second partition plan. Otherwise, throughout U.S. 
Administrations it has sought to compromise Israeli sovereignty over land Israel 
acquired: Nixon and Kissinger initiated momentum towards Israel’s relinquishment of the 
Sinai; Ford delayed arms shipments and pushed through the Israeli-Egyptian 
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disengagement agreement; during the Carter Administration the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace 
treaty was signed; the Reagan Administration furthered the legitimacy of the Palestinian 
Arab claim to the land of Israel by opening up relations with the PLO; President George 
H.W. Bush definitively opposed Israeli community building in Judea and Samaria and 
changed the course of AIPAC’s lobbying on that issue, deterring their support for a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria. From the 1947 Partition Plan to the present 2013 peace 
process negotiations, the U.S. has sought to increase its power to influence Israeli 
sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.  
 We can see the faith element if we peruse the Presidents and their backgrounds, 
from Truman to Obama. For example, Truman was known for his Baptist background 
and his thorough knowledge of scripture. Additionally, his friend Edward Jacobson was a 
strong lobbyist for United States support for a Jewish state in Palestine. While Truman 
considered himself Cyrus70  – a supporter of Jewish return to Israel – Eisenhower did not 
see himself as such. The Jewish nation-state had been born in spite of his preference to 
the contrary, and had persisted to survive its war of independence. Kennedy hardly 
brought his Catholic religious upbringing to bear on his decision-making on Israel 
(Merkley 2004). 
Johnson’s attachment to Israel was not because of theology but was rather 
sentimental. He respected the strength of the Zionists (Merkley 2004, 56). Nixon can best 
be characterized by the contrast between his private religious and political selves. In 
private, he spoke to evangelicals about his “tent-meeting conversion” but once huddled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The Persian King Cyrus reigned from 559 B.C.E. – 530 B.C.E. 
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together with his political colleagues, he set out to prove that he was the “hardest, 
meanest, most unscrupulous man in politics” (Merkley 2004, 79).  
Carter was not a Christian Zionist (2004, 140) preferring a Jewish claim to all the 
land of Israel. He believed that all non-Jews of Palestine were aboriginal peoples whose 
history “is marked by victimization at the hands of a succession of imperialists” (2004, 
141). Additionally, President Jimmy Carter exhibited what Berggsten and Rae called an 
“evangelical presidential style,” blurring the line between religion and politics (2006, 
614). Carter had “a vision for the country's role in the world, a doctrine, an understanding 
of the use of force, and a passion to find peace in the Middle East” (2006, 617).  
Reagan’s “confidence in the lord’s appointment over his life is boldly stated in his 
memoirs” (Merkley 2004, 153). On April 18, 1983, terrorists attacked the U.S. Embassy 
in Beirut, killing sixteen Americans. On October 23, 1983, suicide bombers drove a truck 
into the U.S. Marine headquarters at the Beirut airport killing 251 men (2004, 166). 
Finally, on February 7, 1984, the Reagan Administration announced that the U.S. 
Marines would leave Beirut. Reagan thus walked away from his commitment to “secure 
the peace of Lebanon and of Israel” (2004, 167). Hereby we see that Reagan’s 
commitment to Christian Zionism was weak at most (2004, 170).  
George H.W. Bush was an Episcopalian and as such lacked an affinity towards a 
Christian Zionist perspective. In action this may be seen in his commitment to the first 
Gulf war which was fought with the cooperation of the UN and Middle Eastern nations, 
seeking engagement with world politics through the framework of a united “new world 
order,” certainly not focused on building up Israeli sovereignty. In fact, President Bush 
called on Israel to refrain from military action during the war and depend on American 
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defense capabilities against Iraqi scud missiles that rained on her territory. President 
Clinton was a southern Baptist but not a Christian Zionist. His earnest efforts to cause 
Israel to conclude the Oslo process with an Arab state in Judea and Samaria revealed an 
attachment to Jews and Israel that was more aligned with center and left-wing Jews and 
Israelis.  
Like former President Jimmy Carter, George W. Bush also exhibited what 
Berggsten and Rae called the evangelical presidential style. Accordingly, Bush admitted 
to a foreign policy highly tinted by his religious convictions. However, President Bush 
seemed to protect Israel’s image in the world more than did Carter; he rejected 
“arguments that September 11 was the result of U.S. support for Israel, and for past 
military interventions in the region” (Berggren and Rae 2006, 621). President George W. 
Bush was a self-admitted born-again Christian, and this may have helped him to support 
Israel in its military engagements. In his 2009 speech in Cairo, Obama mentioned that 
America is a Christian, Muslim, and lastly a Jewish nation. There is some media attention 
given to Obama’s lack of identification with a Judeo-Christian America, which implies 
his lack of biblically based support for Israel.  
Oren’s (2007) last point is about fantasy. While the Middle East may conjure up 
fantasies of power and faith leading to exploration, wealth, holiness, and peace, these 
perceptions are easily frustrated by the hard and dispiriting realities of war, loss of life, 
and intractable conflict. The perception of U.S. policy in the Middle East applies to U.S. 
policy on Israel as well: The United States goal of facilitating the creation of a Palestinian 
state in Judea and Samaria rests on the illusion that negotiating with Arab terrorists 
(Hamas and Fatah) pledging the destruction of Israel will turn them into peace partners. 
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U.S. Policy on Judea and Samaria 
From Chapter One we know that every U.S. President since 1967 has agreed that 
settlements beyond the 1967 armistice lines – the “green line” – are obstacles to peace. 
President Clinton presided over the signing of the Declaration of Principles (Oslo I) 
between the PLO and the government of Israel. Congress approved S.1487, the Middle 
East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993, which became law on October 28, 1993. The law 
allowed the President to fund the PLO because it suspended 
specified provisions of law which prohibit foreign and United Nations assistance 
to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the receipt or expenditure of PLO 
funds, and PLO membership in the International Monetary Fund, upon 
certification to specified congressional committees that: (1) such waiver is in the 
national interest; and (2) the PLO continues to abide by commitments made in 
letters to Israel and the Foreign Minister of Norway and under the Declaration of 
Principles signed in September 1993. (1993) 
 
Thus, the United States Congress and the President supported the Oslo Accords. 
One organization that tried to oppose U.S. support for the Oslo Accords, however, was 
the Zionist Organization of America. As we saw in Chapter One, in 1993, there was little 
opposition to the Oslo Accords among American Jews, and anti-treaty forces attracted 
only 10 percent of American Jewry – but this minority of a minority made up for that in 
their strength of expression (Rosenthal 2001, 125). While Israeli Prime Minister Rabin 
decided not to be concerned about every Palestinian violation, the Likud party in Israel 
formed an anti-treaty alliance with ZOA in the United States. According to Rosenthal 
(2001, 128-9), they cooperated in lobbying the U.S. Congress to monitor PA compliance 
with the Oslo Agreement. The Oslo accord monitoring group was composed of fifteen 
senators and thirty-one House members. If it were to have cut off aid, it would have 
likely ended the Olso interim cooperation agreement aimed at a final status accord.  
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A group of Orthodox organizations – Orthodox Union, National Council of 
Young Israel, Rabbinical Council of America, Poalei Agudat Israel, Religious Zionists of 
America, and Amit Emuna – joined with ZOA and AFSI in Washington, D.C. to oppose 
Oslo while at the same time, as I earlier mentioned, Congress passed the Middle East 
Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) in order to fund the Palestinian Authority. Mort Klein, 
National Director of ZOA, had a strong influence on the passage, on July 29, 1994, of the 
Specter-Shelby amendment, “which required the State Department to certify the PA’s 
compliance” with Oslo.  
On June 13, 1995, a group of one hundred Orthodox rabbis went to Capitol Hill to 
“lobby for a delay in the funding.” On September 20, 1995, the Committee on 
International Relations gathered to debate a MEFPA extension. ZOA opposed the 
extension and the Orthodox Union wanted to stop payment to the Palestinians until they 
complied with their DOP (Declaration of Principles, the first Oslo Agreement) 
obligations.  The ZOA convinced some legislators to press the Clinton Administration to 
force Arafat to hand over Arab terrorists accused of killing American citizens in Israel 
(Seliktar 2002, 136-7).  
The ZOA also worked with Christian organizations, and in that action we see a 
glimpse of Christian Jewish cooperation, similar to the PCJc, attempting to support a 
Jewish state. By 1995, the National Jewish Coalition and ZOA renewed an effort to move 
the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.  
Finally, a bipartisan group in Congress passed the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation 
Act, the passage of which showed the new dynamics of lobbying for pro-Israel causes in 
the Republican-dominated Congress. The incoming conservative lawmakers, who came 
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to dominate both House and Senate in 1994, gave the nationalist-Orthodox coalition an 
advantage over the mainstream AIPAC and the Conference of Jewish Presidents. The fact 
that many of the conservative legislators had the support of Christian fundamentalists 
helped this coalition more effectively oppose Oslo (Marsden 2008, 196-216; Seliktar 
2002, 139). More specifically, the National Unity Coalition for Israel and the Christians’ 
Israel Public Action Campaign (CIPAC) lobbied against aid for the PA and for the 
embassy move. In August 1995, CIPAC organized a conference to create a grassroots 
lobbying system, to which AFSI contributed (139). 
On May 17, 1999, Ehud Barak won a strong victory in Israel’s election. Right 
wing Zionists disliked Barak’s mandate to fulfill the Oslo peace process. The right-wing 
Israel lobby and the Christian fundamentalists approached Congress. Both ZOA and the 
National Unity Coalition pressured congressmen to vote against a new aid bill for the 
Palestinians, depicting it as an abuse of taxpayers’ money (Seliktar 2007, 127-8). 
However, this coalition differs from the PCJc in that while they oppose the Oslo Accords 
and do whatever they can to pressure the U.S. government to respect Jerusalem as Israel’s 
capital and to protect Americans against PLO terrorism, they have had neither the 
resources nor the methodology to change United States support for Oslo.  
I will now focus on mainly ZOA, and on the Christian Zionists lightly, to show 
the resources and methodologies of the organizations that come as close as possible to the 
essence of the potential coalition. As I reviewed in Chapter Four, the right-wing Zionists 
were the successors of American Revisionist Zionism. Peter Bergson, a leader of the 
Irgun, and the playwright Ben Hecht started the movement in the 1940s. The Zionist 
Organization of America is the oldest Zionist group in America and follows many 
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revisionist themes. It criticized Labor-Zionism, the left-wing ideology associated with the 
Israel’s Labor party, for its willingness to partition the land of Israel (Seliktar 2002, 29).  
From its inception to the 1990s, AIPAC was considered the American lobby 
group representative for the survival of the nascent state of Israel. For example, on 
January 25 and 26, 1970, AIPAC sent some fourteen hundred Jewish activists to 
Congress to lobby against the Rogers proposal (the Rogers Plan), which the state of Israel 
opposed (Tivnan 1987, 72). 
However, before the 1990s, AIPAC supported Israel’s interests at a time when the 
Jewish state did not want to concede land. When the state of Israel in the 1990s moved to 
the left, and AIPAC was unable to resist United States policy, it also swayed to the left. 
The ZOA’s relations with AIPAC result from the former’s membership in the Conference 
of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations (Jewish Virtual Library 2008a).  
Another part of the right-wing coalition was Americans for a Safe Israel (AFSI), 
founded in 1971 with the help of Shmuel Katz, whose book Battleground: Facts and 
Fantasy in Palestine was utilized by Jewish Defense League (JDL) founder Rabbi Meir 
Kahane. Americans for a Safe Israel’s goal was to persuade American Jews to cast away 
the land-for-peace model of the Labor Party (Seliktar 2002, 39).  
Resources  
The ZOA’s resources have been donors such as Irving Moskowitz, who has also 
supported AFSI, the American Friends of Ateret Cohanim/Jerusalem Reclamation Project 
and the Frank Gaffney-founded Center for Security Policy (Seliktar 2002, 128). The 
Center for Security Policy is one of the minor but relevant actors on the outskirts of the 
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potential coalition. The ZOA exists mostly on smaller donations, according to an 
employee. 
Another resource that ZOA utilizes for its survival is information. It helps ZOA to 
appreciate its own value to Americans. Thus, as a result of polls of American Jews in the 
1980s, nationalists such as ZOA or AFSI found insufficient evidence to back the charge 
that they were fringe groups. The polls suggested that a good number of Jews were 
willing to accept retention of the territories and annexation of the West Bank (Seliktar 
2002, 63). “Never again,” a conviction that never again should world Jewry or concerned 
gentiles act apathetically while another Jewish Holocaust unfolds, seems to be a 
mentality that serves as inspirational energy, and may serve as a resource. Norman 
Podhoretz is one of those “never again” thinkers. He is a critic of an independent 
Palestinian state, and, in “Israel: A Lamentation for the Future” he wrote that the creation 
of a Palestinian state would lead to the obliteration of Israel (2002, 97). 
Methods  
The ZOA’s methods are educating members of the public and Congress on what 
constitutes support for Jews worldwide, and for a Jewish state of Israel. For example, on 
May 21, 1978, ZOA placed an ad in the New York Times accusing the Carter 
Administration of selling out Israel for petro-dollars (Seliktar 2002, 58). Also ZOA, as 
did AFSI, supported the cause of Jonathan Pollard, an American who was convicted of 
spying and sentenced to jail for disclosing U.S. intelligence to Israel, and opposed his 
retention (2002, 78). 
As a methodology, ZOA uses its connections, for example with the American 
Jewish community, to muster support for its positions. For example, when in 1989 
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Shamir’s settlement policy engendered U.S. opposition and Shamir visited the United 
States, ZOA attracted some two hundred well-wishers to greet Shamir when he arrived at 
the airport (2002, 103).  
Then in 1991, the Jewish community received a sharp slap in the face, especially 
stinging for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Prime Minister Shamir had 
requested from the U.S. a loan guarantee to cover settling a significant influx of new 
Russian immigrants. The Bush Administration wanted to make the loan guarantee 
conditional upon cessation of building communities in Judea and Samaria. On September 
6, 1991, one thousand Jewish activists went to Capitol Hill to support the loan guarantee 
request from Israel. Bush asked for a 120-day delay in order to pursue negotiations in the 
context of the Madrid Conference. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
supported the activists but discovered that there were not enough votes to override a 
presidential veto of the loan guarantees. Thus, on September 20, a group of American 
Jewish leaders met with Israeli government officials to advise them to moderate their 
policy in Judea and Samaria (2002, 103). 
As a result of the handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and the 
PLO’s Yassir Arafat, there was a forceful reaction from the American Jewish right. On 
October 10, 1993, opponents of the PLO-Israel accord met in Arlington, Virginia for an 
American Leadership Conference for a Safe Israel. Herb Zweibon from AFSI proclaimed 
that September 13 would live in infamy. A large number of organizations prepared to 
oppose Oslo (2002, 126-7). 
Another way to see ZOA’s methodology is to look at its commitment to language. 
For example, the nationalist and Orthodox lobby fought with AIPAC over the reaction to 
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a UN resolution condemning the Hebron killings in 1994 by Baruch Goldstein. In a 
preamble to their resolution, the UN referred to Jerusalem as occupied territory. The 
Israeli government asked AIPAC and the Conference to refrain from lobbying the Clinton 
Administration to veto the resolution, but ZOA convinced eighty-three senators to urge 
the president to veto it. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee was forced to 
change course and the Clinton Administration had to demand a paragraph by paragraph 
vote for the unanimous passage on March 18, 1994 of a UN resolution (2002, 136). 
Under Oslo, a two billion dollar fund to restore the Palestinian economy was 
established, of which a quarter was to come from the United States. Rabin believed that 
poverty fomented Islamic fundamentalism in the territories, and he lobbied for American 
help. The Congress responded by passing the MEPFA, but the National Director of ZOA, 
Mort Klein, the Orthodox Union, and other activists pressed Congress to condition the 
aid on the PA’s compliance with the Declaration of Principles. As I mentioned above, 
largely as a consequence of Klein’s efforts, Congress passed on July 29, 1994 the 
Specter-Shelby amendment (2002, 136-7). 
Some of ZOA’s methodology includes use of the American citizenship of its 
membership. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee or the Conference of 
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (President’s Conference) overlooked 
the fact that in lobbying Congress on how money was being spent on the Palestinian 
Authority, ZOA, AFSI, and Orthodox activists had acted not as American Jews but rather 
as American taxpayers. For example, Rabbi Steven Pruzansky stated that as an American 
taxpayer he demanded a right and a voice on where, how, and to whom economic 
assistance funds are distributed (2002, 141). 
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Another methodology that ZOA uses is criticism of the Israeli government. 
Regarding the building of the Hasmonean Tunnel and resultant riots, ZOA took a lead in 
criticizing the Likud government for insufficient zeal (2002, 154). Zionist Organization 
of America also criticizes United States politicians. For example, right-wing activists 
were angry at Martin Indyk, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, for 
attempting to coerce Prime Minister Netanyahu to implement the Oslo Agreements 
towards an Arab State in Israel (2002, 158).  
Christians’ methodologies include close associations with the Israeli government. 
For example in April 1997, Netanyahu addressed three thousand evangelicals at the 
annual conference of Voices United for Israel. Those who organized this event included 
Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed from the Christian Coalition, and others (2002, 
160). Ralph Reed reemerged in the 2012 election as a major force battling against the re-
election of Obama (Becker 2012).  
The Resources and Methods of the PCJc 
 All members of the PCJc self-identify as politically active. To gather data on the 
resources and methods the PCJc uses I asked the following interview questions: In what 
way are you politically active, [and with] what type of activities? What have you done to 
support a Jewish Judea and Samaria? What have been the effects of your support for a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria? [If Christian,] what [percent of] activities [for a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria] included Jews? [If Christian, on average] how many Jews were at those 
activities [for a Jewish Judea and Samaria]? [If Jewish,] what [percent of] activities [for a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria] included Christians? [If Jewish, on average,] how many 
Christians were present at those activities [for a Jewish Judea and Samaria]? Barack 
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Obama is a _____ friend of Israel (choose from “one” as “best” to “five” as “worst,” 
please fill in blank). 
The remainder of this chapter will cover the results of the resources and methods 
interview questions for the members of the subgroups ES and MS.  To recall, the first 
subgroup ES consists of three PCJc members (CES, CCU, and CRE5) as described in 
Chapter Four. The second subgroup MS consists of three PCJc members (CDN, CCD and 
JRE1), as also described in Chapter Four. I have narrowed analyses to six of the 28 
members of the PCJc in order to focus on those persons with leadership qualities and, 
thus, those most likely to be leaders of a possible future, actual Christian Jewish 
coalition.  
The Educational Subgroup 
 The primary individual whose activism stands out within the larger PCJc is 
“CES,” the founder of ES, a nonprofit educational organization. Her activism has 
increased after the 2012 presidential election. The secondary individuals, “CCU” and 
“CRE5,” also attend CES’s nonprofit educational meetings.  
The Resources and Methods Responses of CES. A Christian, CES describes herself as 
active in education and sales, as a person who educates people with knowledge of the 
foundations of the country, on truth not on conjecture or with emotions. She attempts to 
bring the right person to be elected. She does not waver from the U.S. Constitution. She 
has campaigned for those who believe in the same values and constitutional principles on 
which the United States was founded. 
Respondent CES identified what she has done to support a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria. She stressed that she educates on the historical facts of the land issue, stating 
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that too many people are deceived on the facts pertaining to the genealogy of the so-
called Palestinians, who in fact are Arabs. She also gives to groups that support Israel.  
 Respondent CES described the effects of her support for a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria. She remarked that “people keep coming back” and that if “we were not being 
effective” educating on the facts, they would not be returning. She estimated that of all 
the activities she is engaged in, some 30 percent included Jewish attendees. She added, 
however, that even with such a minority of Jewish attendees, these meetings educate 
gentiles on how to better relate to Jews and thus have in mind the increase of future 
Jewish attendance.  
When asked for an estimate of how many Jews are present at the meetings for a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria, CES noted that 15 per month attend. She added that in her 
view Barack Obama is the worst friend of Israel. 
In summary, CES’s methods are educating and campaigning on the basis of truth, 
Constitutional principles, and values. She educates on historical facts about the Arabs in 
Judea and Samaria. Her resources include networking with Christian legal organizations 
and other activists – mainly Christian – who will speak at her group meetings. Her 
effectiveness is apparent because her nonprofit educational group attracts returning 
crowds.  
The Resources and Methods Responses of CCU. Respondent CCU is a Christian who 
describes himself as a counselor. He self-describes as politically active by talking with 
neighbors or friends about elections. He calls senators or congressmen. He writes letters 
and helps out during elections. He puts up signs for the campaigns of candidates such as 
Allen West or Adam Hasner.  
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Respondent CCU identified what he has done to support a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria: “In my mid-twenties, about 20 years ago, I understood I had to be involved. I 
have called senators and congressman usually about sovereignty treaties in which the UN 
has an interest. I have spent lots of time speaking to a Jewish neighbor, but I am not able 
to figure out how he makes decisions.” 
I asked CCU about the effect of his support for a Jewish Judea and Samaria. He 
responded that he likes to think that his calls to Congressmen affect their votes. He shared 
that he believed that his conversations with his Jewish neighbor gives that neighbor 
something to “chew on.” It was only through his conversations with one neighbor from 
across the street, however, that he could say that he has been active for a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria. CCU said that Barack Obama is a worst friend of Israel.  
In summary, CCU’s methods include contacting elected officials and 
campaigning. Specifically, his activism for a Jewish Judea and Samaria has been limited 
to conversations with a Jewish neighbor. His resources include mainly his time.  
The Resources and Methods Responses of CRE5. Respondent CRE5 is a retired school 
teacher. She stated that she is politically active and shared the extent of her activism. She 
belongs to the CES-founded nonprofit educational organization. She has been a poll 
watcher, she votes, helps people to register to vote, has walked neighborhoods, keeps in 
tune with candidates, keeps up with a lot of political news, and is educated on the 
principles upon which the United States was founded according to its historical 
documents, e.g., the Constitution. Also, she has attended Tea Party rallies in Florida and 
in Washington, D.C.  
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When I inquired as to what she has done to support a Jewish Judea and Samaria, 
CRE5 responded as follows: She has prayed daily for Jerusalem; she has gone to hear 
speakers at a Jewish group locally; she has heard Prime Minister of Israel Netanyahu 
speak; and she has financially supported missionaries to Jews. Respondent CRE5 
publically defends Israel and the Jewish nation, and she has done a lot of reading about 
the Holocaust and is informed about the past sufferings of the Jews.  
She admitted to negligible effects of her activism for a Jewish Judea and Samaria, 
noting that they “have not been visible.” She stated that she hopes, however, “for God’s 
providence, that he would work behind the scenes.” Respondent CRE5 has not persuaded 
many [about the importance of a Jewish Judea and Samaria] and now the “problem is 
more enormous.”71 
According to her count, 25 percent of the events for a Jewish Judea and Samaria 
in which she participates have included Jews and of these, 10 percent were Jews.  
Finally, to my question about the kind of friend Barack Obama is to Israel, she responded 
that “he is a worst friend.” 
In summary, CRE5’s political activities follow those of CES’s actions: her 
methods are involvement in elections and working for Constitutional issues. As a retired 
teacher, her resources include time.  
General Analysis for the ES Members. Members of subgroup ES, that is CES, CCU, and 
CRE5, work together in a nonprofit educational organization that works to bring the 
United States back to observance of constitutional and moral principles. Thus, an 
important resource for all three is the encouragement they provide to each other through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The question was asked on March 12, 2013, after the 2012 presidential election. 
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assembling and strategizing. On the topic of a Jewish Judea and Samaria, these members’ 
methodology is to try to be educated on ownership of the land, engage others in 
conversation, and be sensitive to the past persecution of the Jewish people.     
The Media Subgroup 
For the MS, the primary individual whose activism stands out is CDN, the 
founder and producer of an Internet television show. The Director of Communications, 
CCD, is part of his organization. Respondent JRE1 appears on his show from time to 
time.   
The Resources and Methods Responses of CDN. A Christian, CDN describes himself as 
a director of a nonprofit counter terrorism educational organization. His work now, 
primarily, is as director of the Internet media outlet, which was founded after the 
educational organization and just before the 2012 presidential election.    
In response to my question regarding political activism and the type of activities, 
CDN claimed to have been “active saving America, Israel and the West.” He has 
supported a Jewish Judea and Samaria by having spent the last 10 years of his life 
educating Americans and Westerners to the vital significance of Israel on theological, 
geopolitical, and national security issues. That education has taken many forms from 
writing to speaking. 
When I asked CDN about the effects of his support for a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria, he offered that they have been extremely positive and beneficial in “waking up 
Jews who do not understand their own theological and political heritage. He also alerts 
Christians to the theological, historical and political role of the Jewish nation. Not only 
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does CDN “wake them up” but he also initiates many to engage in activism to implement 
political change eventually for the sake of Israel, America, and Western Civilization. 
He stated that of all activities he has engaged in for a Jewish Judea and Samaria, 
80 percent have included Jews.  He added that 80 percent of the persons at these activities 
were Jewish. Finally, to CDN Barack Obama is a worst friend of Israel.  
In summary, as an activist, CDN’s role is to spotlight the threat of Sharia Islamic 
law predominating U.S. Constitutional law in the United States and in Western 
Civilization, and to defend Israel. His activism has attracted many Jewish followers. The 
co-host on his Internet television style program is Jewish. His methodology is to attract 
Jews, Christian Zionists, and Tea Party patriots by creating a message that speaks to 
Israel, a strong America, and constitutional principles. The message of CDN is not 
discordant with the neo-conservative ideology, which supports American interventionism 
in foreign countries as a means of defending the U.S. from foreign invaders.    
The Resources and Methods of CCD. Respondent CCD is the communications director of 
CDN’s Internet Media organization. As far as his political activism and activities, CCD 
stated that he lectures, speaks, interacts with people, and assists in voter registration. He 
speaks on such topics as the Muslim Brotherhood and the radical nature of Islam, about 
how these entities attack Jewish and Christian culture.  
As far as what CCD has done to support a Jewish Judea and Samaria, he has 
produced well over 150 videos on the topic of Israel. He exposed a Hamas donor who is 
part of a U.S. governor’s faith-based council. He stated that Barack Obama is a worst 
friend of Israel. 
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In summary, CCD’s methods include investigative media and production. 
Respondent CCD’s resources include whatever benefits he accrues through his 
association with CDN’s media organization.   
The Resources and Methods Responses of JRE1. A retired former school principal, JRE1 
stated that he is active for Israel and the United States and that he has supported the land 
of Israel through speaking and education. The effects of his support for a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria have been positive. These results are the dissemination of a better 
understanding of the true facts about the history of Judea, Samaria, and the Jewish 
homeland. Eighty percent of activities attended by JRE1 have included Christians and 
where Christians have been present, 70 percent of the attendees have been Christians. He 
stated that Barack Obama is a worst friend of Israel. 
In summary, as a retired individual, JRE1’s resources are free time. As an 
intelligent person, JRE1’s resources are education. His methods include a personal 
debating style that is fierce. He is willing to criticize his own people, the Jews, for not 
seeing the danger to Israel of a second term of Barak Obama.  
General Analysis for the MS Members. The resources of CDN, CCD, and JRE1 include 
time and funding from sources that probably support a neo-conservative ideology. For 
these three, methodology is foremost the use of sharp-to-the-point arguments for waking 
up America to the dangers of Islamist doctrine and to the necessity of voting for pro-
Israel candidates. Additionally, CDN’s media organization regularly features security 
experts from Israel and sometimes films on location in Israel to help connect the audience 
to Israel.   
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Overview of the Subgroups 
 The first subgroup consists of those who work together as part of a nonprofit 
educational organization. Their striking resources are their connection to a legal nonprofit 
organization, to dynamic speakers, and their strong inter-personal relationships with other 
members of the organization who encourage them to progress towards goals. The second 
subgroup consists of those who work together as part of a media organization. Their role 
in this alternative media venture is striking as well in that in spite of their losses in the 
2012 presidential election – because their candidates did not win – they are able to 
receive funding resources and to adjust and soften their methodology in the post-election 
season, with the loss of political opportunity, to get their constituencies’ attention.  
 Future leaders of an actual Christian Jewish coalition that supports a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria will have to maintain momentum. They will need the resources to survive – 
funding and networking – and they will need the methodologies – the ability to tailor 
their message in a new environment which, as they portray it, lacks promise. They draw 
their hope from Judeo-Christian principles that teach them to work in an adversarial 
environment for the sake of the survival of a “Constitutional America” and a “Biblical 
Jewish Israel” in which they believe.  
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VI. THE SUCCESSES OR FAILURES OF THE POTENTIAL CHRISTIAN 
JEWISH COALITION  
The chapter will assess the apparent successes or failures of the potential 
coalition’s advocacy. As part of a larger context of contended discourse, however, I will 
first present a literature review of the success of the Israel Lobby as advanced by 
Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), and second, counter it with a brief review of the Arab 
Lobby as proposed by Bard (2010). Third, I will present the results of my research on the 
PCJc’s successes or failures.  
Fourth, I will advance possible obstacles to an organized Christian Jewish 
coalition: (a) the media may inspire IRS scrutiny of groups that support a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria; (b) the IRS may possibly target Tea Party and pro-Israel groups; (c) AIPAC 
dominates the foreign policy space in Washington, D.C. on Israel-related issues; (d) 
CUFI, the largest “pro-Israel organization in the United States” and, more importantly, a 
Christian one, opposes any U.S. political organization against Oslo.  
Fifth, I will attempt some insights into the worldwide and Israeli movements for 
Jewish sovereignty over the land of Israel, and the implications of that for the organizing 
of the potential coalition.   
Success of the Israel Lobby 
 In the literature, the success of the Israel Lobby is portrayed variously. John 
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt propose that the Israel Lobby is highly influential and 
actually works against United States’ interests in the Middle East (2007). The Israel 
Lobby, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, is defined as “a loose coalition of 
individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-
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Israel direction” (112). The authors go further and suggest what it means to be “pro-
Israel,” where a person who is pro-Israel (1) supports Israel’s right to exist, (2) admires 
its many achievements, (3) wants its citizens to enjoy secure and prosperous lives, and (4) 
believes that the United States should come to Israel’s aid if its survival is in danger (113-
4). Mearsheimer and Walt consider themselves pro-Israel but not part of the Israel Lobby. 
They cite various intellectuals or scholars who are part of the Israel Lobby: Charles 
Krauthammer, Bernard Lewis, Morton Klein (ZOA), John Hagee (Christians United for 
Israel), Rael Jean Isaac (AFSI), Dennis Ross, and Martin Indyk.  
However, Mearsheimer and Walt note an important distinction between Klein, 
Hagee, and Isaac, on one hand, and Ross and Indyk, on the other. The former group 
opposes “a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians” and believes “instead 
that Israel should retain all or most of the Occupied Territories.” The latter favors “a 
negotiated settlement” and has “occasionally criticized specific Israeli actions.” The 
authors add that despite these differences, “each of these individuals believes that the 
United States should give Israel substantial diplomatic, economic, and military support 
even when Israel takes actions the United States opposes” (114). Thus it appears that 
according to Mearsheimer and Walt’s example of individuals within the Israel Lobby, the 
key to active support of Israel is pressing for U.S. support for Israel even when Israel 
takes actions the United States opposes.  
First, I would emphasize that Mearsheimer and Walt take the view that the Israel 
Lobby, while not a monolith, is composed of those who work assiduously to press the 
United States to support Israel even when Israel disregards U.S. interests. Also 
noteworthy is the definition of pro-Israel, particularly the authors’ statement that being 
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pro-Israel means believing that the United States should come to Israel’s aid if its 
survival is in danger. Speaking to this point in particular, I would like to note that the 
New York Times recently reported on the latest IAEA August 30, 2012 report to the effect 
that Iran has now “installed three-quarters of the nuclear centrifuges it needs to complete 
a site deep underground for the production of nuclear fuel,” which led the White House to 
warn that “the window that is open now to resolve this diplomatically will not remain 
open indefinitely” (Sanger and Broad 2012). Stephen Walt does not believe that Israel is 
in existential danger with Iran being close enough to the production of a nuclear bomb 
such that the United States has issued a warning implicitly raising the possibility of 
military action. Walt suggested in September that an attack on Iran at this time would in 
fact make matters worse for everyone: 
If the United States or Israel decides to launch an unprovoked attack on Iran, it is 
going to be seen in the region as the latest manifestation of Western hostility to 
Islam, as well as another sign that we are actively trying to dominate the region. 
Public sentiment will be overwhelmingly against us, and current governments will 
have little choice but to go along with it. There are big problems throughout the 
Middle East these days: civil war in Syria, low-level violence in Iraq, pervasive 
instability in Yemen, armed militias in Libya, uncertainty in Egypt, slow-motion 
ethnic cleansing on the West Bank, and a host of others. But no set of problems is 
so great that we couldn't make them a lot worse. (Walt 2012) 
 
That is, Walt does not seem to view the possibility of Iran with a nuclear bomb 
coupled with Iran’s threat to wipe Israel off the map as an existential threat to Israel. 
Mearsheimer and Walt claim to be pro-Israel on the basis of their alleged belief that the 
United States should come to Israel’s aid if its survival is in danger, however, they do not 
appear to think that Israel’s survival is in danger now with an anti-Israel Iran appearing to 
move towards nuclear capability. Indeed, Mearsheimer and Walt believe that negotiating 
with Iran is the promising option (2007, 280-305). 
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 Mearsheimer and Walt would seem to be hard pressed to describe what in fact 
would constitute an existential threat to Israel and justify United States support for an 
Israel in trouble. At the end of the day, their argument is that the Israel Lobby has been 
successful in supporting and maintaining Israeli control over the territories to the 
detriment of solving the Arab-Israeli conflict and achieving some level of Middle East 
peace. To be noted, however, Walt and Mearsheimer do not precisely assess the success 
of the coalition that is the focus of this research, those who support a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria, and who are against concessions, like the Zionist Organization of America. 
Success of the Arab Lobby 
Another view countering the idea of a successful and essentially unopposed Israel 
Lobby is the view that there is actually an Arab lobby that places considerable pressure to 
oppose U.S. support to Israel (Bard 2010). From the Eisenhower administration through 
the Johnson years, the prevailing view was that Washington's dominant interests were in 
the Arab world – and that Israel was a disturbance.  
Beginning with Kennedy, however, U.S. presidents became more personally 
involved in Middle Eastern issues within areas that the State Department had traditionally 
managed. From Kennedy on there has been a diversity of voices within administrations, 
including those supportive of Israel. In other words, starting with Lyndon Johnson “every 
president saw Israel as a military ally – an idea reinforced by the Six-Day War. From 
1967 on, an unwritten alliance became more of a reality despite Arabist concerns” (Bard 
2010). 
The literature suggests that the success of the Israel Lobby is mostly because of its 
ability to elect members, who support Israel uncritically, to a U.S. Congress that passes 
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bills that have an impact on U.S.-Israel relations. The idea of an Israel Lobby conveys the 
image of a consortium of groups and individuals who prioritize Israeli interests over U.S. 
interests. Indeed, a Google search for “Success of Israel lobby” (without the quotes) 
yields 1,110,000 hits,72 where the articles are mostly “anti-Israel” and portray Israel as 
inimical to world peace.  
The Successes or Failures of the PCJc 
Before presenting my interview data, and because it is so much in the news even 
as I write this chapter, I need to review elements of the IRS 501c3 status, since this factor 
appears to constrain, or at least potentially constrain, pro-Israel activists who have agreed 
to belong to 501c3 organizations.  
The IRS 501c3 Status 
Introduction. The 501c3 Internal Revenue Service agreement is mainly for nonprofit 
groups that may wish to offer educational services or function as charities. Nonprofit 
501c3 organizations may not participate in any campaign activity for or against a 
candidate (IRS 2013b), the logic being that 501c3 organizations are in effect subsidized 
by other taxpayers (Berry 2007, 236). More specifically, if the organization receives IRS 
permission to be a nonprofit charitable 501c3 organization, donations to that organization 
are tax-exempt. 
History of IRS 501c3. In 1919, the United States Department of the Treasury 
promulgated regulations for the law enacted in 1917 creating the tax deduction (Berry 
2007, 239). Nonprofits that qualified for the 501c3 status had to be working for religious, 
charitable, scientific, public safety, literary, or educational purposes. In 1934, Congress 
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added to the 501c3 regulations whereby tax deductibility should not be granted or 
maintained by a nonprofit where a “substantial” part of that organization’s activities was 
carried out with the propagation of propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence 
legislation (Berry 2007, 239-40). 
Neither the IRS nor Congress has ever acted to define “substantial.” For 
“lobbying,” IRS statements and legal interpretations have been more helpful. According 
to United States law, lobbying targets refers not to the executive branch but only to 
legislative bodies (e.g., Congress, state legislatures, and city councils). Education is not 
restricted by the 501c3 tax code (2007, 240-1). 
An “H election status” was added in 1976 legislation, which offers an expenditure 
ceiling on lobbying expenses. The law created a measure specifying the amount that may 
be spent on direct as well as grassroots lobbying. Limits depend on the annual income of 
the nonprofit. For example, a small nonprofit with an income under $500,000 may spend 
up to 20 percent of its budget on direct lobbying and five percent on grassroots lobbying. 
Only 2.4 percent of all 501c3s are H electors (2007, 245).   
Berry’s study showed that many nonprofit leaders believed that the IRS was 
watching them. Their fearfulness, which continues and currently may even be heightened, 
derives from a number of sources. Leaders noticed high profile audits (e.g., the IRS’s 
1966 revocation of Sierra Club’s 501c3 status). Lawyers and accountants caution 
organizational leaders to not get involved in lobbying, and executive directors are 
attentive to signals from their boards to avoid politics (2007, 241). Research conducted 
by Curtis D. Child and Kirsten A. Grønbjerg (2007) demonstrates that “the odds of 
advocating decrease (by 50 percent) for charities registered under Section 501c3 of the 
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Internal Revenue Code, compared to nonprofits registered under other IRS sections, or 
not registered at all.” Internal Revenue 501c3 status deters political activism of nonprofit 
organizations, for example, participation in policy-making through lobbying or 
mobilization of members (Berry 2007, 235-253).  
To assess the apparent successes or failures of the PCJc’s influence attempts, I 
interviewed the respondents after the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Twenty-one of 
twenty-eight (or 75 percent) of the PCJc participated. As I mentioned in Chapters One, 
Four, and Five, however, I narrowed the presentation of the interview data to the results 
for six key individuals. These key individuals were chosen because they showed greater 
potential for leadership of a future Christian Jewish coalition by belonging to one of two 
organizations, within which I observed their behavior; additionally, by demonstrating 
activism in these organizations before, during, and after the 2012 presidential election, 
they proved a deeper commitment to their causes than the other 22 members of the 
potential coalition. By focusing on these six individuals, I can see a personnel skeleton or 
infrastructure of a potential coalition upon which less active members of a potential entity 
could possibly gather around. More specifically I ask how the 501c3 agreement affected 
the respondent’s behavior during the election. The question was necessary to pose 
because the answer would help assess the respondent’s self-assessment of success. Also, 
it furthered exploration of my Proposition Three: “The 501c3 status of organizations may 
affect the political efficacy of its leaders, reducing their sense of influence over public 
policy.” 
 I posed a set of additional questions to the respondents: What were your goals for 
the 2012 election? How successful were you in achieving these goals? What would you 
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do differently next time? Would you please use the words “success” or “failure” to 
describe your effectiveness during the 2012 election? On November 5, which presidential 
candidate did you think would win and by how much? Because you are a leader of [or 
affected by] a 501c3, do you feel restricted in your ability to discuss the vote you as an 
individual cast? [If appropriate to ask] Did you vote? If you do not mind, please indicate 
for whom? 
 In order to evaluate the apparent successes or failures of the coalition’s advocacy, 
I reviewed their political activism during the election period and thus framed the 
questions for this period, which explains why the questions did not specifically address a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria, although I allowed an opening to broach that issue when I 
asked “What were your goals for the 2012 election?” Also, since all six of these  persons 
see  Obama as the “worst” friend of Israel and  support a Jewish Judea and Samaria, their 
activism during this election probably reflects their effort to protect Israel (and by 
extension Judea and Samaria, which they regard as being Israel) from another 4-year term 
of Obama. Indeed, one of the discoveries of this research is that this unorganized and thus 
potential Christian Jewish coalition finds organizational homes (is active) in 
organizations whose missions are not specifically to fight for a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria, but to protect the United States Constitution from invasions such as the 
Islamization of the legal system (groups like Act for America do this), and to educate on 
what is best for America and Israel (educational groups such as the one that CES founded 
or alternative media outlets such as the one that CDN founded do this). One way to look 
at these organizations is that are the means through which the PCJc members may meet.  
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 The usefulness of using questions pertaining to the 2012 election, but not 
specifically to a Jewish Judea and Samaria, to measure success or failure is that the 
election was bound to elicit activism that otherwise might be more muted, and also that 
since the coalition is but a potential entity, there is no practical question set to measure 
success or failure of advocacy that without an organization is barely, if at all, apparent.  
Finally, the goal of opposing the reelection of a President that these six very 
active individuals find is a “worst” friend of Israel serves in the place of the goal of 
supporting a Jewish Judea and Samaria, because the Obama administration called for 
Israel to negotiate with the Arabs starting from the 1967 borders. When members of the 
PCJc opposed Obama as a “worst” friend of Israel they were opposing a man who clearly 
opposes a Jewish Judea and Samaria and even a Jewish Jerusalem.73 Thus, activism 
during the 2012 election season to oppose Obama serves as a reasonable or at least rough 
expression of activism for a Jewish Judea and Samaria. 
 As I did in Chapters Four and Five, I now present data of the six key individuals 
of the two subgroups, ES and MS, of the potential coalition. 
The Educational Subgroup (ES) 
 The primary individual whose activism stands out is CES, the founder of ES, the 
nonprofit educational organization. Her activism has increased after the 2012 presidential 
election. The secondary individuals, CCU and CRE5, also attend CES’s nonprofit 
educational meetings.  
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The Successes or Failures Responses of CES. A Christian, CES describes herself as 
active in education and sales. In response to the question about how the 501c3 agreement 
affected her behavior during the election, she offered, “It did not affect my behavior. As 
an individual I can do and say [as I please, using my] First Amendment right; as a 501c3, 
we support those who take a stand for Judeo-Christian values.” She stated that her goals 
for the 2012 election were to educate as many people as possible and to try to see those 
candidates she believed in elected.  
I asked CES to describe her success in achieving her goals, and she remarked that 
her group partially did succeed.  They educated a lot; they got people to think, to register; 
they got people to vote who had not voted before. If one stirs the pot, i.e., gets people to 
think about why they believe as they do, then society will be more educated and it would 
not be “in the pickle” that it is in today, influenced by snippets of media.  
Respondent CES added that as a collective, she and others who are part of either 
her education group or the wider Christian community did not feel that they won the U.S. 
presidential election. Her perspective as a Christian is, however, that “all is in God’s 
hands.” She explained that wicked people won who do not believe in God’s precepts, 
who do not believe in the American dream; they lie, cheat, commit fraud. However, in 
regards to winning, because her group expended effort signified that her group was not a 
failure. If one tries but does not accomplish the mission – there is but a reason, a lesson. 
If one continues to cry in one’s soup, however, that is failure. Getting up again is not 
failure. Is it disappointing? Yes. It is hard to beat ignorance, deception and Santa Claus 
(i.e., tradition, fantasy). The fact that “our people” did not win does not signify failure 
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because ultimately the greater goal is to bring “our country” back to “our Judeo-Christian 
values.” 
When asked what she would do differently next time, CES proposed that “we 
could go into different arenas, provide more varieties of dialogue” [in the course of trying 
to influence American society and politics]. 
I asked CES to use the words “success” or “failure” to describe her effectiveness 
during the 2012 election. She answered that “failure” depends on how you define it and 
that any time you have moved forward you always have success. God allowed the 
election results. In other words, she and others tried and that is what is important.  
On November 5, CES thought that Romney would win. She maintains that he 
actually did win [but that fraud prevented him from being recognized as the legitimate 
winner]. As a leader of a 501c3, CES did not feel restricted in discussing her vote. She 
did vote for Romney.  
Analysis for CES. Assessing success and failure for the 501c3 educational nonprofit and 
its network – CES stated that they did not succeed. However, her philosophic estimation 
is that the long term success of the country depends on moving the United States back to 
its Judeo-Christian values. She believes that she succeeded in moving towards that long 
term goal by having educated people. 
On the basis of her interview responses, the 501c3 status of CES’s organization 
does not appear to affect her sense of political efficacy perhaps for the reason that CES is 
determined to adjust her rhetoric to suit the IRS rules for 501c3s, namely no endorsement 
of candidates, and to succeed in the long run by bringing the country back to its Judeo- 
Christian roots. 
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The Successes or Failures Responses of CCU. Respondent CCU is a Christian who 
describes himself as a counselor. The 501c3 agreement did not affect his behavior during 
the 2012 presidential election because as an independent contractor for a church, he is not 
an employee of the nonprofit organization. 
The goal of CCU for the 2012 election was to support a strict constructionist view 
of the U. S. Constitution. He would talk with friends and neighbors about these goals, and 
CCU asserted that on an individual level he succeeded during the election period or did 
what he needed to do; however, this did not appear to decide the election. He understood, 
however, that the results were not up to him but to everyone; that is, they depend on 
everyone putting their heads together.  
Respondent CCU stated that he would not do anything different for the next 
election [in 2016]. As far as he was concerned, CCU was successful at getting the word 
out for candidates that he was supporting; he did not describe his political efficacy in 
terms of the word “failure.” 
Respondent CCU thought Romney would win by as much as five percent. He was 
very surprised by the “way it turned out.  But it was a case of a liberal [against] a liberal-
light as opposed to candidates on the opposite ends of a spectrum.” He answered that he 
voted for Romney and Adam Hasner, a Jewish Republican candidate for Florida’s 22nd 
congressional district during the 2012 election.  
Analysis for CCU. Respondent CCU rationally understands well how little control he has 
over the collective response to an election. He is confident that he acted responsibly as an 
individual in playing his part in the elections and for Israel (as best as he could). On the 
basis of CCU’s interview responses, neither the 501c3 status of the church for which he is 
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a contractor nor the 501c3 status of ES appear to affect CCU’s feelings of political 
efficacy. 
The Successes or Failures Responses of CRE5. Respondent CRE5 is a retired school 
teacher. She admitted that the 501c3 agreement did affect her behavior during the 2012 
election. She explained that she had been heading a chapter of CES’s organization and 
“We had so many speakers from both sides of the political spectrum and I always said 
that we are not endorsing political candidates” but that “we want to ask questions so that 
we are more informed.” 
As a goal for the 2012 election, CRE5 stated that “We tried as hard as we could to 
get conservatives elected and conservative principles endorsed by candidates.” As far as 
success in achieving this goal, CRE5 offered, “We failed.” She would do things 
differently next time. She would “try to educate people that are truly uninformed and 
uninterested. It is a spiritual issue. Only changed hearts make a difference.” As far as 
using the words “success” or “failure” to describe effectiveness during the 2012 election, 
CRE5 stated that she was able to convince one friend to vote but that “on the whole,” she 
was not effective.  
On November 5, 2012, one day before the election, CRE5 thought that “Romney 
would squeak by” as Bush did in certain states in 2004. As a leader of a 501c3, CRE5 did 
not feel restricted in her ability to discuss her vote. She voted for Romney. 
Analysis for CRE5. Respondent CRE5’s measure of success is changing people 
spiritually. She considers that on the whole she failed.  
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On the basis of her interview responses, the 501c3 status of CRE5’s organization 
seemed to have affected her political efficacy, because it affected the types of candidates 
she chose to invite (and apparently will invite in the future).  
General Analysis for the ES Members. Members of ES, specifically CES, CCU and 
CRE5, seem to value individual effort over winning an election. In order to cause 
significant changes to the quality of political and social life in the United States, they feel 
the need to commit effort over the long run. In all, they seem to feel they succeeded 
because they put forth significant effort, even though quantitatively they lost the election. 
Only CRE5 admitted that the 501c3 agreement influences her political activism. 
The Media Subgroup 
The primary individual whose activism stands out is CDN, the leader of MS, a 
subgroup of the potential coalition. He is the founder and producer of an Internet 
television show. Respondent CCD, the Communications Director, is part of the subgroup. 
Respondent JRE1 appears on CDN’s show from time to time.   
The Successes or Failures Responses of CDN. A Christian, CDN describes himself as a 
director of a nonprofit counter terrorism educational organization. His primary work, 
however, is as director of an Internet media outlet, the founding of which followed that of 
his educational organization and occurred just before the 2012 presidential election.    
He stated that the 501c3 agreement did not affect his behavior during the 2012 
election period. His organization’s goal was to defeat Obama, and he felt that failed, and 
that next time his organization should spend more time mobilizing the Christian 
community. The word “failure” surely describes CDN’s sense of effectiveness during the 
2012 election period. On November 5, 2012, CDN thought that Romney would win by 
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three percentage points. As a leader of a 501c3, CDN did not feel restricted in his ability 
to discuss the vote he cast. He voted for Romney.  
Analysis for CDN. Success for CDN seems to be defined as winning an election and thus 
his assessment is that he failed. He seems to feel his role is to mobilize the Christian 
community; his interview response suggests that the 501c3 status of CDN’s organization 
does not appear to affect his political efficacy. CDN once told me that this is the case 
because he does not raise a lot of money through his 501c3, which  is confirmed by my 
checking his organization at the IRS Exempt Check online site where I found that he 
raised no more than $50,000 in 2012 (IRS 2013a).  I later explain in the Overview of the 
Subgroups that implicitly CDN was affected by his 501c3 status.  
The Successes or Failures Responses of CCD. Respondent CCD is the communications 
director of CDN’s Internet Media organization. He was not available to answer these 
2012 post-election questions.  
The Successes or Failures Responses of JRE1. Respondent JRE1 is a Jewish retired 
former school principal. While JRE1’s primary work – debates and writing – does not 
place him under the direct influence of a 501c3 organization, he is involved with a local 
branch of the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC), which is affiliated with the 
Jewish Federation, a 501c3 organization. JRE1 stated that the 501c3 agreement did not 
affect his behavior at all, which apparently is true: the JCRC recently (in 2013) requested 
and received JRE1’s resignation on account of his expressed political views.  
His goals for the 2012 election were “working for presidential and congressional 
candidates who would conform to his values.” He stated that he considered himself 
successful in achieving these goals because he “made [his] opponents furious.” Next time 
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JRE1 would work harder but, ultimately, JRE1 evaluated his effectiveness during the 
election as a “success,” choosing not to mention “failure” at all.  
On November 5, JRE1 thought that Romney would win by four percentage points. 
Any association that JRE1 might have with a 501c3 organization did not cause him to be 
reluctant to discuss the vote he cast. He voted for Romney.  
Analysis for JRE1. By JRE1’s measure of success, he succeeded because of his evident 
confidence in the campaigning tactics he used. In JRE1’s case, he was effective in pre-
election debates where he would debate others on issues such as Israel or the presidential 
candidates. He was not afraid to sharply confront Jewish voters for not perceiving the 
fallacies of Obama’s record on Israel. Respondent JRE1 appears to measure success as 
staying true to one’s values, which he felt he did by speaking out on what he believed 
was best for the Jewish people.    
On the basis of his interview response, the 501c3 status of others’ organizations 
did not inhibit JRE1’s behavior during the 2012 presidential election season.  
General Analysis for the MS Members. Respondents CDN and JRE1 offer some contrast 
because the former does lead and benefit from a 501c3 organization, while the latter does 
not. However, since CDN receives very little funding for his 501c3, he was able to 
express his thoughts about President Obama’s leadership on national security issues and 
Israel more freely than I have seen from other 501c3 leaders. Respondent JRE1, who is 
not affiliated with any 501c3 organization, is very spirited and unconstrained. By their 
example, CDN and JRE1 show ways to get around the paralyzing effect of perceived IRS 
surveillance; CDN does not take in a lot of funds so he has little to lose by risking his 
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501c3 agreement; respondent JRE1 does not lead a 501c3 organization, so he can speak 
fearlessly.  
 Respondent CDN measures success by winning or losing, and so by that measure 
he failed over the election season. Respondent JRE1 was successful because he places a 
lot of weight on his ability to communicate effectively, which according to my participant 
observations, he seemed to do and which he thought he did.  
Overview of the Subgroups 
Proposition Three: “The 501c3 status of organizations may affect the political efficacy of 
its leaders, reducing their sense of influence over public policy.”  To attempt to measure 
the effect of the 501c3 agreement on leaders (or members),74 I used an open-ended 
interview question and asked how the 501c3 agreement affected the respondent’s 
behavior during the election. A qualitative assessment of the effect of the 501c3 
agreement on leaders’ sense of influence for this case study consists of analysis of a few 
individuals. The leader of ES is not apparently affected by the 501c3 agreement, but a 
member of that subgroup, CRE5, does feel affected. From my participant observations, I 
note that CCU’s involvement with the group may not be extensive enough to notice the 
influence of the 501c3 agreement.  
The leader of MS is not apparently affected by the 501c3 agreement because, as 
he admitted, the organization took in so little money, which implies the possibility that 
the 501c3 agreement would affect his performance if he received a larger quantity of 
donations. Respondent JRE1 did not reveal that the 501c3 agreement affected his sense of 
influence over public policy. On the basis of these results, the 501c3 status does affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 I asked the questions to some members of the PCJc, which has no formal leadership. 
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some of these most active PCJc members’ sense of influence, according to this case 
study. Further research could narrow the question and ask whether the 501c3 agreement 
reduces their sense of influence. 
 The first subgroup, ES, consists of those who work together as part of a nonprofit 
education organization. Respondents CES, CCU and CRE5 are admirable for their ability 
to persevere. The second subgroup, MS, consists of those who work together as part of a 
media organization. Respondents CDN and JRE1 are impressive in their positive outlook 
after the bruising 2012 presidential defeat. The former looks to hone his mobilization 
skills and the latter is encouraged to just “keep on keeping on.” Thinking more broadly 
about the PCJc, I would offer that if more individuals are to be as engaged as these six 
members, then they will need to find at least similar levels of inner motive to keep going 
even when the going is so tough.  
 In this next section I will attempt to elucidate some evident exogenous barriers to 
the organizing of a Christian Jewish coalition. 
Obstacles to an Organized Christian Jewish Coalition 
The Media 
Iyengar and McGrady (2007, 19) point out that the media in democratic societies 
have three important functions: 1) to provide informative publicity for candidates and 
political parties; 2) to inform citizens with perspectives on issues; and 3) to act as 
“watchdog” following the actions of government officials to help citizens who cannot 
scrutinize them or government. On July 6, 2010, the New York Times published an article 
in which it most prominently acted in the latter role, as watchdog. It drew attention to a 
list of organizations or persons who are supportive of Jewish communities in Judea and 
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Samaria. At the outset, it stated that the “New York Times examination of public records 
in the United States and Israel identified at least 40 American groups that have collected 
more than $200 million in tax-deductible gifts for Jewish settlement in the West Bank 
and East Jerusalem over the last decade” (Rutenberg, McIntire and Bronner 2010). Later 
it specifically warned that while most “pro-settler groups” act within the IRS rules, 
“some…risk violating them by using the money for political campaigning and residential 
property purchases, by failing to file tax returns, by setting up boards of trustees in name 
only and by improperly funneling donations directly to foreign organizations.” These few 
sentences possibly sent a signal to IRS officials regarding actions through which the 
mentioned pro-Israel groups might be in non-compliance with IRS rules.75 In effect, the 
New York Times, in its role as watchdog of government officials, was actually suggesting 
IRS scrutiny of the mentioned groups.  
The IRS  
 In May 2013, the IRS revealed that it had been targeting conservative groups, 
among those with “Tea Party” in its group description. The FBI started an investigation 
called for by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder. The scandal speaks to the IRS’s 
harassment of those who were seeking organizing as nonprofits including 501c4 
organizations, which, by terms of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 26 U.S.C. § 501c4, 
are groups whose  tax-exempt purpose is to be a social welfare organization not 
organized for profit and operated exclusively to promote social welfare. According to the 
IRS website, “to be operated exclusively to promote social welfare, an organization must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 In an interview with a representative of one of the pro Judea and Samaria groups mentioned in the New 
York Times article, the person told me that she believed that the IRS did target her group because of that 
article.   
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operate primarily to further the common good and general welfare of the people of the 
community [emphasis added]” (IRS 2013c). I emphasized “exclusively” and “primarily” 
because the IRS has defined “exclusively” to have the same meaning as “primarily.”  
The IRS also states that “seeking legislation germane to the organization's 
programs is a permissible means of attaining social welfare purposes. Thus, a section 
501(c)(4) social welfare organization may further its exempt purposes through lobbying 
as its primary activity without jeopardizing its exempt status [emphasis added].” 
“Lobbying” is emphasized to show how existence as a 501c4 allows fulltime lobbying as 
long as the purpose of the organization is to seek legislation germane to the 
organization’s programs.  
While no participation in political campaigns for the benefit of political 
candidates is allowed for social welfare organizations under the 501c4 agreement, “a 
section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization may engage in some political activities, so 
long as that is not its primary activity” (IRS 2013c). Also, IRS rules allow 501c4 
organizations to not disclose the names of their donors. I have described the 501c4 
agreement in particular because news reports have focused so heavily on this type of 
501c organization, and because many Tea Party groups are 501c4s.  
Citizens United and Requests for 501c Investigations. On January 21, 2010, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Citizens United vs. the Federal Election Commission that the government 
“may not ban political spending by corporations in candidate elections” (Liptak 2010), 
which led to the use of political action committees (PACs) to make expenditures for 
candidates, such as advertising, without directing funds into campaigns.   
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Senator Max Baucus, Democratic Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, 
referring to The New York Times and other media that pointed to possible non-
compliance of IRS rules by organizations, wrote a letter to the IRS demanding that it 
survey “major 501(c)(4), (c)(5) and (c)(6) organizations involved in political campaign 
activity to examine whether they are operated for the organization’s intended tax exempt 
purpose and to ensure that political campaign activity is not the organization’s primary 
activity” (The United States Senate Committee on Finance 2010). Senator Orrin G. Hatch 
(R-Utah) and Minority Whip Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) responded by writing to the IRS to 
express their concern about Baucus' request. They requested that an inspector general 
review any investigation to “make sure it is not partisan” (Dennis 2010). The number of 
applications sent to the IRS by groups seeking 501c4 status increased to 3,400 in 2012 
from 1,500 in 2010 (Drawbaugh and Dixon 2013). 
Extra Scrutiny for Conservative Groups? Between April 2010 and April 2012, the IRS 
placed certain applications with conservative terms in the groups’ names on hold. 
Eilperin (2013) reviewed the Treasury Inspector General [IG] for Tax Administration’s 
report and summarized it in five points:  
1) The campaign focusing on conservative organizations seeking tax-exempt 
status lasted 18 months, during which “no work was completed on the majority of these 
applications for 13 months”; 
 2) Many of the 298 applications the attorney general reviewed experienced long 
waits, where “160 were open from 206 to 1,138 calendar days (some for more than three 
years and crossing two election cycles)”;  
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3) Originating in the “Determinations Unit,” the decision to focus on groups with 
conservative-sounding names was implemented starting in May 2010, and the office 
“began developing a spreadsheet that would become known as the ‘Be On the Look Out’ 
listing,” known as BOLO. The Determinations Unit distributed its first BOLO listing in 
August 2010, and by June 2011 the rules for singling out groups included not only the 
words “Tea Party” but “9/12”76 and “patriot,” as well as “statements in the case file [that] 
criticize how the country is being run.” From all the cases the IG reviewed, 72 were from 
Tea Party groups, 13 from those with “patriot” in their name, and 11 with “9/12″ in their 
title;  
4) When the head of the tax-exempt organizations division, Lois G. Lerner, did 
not approve of the criteria being used by the Cincinnati office in late June 2011, it 
changed approaches, adopting a broader definition focused on the “political, lobbying, or 
[general] advocacy” activities of applicants. Six months afterwards, the unit created a 
new set of criteria — including targeting groups that sought to educate Americans on the 
U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights — “without executive approval because they 
believed the July 2011 criteria were too broad”;  
5) Some of the Cincinnati office IRS workers who were asking questions 
regarding whether applicants passed the test for receiving tax-exempt status did not fully 
grasp the legal distinctions between certain categories. According to the report, these 
employees “showed a lack of knowledge in the Determinations Unit of what activities are 
allowed” for tax-exempt organizations. It should be noted that among information 
requested were names of donors and the amounts of each of the donations – inappropriate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 “9/12” is a conservative group seeking to return the United States to a country operation according the 
principles of God and liberty.  
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requests for the IRS to ask of organizations seeking 501c3 or 501c4 approval (Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration 2013). 
The IRS Exposure. In May 2013, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
released an audit report establishing that the IRS used inappropriate criteria to identify 
potential political cases, including organizations with Tea Party in their names (Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration 2013). On May 14, 2013, Attorney General 
Eric H. Holder Jr. said that the Justice Department and the FBI began a criminal 
investigation of whether Internal Revenue Service employees “broke the law when they 
targeted conservative groups seeking tax-exempt status.” This probe was initiated after 
the IRS acknowledged that it “selected conservative groups with the words “Tea Party” 
and “patriot” in their names for special reviews” (Eilperin and Goldfarb 2013a). 
Resignations. On May 15, 2013, Steven T. Miller, Acting Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue and Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement resigned (Hicks 
2013); On June 3, 2013, Joseph H. Grant, commissioner of the Tax Exempt and 
Government Entities Division, announced that he would retire on June 3, 2013 
(Ohlemacher 2013). On September 24, 2013, the IRS announced that Lois Lerner, on 
administrative leave since May 2013 as head of the IRS tax-exempt-organizations 
division, retired (McKinnon 2013). 
The IRS Scandal and the Pro-Israel Lobby 
The IRS controversy breaking out in media reports provided an opportunity for 
focusing on an underreported phenomenon – IRS targeting of pro-Israel groups. I already 
mentioned the 2010 New York Times article suggesting the need for the IRS to focus on 
nonprofit pro-Israel groups that support Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria.  
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The section will draw attention to the IRS’s tactics towards groups that support 
Judea and Samaria. In fact, as soon as the IRS story broke, the Wall Street Journal, 
among others, reported that “lawmakers were probing for possible IRS scrutiny of other 
political groups, such as pro-Israel entities” (McKinnon, Perez and Paletta 2013). During 
the first week the scandal surfaced, from May 15-May 22, 2013, other mainstream media 
covering reports of the IRS targeting pro-Israel entities included HaAretz, The Jerusalem 
Post, Forbes, and Fox News.77 
As the IRS’s attention to conservative groups, including pro-Israel organizations, 
is not the central thesis of this study, I will highlight the experience of one group, Z-
Stree, already mentioned in Chapter One.  
According to the founder of Z-Street, Lori Lowenthal Marcus, the pro-Israel 
organization started a suit against the IRS in 2010 for the “same (and worse) conduct” 
that is the focus of the recent IRS controversy (Marcus 2013c).  
Z-Street’s lawsuit states that the IRS showed viewpoint discrimination when it 
singled out Z-Street’s application because the organization was “connected to Israel” 
(Marcus 2013c). In an interview, Greta Van Susteren asked Marcus why, with a strong 
U.S. Israel relationship, the IRS would target Z-Street. In answering, Marcus first stated 
that Z-Street supports all of Israel and then conjectured that the reason the IRS targeted 
Z-Street is because there are some who believe that the idea that a Jewish state should 
exist in Judea and Samaria (Z-Street’s belief) is inappropriate (Gretawire 2013).  
Additionally, other pro-Israel organizations have been under scrutiny, according 
to the Washington Free Beacon, which has identified “at least five pro-Israel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 I searched Google using “pro-Israel” and “IRS” for the week May 15-22, 2013 (Associated Press and 
Haaretz 2013; Epstein 2013; Investor's Business Daily 2013; Wilner 2013)  
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organizations that have been audited by the IRS in the wake of a coordinated campaign 
by White House-allied activist groups in 2009 and 2010” (Goodman 2013). 
The connection to the possibility of the IRS targeting pro-Israel groups and this 
dissertation is as follows: in Chapter One, I proposed that “The 501c3 status of 
organizations may affect the political efficacy of its leaders, reducing their sense of 
influence over public policy.” Berry (2007) and Child and Grønbjerg (2007) argue that 
the 501c3 tax status does intimidate those who obtain that status. I have interviewed 
twenty-one of twenty-eight (75 percent) of the PCJc but reported results on six 
individuals and, on the basis of this important but preliminary research, included 
questions on the effect of the 501c3 agreement on political activism.  
The recent (from May 2013) IRS controversy provides some evidence that the 
IRS has the capability to target groups through their applications for 501c agreements. 
Media reports suggest the possibility that the IRS has targeted pro-Israel groups, one of 
which is the illuminating Van Susteren interview of Z-Street founder Lori Lowenthal 
Marcus, who conjectured that because Z-Street supports all of Israel, and a Jewish state in 
Judea and Samaria, the IRS targeted her organization.  
On June 26, 2013, another set of significant documents was released by the IRS, 
via the House Ways and Means Committee. Included in the documents was a category 
labeled “occupied territory advocacy.” “In other words, the IRS singled out applications 
for tax exempt status on the basis of a particular political viewpoint which is inconsistent 
with this administration’s” (Marcus 2013b).  
The relevance of the recent IRS controversy is that it not only suggests why 501c3 
leaders should be concerned about possible IRS targeting, adding to Berry’s (2007) and 
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Child and Grønbjerg’s (2007) findings that 501c3-affiliated persons are concerned, but it 
also highlights as worthy of attention the IRS targeting of Z-Street and the hindering of 
its funding, an organization that explicitly supports a Jewish Judea and Samaria.  
I will now move to present information that outlines, or at least suggests, 
AIPAC’s role in hindering the organizing of the Christian Jewish coalition for a Jewish 
Judea and Samaria.   
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
History of AIPAC. The impetus for the formation of AIPAC has several sources. First, as 
mentioned earlier, Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, narrowed the 
definition of “Zionism” to the ideology of Jews living in Israel. From this position, Ben-
Gurion sought to remove the status of ZOA as the Zionist organization in control of 
supporting Israel and legitimize non-Zionist Jewish community leaders who would 
appeal to a wider spectrum of American Jews. During this process what evolved was 
Isaiah L. Kenen’s 1951 founding of the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs 
(AZCPA), which in 1959 would become the American Public Affairs Committee. Within 
that same time frame (1951-1959), in 1954 the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish 
Organizations (the “Presidents Conference”) was formed as a consequence of the desire 
of the Eisenhower Administration to unify the disparate voices of the Jewish Community 
into one leading voice that would be the point of contact between U.S. Administrations 
and the American Jewish community.  
Tivnan (1987, 40) writes that Henry Byroade, Dulles’s assistant Secretary of 
State, suggested to Nahum Goldmann (Zionist leader, head of the World Jewish 
Congress) that it would be helpful if American Jewry could address the State Department 
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with one voice. Goldberg (1996, 220) explains that the purpose of the Presidents 
Conference was thus to weld a consensus on Israel from among the diverse views of 
organized Jews. The job of AIPAC was to turn those views into political influence in 
Washington, D.C. Thus the point of contact between the assistant Secretary of State and 
the Presidents Conference with AIPAC suggests two corners of the iron triangle 
(subgovernment) – the executive branch of the U.S. and lobby groups – by which 
government power operates. The third point on the triangle, of course, is Congressional 
committees. 
Not too surprisingly, the two groups (AIPAC and the Presidents Conference) have 
overlapping memberships. The former is one of the fifty organizations that make up the 
Presidents Conference. The members of the Presidents Conference each have one seat on 
AIPAC’s executive committee, and the chair of the Presidents Conference is a member of 
AIPAC’s elite ruling body, the officers group. After the 1982 Lebanon War, AIPAC 
doubled the size of its executive committee so that the Jewish organizational leaders 
could be outvoted by a collection of individuals chosen directly from among AIPAC’s 
mass membership. As the executive committee became more and more unwieldy, 
however, the officers’ group began to exert more autonomous decision-making 
(Goldberg 1996, 220).  
Several years later, AIPAC faced a legal challenge to its position of domination. 
In 1989, former State Department officials involved in pro-Arab lobbying were plaintiffs 
in a suit filed before the Federal Election Commission. They argued that AIPAC secretly 
coordinated the sixty-odd Jewish PACs, “arranging their gifts so that candidates receive a 
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share of the total in proportion to their importance to the pro-Israel lobby.” The lawsuit 
was dismissed for lack of evidence in 1995 (Goldberg 1996, 268). 
AIPAC Operations. A substantial part of the AIPAC staff is directed to work with its 
members to help them become involved in almost every political campaign as volunteers 
and donors. AIPAC staffers produce regional training sessions for members, instructing 
them in campaign skills and demonstrating how to leverage their money, thereby 
maximizing the political import of each donation. Members, for example, learn to 
“bundle”78 donations, collecting campaign contributions from friends, relatives, and 
coworkers, and donating them to the candidate in a lump sum so as to make a measurable 
impression (Goldberg 1996, 224). 
During every congressional campaign, AIPAC asks each candidate to depict his 
or her views on the Middle East; most are glad to comply. The lobby organization then 
distributes the results to its members, facilitating their decision-making on which 
candidate is the most pro-Israel (1996, 225). 
Study on Influence of Israeli Lobby. In Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy, Paul and 
Paul (2008) present the results of a study on the influence of ethnic groups on United 
States foreign policy. First, interviews suggest that Jewish Americans collectively form 
the best organized ethnic community, a prime example of which is the aforementioned 
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the umbrella 
organization which helps to unify their message. No other ethnic group has an equivalent 
organization (Paul and Paul 2008, 139).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 On January 16, 2013, Mendy Ganchrow (MD), a formerly active AIPAC leader, lectured at a community 
synagogue and similarly described the “bundling” procedure.   
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Respondents discussed multiple reasons why AIPAC is so effective. One reason is 
that AIPAC disseminates helpful information. Another reason is that financial 
contributions to members of Congress cause some to be concerned about getting on the 
“wrong side of AIPAC” (2008, 140-1). And one policymaker offered that “AIPAC is the 
800 pound gorilla. If your survey were not anonymous, no one would mention AIPAC. If 
word were to leak out, they [those who mentioned AIPAC] would be looking for a new 
career. No one says anything bad about AIPAC.” Other respondents agreed with this 
statement that it is difficult to have an open debate on Middle East policies, indicating 
that the influence of the Israel Lobby, particularly AIPAC, involves agenda control 
(2008, 192-3). Indeed, a longstanding concern in political science that goes back to at 
least Bachrach and Baratz (1962), power and control over agendas seems apt to describe 
AIPAC’s domination of the United States-Israel policy space. The lobby group also 
dominates because of its historical connection to the State Department from the founding 
of the Presidents Conference in 1954, forming two points of a subgovernment. Also 
noteworthy is that AIPAC is supporting current U.S. policy (the two-state solution), 
which gives it a strategic advantage that may help explain its dominant influence in the 
United States-Israel policy space (2008, 194). 
The Republican National Platform 2012. I obtained confidential interviews with persons 
who were involved in the politics of the two-state solution at Republican National 
Platform Committee meetings in August 2012 and with persons who have had extensive 
experience lobbying for Israel in the United States. What occurred in several of the 
Platform meetings indicates some of the tactics that AIPAC uses to influence U.S. policy 
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on the Arab-Israeli conflict – and to keep the PCJc, or any similar group for that matter, 
from having influence in American politics.   
 The meetings lasted from August 19 to August 21, 2012. When on August 19, the 
Platform’s foreign policy subcommittee met, delegates, motivated by their state 
legislatures, their Christian beliefs, and informed by their own research, advocated letting 
Israel make up its own mind (the neutrality stance) on the issue of Judea and Samaria. 
The lobby group, however, was able to prevent the neutrality stance from becoming part 
of the Republican Party platform, and the two-state solution position again prevailed and 
was approved on August 21, 2012 at the full Platform Committee meeting. 
 From my anonymous sources, I am able to offer the following: 
1) Senator Jim Talent, Chairman of the Republican Party Platform committee, an 
advisor to Mitt Romney, a member of Romney’s  campaign committee, and well-
connected to AIPAC, was in favor of the two-state solution in the platform from the 
outset;  
2) The American Public Affairs Committee worked assiduously against the 
adoption of a “neutrality” amendment to the platform which would let Israel decide about 
its land policy by a) supporting a delegate on the foreign policy subcommittee who was 
against the neutrality amendment; b) directly e-mailing undecided delegates and 
“applying intense pressure” on them; c) having  the Chairman of the Platform Committee 
(i.e., Jim Talent) on the foreign policy subcommittee go against published subcommittee 
rules and allow the AIPAC National Director of Policy, Brad Gordon, to speak from the 
gallery during the foreign policy subcommittee meeting, where Gordon stated 
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erroneously that since 1992, all Israeli governments had positions favoring an Arab state 
in Israel; 
3) The failure of the neutrality amendment was on account of AIPAC protecting 
“money and their interest,” according to one source probably experienced with AIPAC’s 
lobbying tactics. In other words, AIPAC’s success in keeping the two-state solution as 
part of the 2012 Republican Party Platform had “nothing to do with promoting American 
Israeli relations”; 
4) Jim Talent communicated that in order to prevent jeopardizing Romney’s 
election, it was necessary to include support for the two-state solution in the platform; 
5) According to another source familiar with AIPAC’s tactics, “AIPAC gets the 
heads of PACs together; AIPAC offers these PACs policy and access to candidates.” 
The lobby groups thus seems able to keep the Republican Party in line with the 
two-state solution, supporting the goal of the Oslo Accords, which is continued 
partnership between the state of Israel and the PLO towards the establishment of an Arab 
State in Judea and Samaria.  
Interestingly flowing in the opposite, or at least a different, direction, and on the 
basis of my interviews and C-Span coverage of the August 20-21 meetings of the 
Republican Platform Committee (2012), strong support remains among the Republican 
Party for letting Israel make its own decisions on Judea and Samaria. A number of 
Republicans prefer Israel to make up its own mind regarding management of its land. A 
non-anonymous example can be seen in a statement by former Republican presidential 
candidate and former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum, which mirrors the neutrality position. 
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In January 2013, I observed Santorum speak at a church and afterwards tell an attendee 
that he would prefer that the U.S. government not tell Israel what to do with its land. 
Christians United for Israel 
 Christians United for Israel (CUFI), a 501c3 nonprofit (Christians United for 
Israel 2013b) is the largest “pro-Israel organization in the US, with more than a million 
members” (Christians United for Israel 2013a). It was founded in 2006 (Sharon 2012).  In 
that very year, David Brog (the current executive director of CUFI) had written against a 
Morton Klein79 led minority of Jews who opposed Oslo (Brog 2006, 198-99). He also 
argued that Christians working against an Israeli government that “chose to trade land for 
peace” being “at odds with the majority of Jews in America and Israel” would “raise 
troubling questions about Christian Zionism” (2006, 200). Brog thus opposed both 
Christian and Jewish Zionist opposition to Oslo, the main topic of this dissertation.  
In February 2012, through Roy Casanova, I conveyed the following questions to 
David Brog and Founder of CUFI, Pastor John Hagee: 1) Is CUFI for or against 
settlements in Judea and Samaria?  2) Is CUFI for or against U.S. aid to the Palestinian 
Authority? 3) Is CUFI for or against a Palestinian state within Judea and Samaria? I 
received “no comment” to all questions. Thus, it is most likely that CUFI’s support for 
Israel is limited to support for Oslo, which is actually support for U.S. pressure on Israel 
to give land for peace.  
The two most dominant lobbying organizations “for Israel,” AIPAC and CUFI, 
oppose any U.S. political organization against Oslo. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 The President of Zionist Organization of America. 
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One final factor that might contribute to the future more formal organizing of a 
Christian Jewish coalition for a Jewish Judea and Samaria is a worldwide movement in 
support of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.  
Worldwide and Israeli Movements for a Jewish Judea and Samaria 
From commentary recently (June 6-11, 2013) emanating from ministers of the 
Knesset on the topic of a two-state solution, Danny Danon, Deputy Defense Minister of 
Israel and member of the Likud Party, seems to be emerging as a leader for  Israeli 
sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.  
Danon’s support for Israeli sovereignty has been visible at several forums in the 
last several years. On April 24-25, 2010, Danon spoke at the 90 year commemoration of 
the San Remo Conference in the Italian town of Sanremo (Canadians for Israel’s Legal 
Rights n.d.; Mitchell 2011) in support of the Israeli claim to Judea and Samaria. Later, on 
a speaking tour in the United States just before the 2012 Presidential election, Danon 
lectured before mostly Jewish residents in Florida, expressing his displeasure at the 
Obama administration and specifically the President’s approach to Israel, promoting his 
new book Israel: The Will to Prevail (Times of Israel 2012), a book that explains 
Danon’s support for the application of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria and 
that argues for a Palestinian state in Jordan.  
Recently, in an interview with The Times of Israel, Danon stated that the 
government of Israel will block any two-state deal (Aren 2013). His statements evoked 
responses from Israeli proponents of the two-state solution within different factions of the 
government’s coalition, for example from the political party Hatnua’s Tzipi Livi and 
Amir Peretz (Arutz Sheva Staff 2013).  
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As stated in Israel: The Will to Prevail (Danon 2012) and in “Under Fire, MK 
Danon Not Budging” (Ronen 2013a), Danon’s solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
includes the application of “Israeli sovereignty in the Jewish communities of Judea and 
Samaria” and the need for discussions about “the status of the local Arabs in a joint 
forum that includes Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority.” However, the 
present conflict with the Palestinians, in Danon’s view, is better than “the results of 
mistakes we are liable to make in a future agreement, as we already did in the Oslo 
Accords or the Disengagement” (Lev 2013). In addition to Danon, Naphtali Bennet 
(Jewish Home Party) recently expressed, loud and clear, his opposition as well to the 
two-state solution (Fiske and Leshem 2013). 
Additionally, there is currently a small, dispersed, but active worldwide 
movement, consisting of individuals or organizations such as Howard Grief (recently 
deceased), Salomon Benzimri (Canadians for Israel’s Legal Rights), and the European 
Coalition for Israel, that supports a Jewish Judea and Samaria, in addition to an Israeli 
movement that has just started discussions on the application of Jewish sovereignty to 
Judea and Samaria. The recent three Israeli annual conferences (in 2011, 2012, and 2013) 
to apply Jewish sovereignty to Judea and Samaria are an example of an Israeli movement 
exerting ongoing efforts to provide alternate solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict other 
than the U.S. two-state policy. Danon participates in this Israeli movement.   
To place this movement in  larger context, from  the founding of the state of Israel 
until today, the ideological spectrum among Jewish immigrants to Israel has been roughly 
divided between the Left, a secular socialist branch, originally emigrating from Russia 
and eastern Europe and falling eventually under the title of Labor Zionism, and the Right, 
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a Revisionist Zionist branch starting with Ze’ev Jabotinsky and his followers, including 
Menachem Begin, that became the Herut Party and later the Likud.  
Danny Danon falls within the Right, which attracts supporters not just worldwide 
but from the American people, including Christian Zionists and Jews (generally Orthodox 
or Conservative). The Israeli Right’s continued persistence in disseminating a message 
for Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria may potentially embolden those American 
organizations (for example ZOA) and people, including members of the PCJc, to oppose 
the U.S. policy for an Arab state in Judea and Samaria in spite of formidable opponents 
that directly or indirectly defend U.S. policy (e.g., AIPAC and the IRS). Indeed, recently 
Mort Klein, President of ZOA, which just saw their 501c3 status returned, spoke out 
against Jewish organizations that support the two-state solution (Ronen 2013b). The 
timing of Klein’s bold message may be related to ZOA’s recent 501c3 re-approved status, 
Israeli Danny Danon’s messaging, or it may just be coincidental. It is Israel that now 
holds the key to the application of Jewish sovereignty over Judea and Samaria. Efforts to 
organize the PCJc are encouraged if supporters of a Jewish Judea and Samaria, from 
Europe, Israel, and elsewhere, continue to speak out.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The chapter will sum up the lessons of this dissertation and will describe what this 
case reveals or informs about interest group politics and social movements more broadly 
in the United States.  
I started this dissertation with a description of interest groups and social 
movements.  Moving to my case study, the unit of analysis is a group of mostly Christian 
and Jewish individuals who advocate for complete Israeli sovereignty over “Judea and 
Samaria,” whose positions are not represented by politicians and organizations in 
American Politics, who are not organized in a formal sense but who, by virtue of a 
common persistent interest, have the potential to form and are appropriately described as 
the Potential Christian Jewish coalition (the PCJc). From a larger set of 28 individuals, I 
narrowed the interview data to two subgroups consisting of six individuals.  
The PCJc as an Unorganized Interest 
While an unorganized interest may be shared in common by an identifiable group 
of people, it lacks organization structures such as regular meetings, a mission statement, 
and recognized leadership. In the case of the PCJc, the unorganized interest is the 
common opinion held by the members that: 1) Zero percent of Judea and Samaria should 
be given to a sovereign entity for peace; 2) The United States should not continue 
supporting the Oslo Agreements; 3) The United States should not continue funding the 
Palestinian Authority; 4) There should not be a sovereign Arab state in Judea and 
Samaria. The common opinion is what I define as “support for a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria.” The PCJc has an interest in influencing the government of the United States to 
cause it to reject the land-for-peace theory, the Oslo Accords, funding of the PA, and a 
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two-state solution or an Arab state in Judea and Samaria. However, that interest is not 
organized and it is unrepresented by politicians in local, state, or federal government 
offices. The PCJc would argue or advocate that Washington D.C. heed the voice of 
international law, the Hebrew Scriptures, and the New Testament of the Bible. As 
covered in Chapter Two, and argued by Grief (2013), since the San Remo Resolution, the 
land of Israel, which falls within the biblical boundaries of Israel, is Israeli sovereign 
territory. According to the beliefs of the PCJc, the Bible records that Judea and Samaria 
is within the boundaries of the area promised to the Jewish people.  
Obstacles to an Organized Christian Jewish Coalition 
First, the members of the PCJc may consider setting up 501c3 organizations so as 
to be able to afford to promote their propositions through writing, educating, lobbying, 
and speaking and other such activities displaying mostly contained behavior. However, 
the use of 501c3 organizations to speak out for a Jewish Judea and Samaria would risk 
attracting IRS discrimination (Berry 2007). As I explained in Chapter Six, Z-Street’s 
application for obtaining 501c3 status seems to have been denied as a consequence of a 
“special IRS policy regarding organizations connected with Israel (Hausman 2010).80 
Hausman81 explained that 
Z Street filed its 501(c)(3) application back in December 2009, having satisfied 
all the requirements necessary for approval under the IRS regulations. 
Nevertheless, according to official documents filed by Z Street in a lawsuit 
against the IRS over the matter, an agency spokesperson stated that Z Street's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 In an interview in 2012, a representative of Z-Street told me that Z-Street was not going to be able to 
obtain its 501c3 status. However, since the IRS controversy broke in May 2013, Z-Street’s lawsuit against 
the IRS seemed coincidently to be on course again as Z-Street received notice of a July court date for that 
lawsuit.  
 
81 I am aware that it is not common to offer new data or quotes in a concluding chapter. I have included 
new material here, however, as the IRS controversy has been much in the news as of late.  
	  229 
	  
application was being delayed, and could be denied, because of a special IRS 
policy regarding organizations connected with Israel. The spokesperson further 
stated that the applications of many such Israel-related organizations had been 
assigned to ‘a special unit in the D.C. office to determine whether the 
organization's activities contradict the Administration's public policies.’ 
 
With the IRS controversy breaking out as I was writing this dissertation, and with 
the Attorney General’s report, there is evidence that the IRS has inappropriately targeted 
conservative groups in addition to progressive type organizations.  Groups with “Tea 
Party” in their titles are just the sort of entities through which the PCJc is active because 
the conservative groups and the latter are ideologically similar. 
Moreover, I presented evidence that suggests actual targeting by the IRS of pro-
Israel groups that support Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria. According to Z 
Street founder and President Lori Lowenthal Marcus, because of Z-Street’s troubles with 
the IRS, Z Street has been “in legal limbo.” Without being able to accept donations “it 
shut us down,” Marcus told a Washington Jewish Week writer (Pollak 2013). The 
Attorney General similarly noted that where the IRS delayed the issuance of letters to 
organizations approving their tax-exempt status, for “I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations, 
this means that potential donors and grantors could be reluctant to provide donations or 
grants” (Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 2013, 12). Thus, the 
formation of a Christian Jewish coalition may be impeded by IRS-imposed barriers on 
account of support for a policy the U.S. government opposes. The difficulty in obtaining 
nonprofit status would then lead to financial shortages because of lack of donor support 
and ultimately to the group not being formed. 
 Second, when a major media outlet, such as the New York Times, supports 
investigations of U.S. tax supported charities supporting Jewish communities in Judea 
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and Samaria, this may help the IRS in targeting of these charities. I did interview one 
representative of a pro Jewish Judea and Samaria group who told me that the 2010 New 
York Times article did cause the IRS to investigate her group. The proximity of the 
appearance of the New York Times 2010 article listing about fifteen pro-Israel groups and 
the reported targeting of pro-Israel groups is at least circumstantial evidence suggesting 
the role of the media in encouraging IRS targeting. Research on the factors leading to IRS 
targeting is understudied, and needed.  
Third, AIPAC supports the U.S. two-state solution policy. It seems to work with 
PACs, legislative members, and candidates to see the continuance of the two-state 
solution in U.S. foreign policy82; the legality of this operation has been challenged but not 
significantly undermined. Because AIPAC is on the side of continuing the status quo in 
support of an Arab state in Judea and Samaria, a Christian Jewish coalition faces a 
significant challenge in decisive venues in Washington, D.C. for policy in support of a 
Jewish Judea and Samaria.  
Fourth, not only the predominantly Jewish AIPAC but Christians United for Israel 
(CUFI) challenges the ability of a Christian Jewish coalition to organize for the support 
of a Jewish Judea and Samaria.  Having a reputation as the largest pro-Israel organization 
in America with an active Christian constituency, CUFI can use its Christian Zionist 
image to steer its one million members to support the U.S. government’s policy to 
continue the Oslo agreements, thereby taking support from the potential coalition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 These statements were stated by two anonymous sources; there is already evidence from Paul and Paul 
(2008) that elected officials see AIPAC has having significant control over their reelection prospects (see 
Chapter Six).  
	  231 
	  
Fifth, to a certain extent another obstacle is presented by Orthodox Judaism, 
which creates fences around observant Jews to keep them away from Christians. Dietary 
laws and extra religious holidays, during which Jews are forbidden to travel outside their 
neighborhoods, and other rules are part of these fences. Observance of these rules keeps 
Jews who support a Jewish Judea and Samaria away from Christians and hence away 
from the potential coalition. Thus, Jews who value the Hebrew Scriptures more than the 
Talmud (Rabbinic writings) for defining Jewish identity might be more likely to be part 
of the potential coalition. These Jews are mostly not of the Orthodox branch (as the 
median denomination of PCJc members is Conservative) but are more typically of the 
Conservative, Reform or “non-observant” type, but neither are they secular persons who 
neither study the Hebrew Scriptures nor consciously adhere to their principles. Thus, the 
problem Orthodox Judaism poses to an organized Christian Jewish coalition is that the 
rabbinic rules discourage those Orthodox Jews who otherwise support a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria from being part of an active Christian and Jewish organized interest group. 
Indeed, three Jewish (non-Christian) members of the PCJc stated that they prefer Tanakh 
over Talmud in defining a Jew, compared to only two Jews that preferred Talmud over 
the Tanakh for defining a Jews. On the other hand, post-election interviews with six 
respondents show that among those who either prefer the Talmud or the Tanakh for 
defining a Jew, all of these Jews seem about equally comfortable working with 
Christians. Thus, the attachment to a Jewish Judea and Samaria seems to overcome 
religious barriers. Also, as the Middle East becomes increasingly destabilized by Arab 
uprisings that bring the Muslim Brotherhood into positions of power (or that more 
recently challenge the Muslim Brotherhood), Israel apparently becomes more vulnerable 
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in the eyes of the PCJc, and these events may reduce the practical impact of religious 
barriers.  
Sixth, the Christians in the PCJc also tend to believe in the pre-tribulation rapture 
doctrine, a belief that would tend to separate Christians from Jews perhaps because 
Christians who believe in pre-tribulation doctrine believe that they will escape the Great 
Tribulation whereas the non-believing, including the typical Jew, will be left to suffer. 
Belief in this doctrine cannot further warm relations between Christians and Jews; those 
who tend to believe they will have the merit to survive the Great Tribulation will be 
better companions to Jews, who likewise will also have to survive this tribulation. Thus, 
pre-tribulation doctrine is another barrier to an active organized Christian Jewish interest 
in favor of a Jewish Judea and Samaria.  
The seventh reason why the PCJc is not organized is that the present structure of 
the United States government is highly centralized in its power in Washington D.C. in the 
Executive Branch and some powerful bureaucracies. Notwithstanding gridlock between 
the political parties in both Houses of Congress, the elected officials are fairly unified in 
allowing the many arms of the federal government – e.g., the Federal Reserve, the IRS, 
the EPA, and the Department of Justice – to limit constitutional freedoms of U.S. 
citizens. Ever since the War between the States (the Civil War), the United States federal 
government has increased in power at the expense of the states, which is seen in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (Section 1) which states in part that “No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
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protection of the laws.” Arguably, the Amendment weakens the Tenth Amendment, 
which states that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,” 
because it gives to the federal government powers over the states that were not originally 
intended by a strict reading of the original Constitution and the Amendments. Through 
the War Between the States, the northern industrial states won. Whatever the primary 
causes of the War Between the States, northern interests predominated in the post-war 
period and the non-industrial southern interests had the lesser influence, including on 
states’ rights.  
Once into the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson brought about the Federal 
Reserve and the income tax. The Federal Reserve is an unelected organization that has 
much autonomy even from the federal executive branch. Since the Woodrow Wilson 
Administration, the two World Wars, the Great Depression, and four terms of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, the size of the federal government has grown in personnel, agencies 
and Congress has given it increasing regulatory power.   
The State Department, while occupied with some presidentially appointed figures 
such as the Secretary of State, is also filled with career staff. The dissertation has not 
covered these bureaucracies in detail. Suffice it to say that the present federal government 
has amassed power over local state, county or city government in many ways, including 
through abortion rights, environmental law, hate speech codes, and other such regulations 
in areas that were once under the states’ jurisdictions. The present Federal Government, 
in other words, has grown in power to regulate cultural and moral issues. Its role as 
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“moralizer” has come to include policy (“land for peace”) that opposes a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria. 
The Supreme Court, starting with cases such as Roe vs. Wade, has created a 
“Constitutional right to privacy,” and the Court has issued opinions that call state laws 
that forbid or limit abortion unconstitutional. In effect, it would appear that the Court is 
legislating from the bench, which should be unconstitutional since legislatures are the 
appropriate branches to create legislation. Another example of the increased power of the 
federal government is seen in the U.S. civil rights code from the 1960s, which allows the 
federal government to enforce employment rules on businesses telling them that they may 
not “discriminate” against a particular race, religion, or age category of people. The civil 
rights code reduces the states’ authority to control business and determine business 
ethics. The federal government intervening in moral and ethical issues has made it a 
moralizer and has reduced state capacities to do so. 
The federal government, including the executive and legislative branches, has 
become an active judge in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. It supports a two-state 
solution with an Arab state in Judea and Samaria, which cannot be called a policy in the 
strategic interest of Israel or the United States in the context of current events in the 
Middle East:  Gaza’s rockets into Israel, the Syrian brutal civil war, the Iranian repression 
of the 2007 Green Revolution, the Iranian export of terrorism to Hamas and Hezbollah 
and other terrorist groups, the Al-Qaida slaughter of the United States Ambassador to 
Libya J. Christopher Stevens, and other such upheavals. The United States’ continued 
policy in favor of an Arab state in Judea and Samaria – not necessarily negotiated 
according to the Obama Administration, which calls for a return to the 1967 borders 
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whether or not the parties agree on land swaps – is an ideological or moral policy, a 
morality formed on the basis of what constitutes a peace process (e.g., the Oslo Accords), 
not established on the basis of the biblical principle that the land of Israel belongs to the 
Jewish people.   
 It is apparent that a position that is contrary to the ideologies of the United States 
federal government is an enemy to that government. For example, President Obama 
recently said in his address to the United Nations that 
Among Israelis and Palestinians, the future must not belong to those who turn 
their backs on a prospect of peace. Let us leave behind those who thrive on 
conflict, those who reject the right of Israel to exist. The road is hard, but the 
destination is clear -- a secure, Jewish state of Israel and an independent, 
prosperous Palestine. Understanding that such a peace must come through a just 
agreement between the parties, America will walk alongside all who are prepared 
to make that journey. (New York Times 2012) 
 
The message states that the future does not belong to Israelis and Palestinians 
(Arabs) who oppose Israeli land concessions, and implicit in his statement, a corollary of 
it, is that the future does not belong to any interest group that supports Israelis and Arabs 
who oppose Israeli land concessions.  
 Who would wish to fund any organized interest that takes a position against the 
ideological or moral position of the United States government that once defeated the 
southern states and that still is the most powerful military state in the world? Thus, the 
Christian Jewish coalition that supports a Jewish Judea and Samaria survives as an 
unorganized interest. It acts surreptitiously among individuals working for other related 
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interests such as patriotism, limited government, and anti-terrorism. It also works secretly 
behind the scenes through other political events.83 
In short, according to the seventh reason, the PCJc faces difficulties organizing as 
a formal interest because it opposes the position of a centralized powerful United States 
government.84 
Lessons of this Dissertation  
What are the profiles of the individuals who constitute this coalition? There is no 
leadership of the PCJc, but this research has identified two leaders, CES and CDN, of the 
two subgroups (six individuals in all), respectively, ES and MS, within the Potential 
Christian Jewish coalition. The rest of the 22 members are rank and file. Ninety-four 
percent of the PCJc in this case study are Christian Zionists, which means that they take 
the Hebrew Scriptures and New Testament seriously and are politically conservative. The 
median religious denomination of Jews is Conservative. The religious leniency of this 
denomination helps to unify Jews with Christians, because it is not bound by the rules 
and regulations of Orthodox Judaism.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The secret political activism is confidential to protect an informant.  
 
84 Further research could be conducted on how power operates in Washington D.C. looking at issues such 
as 9-11 theories – for example, the U.S. government’s theory (an Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden, directed 
the attacks) or that of architects, scientists and engineers should be considered for a more extensive 
consideration of the operation of power of the U.S. federal government and the implications for U.S. policy 
on a Jewish Judea and Samaria (Architects and Engineers 2012). Another important issue is the growing 
evidence of U.S. government secrecy – the NSA has been secretly spying on Americans, through phone 
records, revealed thanks to disclosure by whistleblower Edward Snowden. On the topic of government 
secrecy, however, a more crucial issue is the question of the legitimacy of the present U.S. government as a 
consequence of the still unrevealed original records of President Obama’s U.S. citizenship. That the still 
scientifically unresolved and disputed events leading to 9-11 and the validity of Obama’s birth, 
identification, and academic records are not considered seriously in mainstream academic discourse are 
indications that political “incorrectness” has gotten in the way of a thorough study of the operation of U.S. 
political power. That power has implications for the organization of policies opposing those of powerful 
state actors.  
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Proposition One stated that within the PCJc, Jewish persons who identify 
“Jewish” more with the Talmud than with the Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) will want to 
work less with Christians than Jews who identify “Jewish” more with the Tanakh 
(Hebrew Scriptures). However, I find on the basis of these six responses – two that prefer 
the Talmud to the Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) for defining a Jew and four that prefer the 
Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) – that in fact all seem about equally enthused with 
Christians implying that working together would not likely be considered burdensome. It 
seems that their common view in favor of a Jewish Judea and Samaria overcomes 
differences more than I had anticipated. 
Proposition Two findings show that of the five (out of 18) Christians who believe 
in post-tribulation eschatology, there were two Christians who are also Jewish who were 
able to participate in this interview question. These two Christian Jews both believe that 
their post-tribulation rapture belief blesses all components – American politics, 
relationship to Jews, and Israel. One Christian also believes that her post-tribulation 
belief blesses all components of the question. One Christian did not know. Only CCO, 
one out of five post-tribulation believers suggested a coming tribulation punishment for 
mankind. However, CHR and CRT, two of the six persons who believe in a pre-
tribulation rapture believe that there will be punishment for the unfortunate. Thus, this 
case study suggests that it is possible that a post-tribulation belief leads to a more liberal 
view of punishment vis-à-vis the tribulation, while a pre-tribulation belief leads to a 
harsher view of punishment vis-à-vis the tribulation. Also, this case study suggests that it 
is possible that Christian Jews tend to believe in post-tribulation rapture.  
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 Some findings that also help to unify the group are: All Jews are comfortable with 
Christian donations to Jewish organizations; nine-tenths of the Jews do not believe that 
all Christians secretly seek to convert them; only one Jew is against Jews entering 
Christian churches.  
 These findings inform theories of religion and American politics in that they 
suggest that citizens of similar religions but with significant religious differences 
nonetheless share enough commonalities and have sufficient tolerance for one another so 
as to possess potential power to act as an interest group to oppose United States foreign 
policy. 
What are the policy positions that have held this coalition together over time, and what 
issues have divided it? The PCJc maintains that they: 1) would give up (or give to a 
sovereign entity) zero percent of Judea and Samaria for peace; 2) do not think the U.S. 
should continue supporting the Oslo Agreements; 3) do not believe the U.S. should 
continue funding the PA; and 4) do not believe that there should be a sovereign Arab 
state in Judea and Samaria. 
 I evaluated the positions of two leaders within the PCJc and their respective rank 
and file, two persons to each one leader. The ES group supports a Jewish Judea and 
Samaria because they believe that God gave that land to the Jews. Their four policy 
positions follow from that premise, so essentially, their political positions result from 
their religious beliefs.  
  The MS group, perhaps because it is entirely composed of men, lists security 
concerns as an additional reason to support Jewish settlement of Judea and Samaria. One 
member values the technology and social life of Judea and Samaria.  
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My research shows that CES and CDN have maintained activism more than any 
of the other 26 members of the PCJc in this case study. Interestingly, they would make 
moderately strong leaders of an organized Christian Jewish coalition at least for the 
reason that CDN does not hold, and CES is undecided on, the pre-tribulation doctrine 
which sees Christians as escaping the Great Tribulation while their fellow Jewish friends 
remain on earth to suffer.  
I also asked why the PCJc possibly remains “outside” of more formal 
organizations that advocate on Jewish or Israeli issues. An important reason that the PCJc 
is not absorbed is ideological. Due to its conservative nature and most importantly 
because it opposes the two-state solution, it is rejected by larger liberal Jewish 
organizations, such as the AIPAC lobby group, which is one of the three corners of the 
iron triangle or subgovernment that dominates policy making in Washington, D.C.  
 These findings inform theories of American politics and religion, suggesting the 
importance of religion to political policy beliefs. The relevance of this connection is 
especially important to American foreign policy as the Middle East is experiencing the 
throes of political-religious-based violence in Egypt and Syria as of this writing (August 
2013).  
How – with what resources and methods – has this coalition attempted to influence U.S. 
policy on (a) the Middle East generally, and (b) the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular? 
The first subgroup, ES, consists of those who work together as part of a nonprofit 
educational organization. Their resources consist of their connections to a legal nonprofit 
organization and to information-filled talks, as well as their strong inter-personal 
relationships with members of the educational organization to which they belong. On the 
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topic of a Jewish Judea and Samaria, ES’s methodology is education, teaching others 
through conversations, and sensitivity trainings at meetings on how to approach people 
and by implication to the past sufferings of the Jewish people.  
For CES, Christianity and politics are threads of one fabric. She alludes to the 
interdependency of politics and society’s moral values, both of which are mankind’s 
domain, which brings to mind a similar principle and aim for Islamists – to cause a 
melding of its religious laws into the political and legal institutions of all political states. 
Samuel Huntington in his 1996 book, Clash of Civilizations, touched upon the thrust of 
Islam against Western civilization, and the competition and conflict between religions as 
a major political current of modern times. Respondent CES’s vision of Christianity and 
politics, and Islam’s aims for religious-political domination make Huntington’s religious-
political thesis especially relevant. Through participant observations at PCJc and non-
PCJc attended events, I have observed a competition within American politics between, 
on the one hand, the religious-political Islamic interest for dominance in America and in 
Judea and Samaria and, on the other hand, the Judeo-Christian religious-political interest 
for returning America to constitutional principles and for a Jewish Judea and Samaria. 
The MS, the second subgroup, consists of those who work together as part of a 
media organization. They are able to receive funding resources, and with the loss of 
political opportunity following the 2012 presidential election they have wisely adjusted 
and softened their methodology in order to attract and mobilize their public.  
 These findings shed new light on the operation of religion and American politics. 
They suggest the persistence of religious-political interests in finding resources and 
honing their methodologies to stay viable, albeit not organized. Organization is probably 
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a characteristic of interests that have some support in Congress. If an interest has too little 
support in Congress, it will maintain viability only within the work of related interests.  
What appear to have been the successes or failures of this coalition’s advocacy? The two 
subgroups of six individuals who have shown the highest level of activism overall draw 
strength from their biblical beliefs, their ability to engage with Jews, and their love for 
Israel. In evaluating Proposition Three – “The 501c3 status of organizations may affect 
the political efficacy of its leaders, reducing their sense of influence over public policy” –   
I used an open-ended interview question and asked how the 501c3 agreement affected the 
respondent’s behavior during the election. I found that there is the possibility that the 
501c3 agreement does have an effect on their ability to advocate; CDN is safe from its 
effects because he does not receive much funding; Respondent CRE5 is self-admittedly 
affected.  
The subgroups’ success is in their commitment to keep getting the message out to 
support Israel and the United States. They do not quit in the face of government policies 
(e.g., the 2010 Affordable Care Act, the 2013 Supreme Court decision overturning 
DOMA) antithetical to their concept of a Judeo-Christian America. Members of the PCJc 
are successful because they persist in their support for a Jewish Judea and Samaria and 
are able to meet through other organizations around Judeo-Christian interests.  
Among the organizations active on the U.S.-Israel relationship, AIPAC dominates 
the Washington, D.C. policy space. The American Public Affairs Committee, a mostly 
Jewish organization, does not appear to share the PCJc’s Christian or Jewish religiously-
inspired reasons for supporting Israel. The lobby organization does not seem to interpret 
international law as giving the Jewish people sovereign claim to the land of Israel. As for 
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AIPAC’s operations, my participant observation suggests that AIPAC leaders 
intentionally exclude those who oppose an Arab state in Judea and Samaria from their 
internal policy discussions. The structure of AIPAC permits only members who make 
substantial financial contributions to gain access to policy-makers. I observed exclusion 
many times at a particular synagogue, one of AIPAC’s two main religious sites of 
membership mobilization, and at an academic conference where I was told that AIPAC 
does not like to be written about and where it was implied that I would suffer 
consequences if I wrote about the lobby group. Notwithstanding these observations, 
academic research on the Israel Lobby would be seriously enriched by respectful and 
fruitful inquiries into the private workings of AIPAC and other established interest 
groups, such as ZOA, AFSI, and CIPAC, the latter three of which are more transparent 
than AIPAC,85 which refuses as a matter of policy to be interviewed. Another powerful 
interest group is CUFI, a mostly Christian organization that offered “no comment” to my 
interview questions, and attracts Christians away from the Potential Christian Jewish 
coalition.  
Another impediment is the federal government’s use of the IRS to inhibit 
organization of the potential coalition. Also, the New York Times, and possibly other 
powerful and respected media outlets, can suggest investigations of organizations that 
favor Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria, probes that weaken the viability of those 
in favor of a Jewish Judea and Samaria.  
 A representative of CIPAC, the Christian pro-Israel lobby in Washington D.C., 
once related to me his vision of support for a two-state solution. He described this support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 I have been interviewing representatives of ZOA and CIPAC since early 2010. I have interviewed a 
representative of AFSI multiple times.  
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as persistent. When asked what organization is most resistant to CIPAC’s lobbying 
against the Oslo Agreement, he included AIPAC in his response. When asked, what 
evidence he has of the resistance to those against Oslo, he described the resistance as 
“subterranean mushrooms under [a] whole forest… [an…area that is] vast” and 
immovable.  “Most people stick” with the two-state solution, so as “not to be right-wing 
fanatics.” One does not want to be “on the fringe.” In Washington D.C., one does not 
hear promotion of an Arab state in Judea and Samaria; the idea, however, needs no 
promotion because it is the default policy and “the politically correct way to be.” As 
Sarah Palin said, the two-state solution is the only solution.  
The CIPAC representative’s depiction of what policies gain access to the 
important corridors of policy-making reminds one of Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) 
development of Schattschneider’s ([1960] 1975) mobilization of bias theory or how 
interests are denied expression. Individuals or groups maintain values, myths, political 
procedures, and rules of the game to keep out other political actors and to limit debates to 
“safe” issues. The bias is towards the two-state solution, the almost unchallenged “myth” 
that the Arabs have a legitimate claim to the land of Israel, and the political procedures 
and rules of the game that inhibit the PCJc are all  implemented by the executive branch, 
Congress, and powerful interest groups, suggesting a subgovernment.    
 These findings depict an unorganized religious-political interest that finds 
organizations through which its members can stay in contact with one another. When an 
unorganized interest opposes U.S. policy, its success is measured by its ability to remain 
viable – to preserve the core set of beliefs or principles that define it – rather than by the 
extent of its influence over American policy. Of course, future studies are needed to track 
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the evolution of potential interests, to see if they do indeed maintain viability and to 
observe if, when, and most interestingly how they become organized.  
What does this case reveal about interest group politics and social movements more 
broadly in the United States? The case offers several observations about interest group 
politics in the United States. First, a multitude of powerful interests can prevent 
unorganized interests from entering the policy space. Second, individuals who hold an 
interest neither represented by politicians nor organizations and who want to be 
politically active on it must organize around related interests. Third, the PCJc is more like 
a potential interest group than a social movement because it does not seek to collectively 
challenge elites, opponents, and authorities, but rather to pressure them to support Israel’s 
historical claim to the land of Israel.   
The PCJc, however, shares certain characteristics of social movements: It will 
accept a collective identity as an intermediary step towards policy success, and it accepts 
disruptive or contained behavior, such as, respectively, protests or lobbying. Therefore, in 
the sense that the PCJc bears some resemblance to a social movement, it is worthwhile to 
note that one important component of the social movement framework is political 
opportunity. To repeat a definition from Chapter One, political opportunity is what 
groups need to gain access to political institutions to try to affect politics or policy. The 
2012 presidential election season provided the PCJc the opportunity to gain access to 
political institutions to affect politics or policy. Given that their preferred candidates 
generally lost, they face a diminished opportunity to promote support for a Jewish Judea 
and Samaria. While the PCJc lost its opportunity to enter mainstream politics through the 
Congress, the Senate, or the U.S. presidency, it remains viable through membership that 
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persists in educating and mediating ideas for a more conservative, constitutional 
America.  
 These findings  suggest the relevance of continued study of unorganized interests 
and their contributions to American society. The results cause reflection upon the 
foundational questions of interest group politics in America. Is the United States political 
system pluralistic? Who has access to the formation of U.S. policy? The U.S. 
Constitution constrains the powers of the federal government, but if the Constitution is in 
fact not observed, then Madison’s argument86 that the structure of a United States would 
protect a diversity of interests against a few powerful factions is nullified. The 
dissertation, thus, homes in on the very essence of what constitutes interest group politics 
in the United States.  
The PCJc’s related collectivities, organized interest groups for a constitution-
abiding United States, argue that the United States suffers economically and socially 
because the federal government has strayed from its obligation to abide by the 
Constitution. It is doubtful, however, that pro-America interest groups have or will obtain 
significant influence to change the course of recent administrations to allow increasing 
indebtedness of the United States to debt holders – foreign or domestic.  
In summary, if Madison was wrong that a diversity of interests would prevent a 
monopoly of a few factions from undue influence over American politics because, as 
Machiavelli expressed in The Prince, the ends justifies the means, or the preservation of 
the state justifies whatever immoral acts are necessary for that end, then power ultimately 
will centralize in the hands of a few. In that case, the ability of less powerful unorganized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 (Madison [1787] 1982, 42-49).  
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interests to improve society through their resources and methods is of interest to the study 
of American politics and social movements and to the study of the influence of the less 
powerful, not only in the case of a Jewish Judea and Samaria, but in all other issue areas 
or policy domains.  
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APPENDIX 
Interview Questions 
 
Profiles 
 Identity 
What is your last name? 
  What is your first name? 
  What is your religion? 
  What is your denomination? 
  What is your age? 
 Jewish Religious Orthodoxy [to Jews] 
Do you view the Torah as recorded law? 
Do you believe in a set of orally passed laws and traditions called the 
Halacha? 
Do you believe in the eventual coming of the mashiach?87 
Do you see both written and oral laws as universally present and 
applicable? 
Do you strictly keep the Sabbath (choosing not to work from sunset Friday 
to sunset Saturday)? 
Do you wear a yarmulka?88 
Do you put on tefillin?89 
Do you hold strict conventions on gender (men and women are segregated 
in the synagogue, and women cannot become ordained rabbis)? 
Christian Religious Orthodoxy [to Christians] 
 Do you believe in the Virgin Birth? 
 Do you believe in the literal existence of the Devil? 
 Do you believe in Jesus as the only way to salvation? 
 Are you opposed to gay becoming clergy? 
 Do you believe that Adam and Eve are historical persons? 
Do you reject evolution as an explanation for how the universe/world 
came into being? 
Do you believe in the inerrancy of Scripture? 
Christian Eschatology: Dispensationalism [to Christians] 
Do you believe that there will be a 1000 year period of peace and 
righteousness called the millennium on earth? 
Do you believe in a tribulation? 
Do you believe in rapture? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Hebrew word for Messiah. 
 
88 Yiddish word for a round head cap that Jewish religious men wear on the top of their heads. 
 
89 Hebrew word for two small black boxes, “containing scrolls of parchment upon which are written four 
Biblical passages,” which are: Exodus 13:1-10; Exodus 13:11-16; Deut. 6:4-9; and Deut. 11:13-21.  Tefillin 
are worn by Jewish religious men during morning prayers; the individual straps one to his head, the other to 
one of his arms.  (Donin 1991, 144-152).  
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Do you believe in the Second Coming of Jesus Christ? 
Please put those [four preceding] events…you think will happen in 
chronological order  - in [the] order in which you think they will happen. 
Christian Zionism [to Christians] 
Do you strongly agree, agree, do not know, disagree or strongly disagree 
with the following statement?: “Modern-day Israel is a special nation 
blessed by God.” 
Potential Barriers to a Christian Jewish Alliance 
 Jews [to Jews] 
Which book best defines a Jew, the Tanakh (Hebrew Scriptures) or 
the Talmud? 
When they disagree, which is more authoritative? 
Given the choice between two presidential candidates, one a 
Muslim and the other an Evangelical Christian, for whom would 
you vote? 
How do you feel about Christian donations to Jewish 
organizations? 
Do all Christians secretly seek to convert Jews? 
How do you feel about Jews entering Christian Churches? 
Why or why not is it okay? 
If a Jew becomes a Christian, does he or she cease to be a Jew?  
Is Jesus an historical person? 
How did Jesus die? 
Who killed Jesus? 
Christians [to Christians] 
Can Christians support Israel without trying to convert Jews? 
Does a Jewish identity have value? 
If yes, what value? 
Is it important for Jews who believe in Jesus to maintain Jewish 
heritage? 
For those Jews who believe in Jesus, is intermarriage a problem? 
Which of the following are important religious symbols to you? 
A Christmas tree 
An Easter bunnies 
Easter eggs 
A Passover Seder meal 
A Succah90 
 
Policy  
Jewish Judea and Samaria 
Do you favor a Jewish Judea and Samaria? 
Why or why not? 
What does Jewish Judea and Samaria mean to you? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 A temporary booth built during the Feast of Tabernacles.  
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What percent of Judea and Samaria would you give up (or give to a 
sovereign entity) for peace? 
Should US continue supporting the Oslo Agreements? 
Should US continue funding PA? 
Should there be a sovereign Arab state in Judea and Samaria? 
Should Jews be allowed to live anywhere in Judea and Samaria? 
 
Resources and Methods 
Are you political active? 
If yes, in what way, list types of activities? 
What have you done to support a Jewish Judea and Samaria? 
What have been the effects of your action? 
If Jewish, how many activities include Christians? 
How many Christians? 
If Christian, how many activities include Jews? 
How many Jews? 
American Politics 
Should Jonathan Pollard be set free now? 
Barack Obama is a ______ friend of Israel (one – five, where one is best; 
five is worst). 
 
Successes or Failures 
Post-Election Questions 
Tannakh and Torah [to Jews] 
Please explain briefly why the Tanakh better defines a Jew than does the 
Talmud or why the Talmud better defines a Jew than does the Tanakh?  
How has your preference for the Tanakh/Talmud over the Talmud/Tanakh 
affected your relationship to Christians? 
Rapture [to Christians] 
How does your belief in a [pre-tribulation or post-tribulation] rapture 
affect your relationship to American politics, Jews and Israel? 
IRS 
Did the 501c3 agreement affect your behavior during the election? 
Success or Failure 
What were your goals for the 2012 election?  
How successful were you in achieving these goals?  
What would you do differently next time?  
Please use the words “success” or “failure” to describe your effectiveness 
during the 2012 election? 
On November 5, which presidential candidate did you think would win 
and by how much?  
Because you are a leader of a 501c3, do you feel restricted in your ability 
to discuss the vote you as an individual cast? 
If no, or if not a 501c3 leader then ask: 
Did you vote? 
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If you do not mind, please indicate for whom did 
you vote? 
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